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ABSTRACT
THE STATUS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE
February 1987
Margaret M. Nash, B.A., Ithaca College
M.Ed., Boston College, M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Robert Ackermann
I examine previous philosophical studies of the
scientific status of psychoanalytic theory and argue that
these analyses have assessed psychoanalytic theory against
the wrong epistemological model. I take as my point of
departure Adolf Griinbaum's recent book, The Foundations of
Psychoanalysis
. Grunbaum criticizes the scientific status of
psychoanalysis as discussed by Karl Popper and the
hermeneuticis ts
,
Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas, and stakes
out his own methodological position. Like Griinbaum, I take
issue with the position of Popper and the hermeneuticists
,
but my position is not coincident with Griinbaum's. The
debate over the scientific status of psychoanalytic theory
centers on the fact that Freud, himself, described
psychoanalysis as a natural science. I argue that the
preceding debate has failed to locate Freud's notion of
natural science, because it has assumed philosophical,
methodological paradigms of the natural sciences that give
the methodology of physics central status. I propose that
Freud originally assumed that medicine was the natural
v
science that provided the epistemological and methodological
background for his work and that the scientific status and
epistemology of medicine needs to be brought explicitly into
the discussion of the scientific status of psychoanalysis.
Although I maintain that medicine is the appropriate
epistemological model against which the scientific character
of psychoanalysis ought to be assessed, I recognize that
psychoanalysis involves an extension of medical thinking into
new domains, forcing breaks with many features of an
originating medical model.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It has proved difficult to examine dispassionately the
question of whether psychoanalysis is a science.
Intuitively, psychoanalysis seems to share features with
science, particularly biology and medicine, in its effort to
explain and alter human behavior, and to share features with
the humanities, in its effort to explain the meaning of many
human utterances and behaviors. To this point, philosophers
who have considered psychoanalysis have brought to it
conceptions of science derived from other domains of human
knowledge, and have used these to interpret psychoanalysis.
In all of these cases, the final judgement on psychoanalysis
was implicit in the original assumptions. My dissertation
will attempt to view this problem in a more flexible manner,
realizing from the start that our notions of science and our
reading of Freud's texts may have to change to accommodate
special features of psychoanalytic theory.
The occasion which triggers this dissertation is Adolf
Griinbaum' s The Foundations of Psychoanalys is
.
Griinbaum
surveys previous studies of the scientific status of
psychoanalytic theory in an authoritative manner that
establishes the framework for my own discussion. On the one
hand, Griinbaum considers the scientistic position,
represented by Karl Popper, a position that brings strong
criteria from the physical sciences to bear on
1
2psychoanalysis, emphasizes the differences between physics
and psychoanalysis, and concludes that psychoanalysis is not
a science. On the other hand, Grunbaum considers the
h e rmeneu t i c is t position, represented by Paul Ricoeur and
Jurgen Habermas, a position that brings an array of
articulated notions of science much broader than the
monological conception of the scientistic group to bear on
psychoanalysis, and concludes that psychoanalysis is a
science, but not a natural science, as Freud seems to have
thought. The hermeneut icist position must reread Freud's
texts, arguing that Freud failed to understand his own
project. Grunbaum attempts to locate himself between these
two positions, defending the notion that psychoanalysis is a
science against the scientistic position, and defending the
notion that it is a form of natural science, against what he
sees as the loose extensions of the concept of science
utilized by the hermeneut ic is ts . Like Grunbaum, I wish to
take issue with both the scientistic position and the
hermeneutic position, but my position will not be coincident
with Grunbaum's.
My criticisms of Grunbaum are several. To begin with,
although he attacks Popper, he brings to psychoanalysis a
notion of natural science derived principally from physics,
so that his attribution of scientific status to
psychoanalysis is partial and guarded. It is barely a
refutation of Popper. Although Grunbaum attacks the
3hermeneuticists
,
he does so on the basis of a naive reading
of Freud's own assertions concerning the scientific status of
psychoanalysis, using these readings simply to contradict the
hermeneuticists. Further, the presuppositions that Grunbaum
brings to bear on the question of the scientific status of
psychoanalysis are problematic. His focus on the logical
foundations of psychoanalytic claims and their deductive
structure privileges Freud's etiological hypotheses.
Grunbaum thus restricts his evaluation of the scientific
credibility of psychoanalysis to an attack on the
epistemological and methodological problems inherent in
Freud's clinical evidence and verification procedure within
the clinical setting. Grunbaum fails to consider the tension
between the clinical practice and psychoanalytic theory
precisely because he overemphasizes the link between
therapeutic efficacy and the establishment of Freud's causal
claims. While the foundations of Freud's theory derive from
his clinical practice and while Freud used therapeutic gains
and insights to corroborate his empirical hypotheses, he also
recognized that, due to the contradictory and antagonistic
character of social and individual reality, therapeutic
success alone could not validate nor invalidate his general
theory. The standards that Grunbaum invokes for establishing
causality are so rigid that even medicine, a discipline which
exhibits a similar tension between theory and practice, but
is clearly scientific in its theorizing, is scientifically
4suspect
.
In my view, the scientific status of medicine,
indeterminate and hardly brought into focus in past
philosophical discussion, must be clearly recognized and
brought into the dialogue between methodologists. If
medicine is scientific in spite of its therapeutic
uncertainties and theoretical problems, and I believe that it
is, then an epistemology adequate to the scientific status of
medicine can appropriately be brought to bear on the more
delicate questions of the scientific status of
psychoanalysis. When this is done, a more robust defense of
the scientific status of psychoanalysis than that provided by
Griinbaum becomes a possibility.
My focus on the need to conceptualize an epistemology of
medicine rests on the view that medicine is the appropriate
model against which psychoanalysis should be evaluated.
Medicine is a developing science on the border between a
theoretical science and a practical art, and, like
psychoanalysis, it does not fall neatly into the usual
natural/human science dichotomies. In medicine, we have
science and practice. Medical science relies on numerous
scientific disciplines (chemistry, biology, anatomy, physics,
etc.), using these to explain and to theorize about the
causative factors of diseases, while medical practice studies
and treats diseases in the living patient and makes
therapeutic success its appropriate short-term goal. The
5clinical data of medicine derive from practice, but since in
practice a disease is studied in a particular patient and the
whole patient is involved in the treatment, therapeutic gains
are difficult to pin down to specific causative factors.
Therapeutic success and theoretical adequacy are not as
easily linked as theory and experiment in the natural
sciences
.
I will argue that a similar situation holds in
psychoanalysis. Initially, psychoanalysis developed as a
method of medical treatment. Freud's early clinical work
brought him in contact with patients who exhibited dramatic
symptoms, for which no known physical or other pathological
cause could be found. Scientific medicine, which had
hitherto attended to the physical causes of disorders and
explained mental events in terms of physical ones, was unable
to account for or to treat these cases. Freud extended
medical practice and science by developing a treatment method
and theory which focused on mental processes and causes, in
effect recognizing and treating a new class of illnesses.
Freud's metapsychology, which uses the language of physics
and biology, stands to clinical practice as medical science
stands to medical practice, and this is the scientific model
that Freud would have used naturally, without lengthy, overt
methodological examination.
In psychoanalysis, as in medicine, theory and practice
are decoupled. But in psychoanalysis, the link between
6theory and clinical data is even looser than is the case with
medicine because medicine has developed instruments which
give rise to precise data and precise tests, data which
constantly expand the data text of medical science.
Instruments, by breaking the hold of theory on data, allow
theories to adapt to the new data. Freud's only instrument
in addition to standard medical practice was a study of
language, the statements made by patients, which is not to
say that the link between clinical data and theory is merely
subjective, but it is to say that, due to this interpretative
component, it is somewhat relaxed in its logical structure by
comparison to medicine.
While I will argue that psychoanalysis is a developing
science and that the medical model is the appropriate
standard for assessing its status, I want to make it clear
that this focus is not an argument for the complete
assimilation of Freudian concepts and techniques to that of
medical science. It may be the case that the science which
Freud developed will someday be reduced to a neurological
foundation, but if it were to be grounded at a more
micro-level, we would have a different therapy and a
different science, perhaps a psychoanalytic science whose
scientific credentials would be obvious. Freud attempted
such a reduction early on but was forced by the complexity of
emerging data to offer a more psychological theory. Freud
restricted his domain of investigation to psychical processes
7and psychical phenomena in the face of his onrushing clinical
observations. I suggest evaluating psychoanalysis as a
science in terms of the domain that Freud staked out, and in
terms of his model for science that was at first immanent to
medical practice and theorizing.
The dissertation will have four sections. In the second
chapter, I examine the scientistic position of Karl Popper
and Griinbaum's critique of Popper's position. In the third
chapter, I examine the hermeneu t ic ist position and Griinbaum's
critique of Ricoeur and Habermas. In the fourth chapter, I
attempt to isoiace cue presuppositions of Griinbaum's critique
and subject them to analysis. In the fifth chapter, I
indicate my own construal of the epistemological position
that will permit a vision of natural science to come into
play that is not coerced by the features of physics that so
many philosophers of science have taken as foundational. I
try to develop a conception of natural science that includes
medicine, at least the scientific aspects of medicine, and I
use this construal to subject Griinbaum's position to the
critique that he also brings to his evaluation of the
scientific status of psychoanalysis. In this way I show how
Griinbaum's critique of psychoanalysis contains the seeds
which undermine his own position, a position based on a
conception of science that is borrowed from physics and that
cannot accommodate either medicine or psychoanalysis without
revealing strains that are derived from its point of origin.
CHAPTER 2
SCIENTISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
In this chapter I will present Karl Popper's view of
science and his position on the scientific status of
psychoanalysis. My aim in examining Popper's position is
twofold. First, I wish to call into question Popper's view
of science and in particular, I wish to dispute the adequacy
of the epistemological and methodological norms that he
invokes as standards against which a theory is to be
evaluated as scientific. Second, I intend to show that,
despite Popper's narrow conception of science, his principal
charges against psychoanalysis are false and hence they do
not support his exclusion of psychoanalysis from science. In
this regard, I concur with Adolf Grtinbaum's critique of
Popper
.
Popper developed his philosophical theory of science with
the intention of solving the problem of demarcation between
science and pseudo-science. The growing popularity of
psychoanalysis and the ubiquitous confirmations of it were on
Popper's mind in 1919 as he wrestled with the problem of when
a theory should be considered scientific. Popper noticed
that the questionable explanatory power of psychoanalysis was
the core of its weakness, for psychoanalysis claimed to be
able to explain practically everything that happened within
the field to which its theories referred.'*' It was the fact
that human behavior could always be interpreted in terms of
8
9the theory, that the theory was always "confirmed," which led
Popper to reject it as part of his view that the inductivist
method of confirmation was not an adequate criterion for
scientific status. Popper's rejection of inductivism was
specifically a reaction against the enumerative inductivism
associated with the logical positivists which held that any
positive instance of a hypotheses confirmed it. Popper's
skepticism with regard to this method of confirmation was
triggered not by the fact that psychoanalytic theory lacked
verifications, but by the fact that it seemed to be able to
explain whatever happened.
Recognizing that any set of data can be held to support
any number of theories, Popper proposed that for a theory to
meet scientific standards, it must be falsifiable or
testable. A genuine test of a theory is a serious attempt to
falsify or refute it. Such a serious attempt involves
subjecting a theory to empirical tests by deducing
observations whose falsity would refute it. Formulating
predictions or observations which risk falsifying the theory
is central to a genuine test of it.
Popper conceptualizes scientific methodology as a method
of putting forward bold conjectures and then seriously
2
attempting a refutation of them. This method fuels
scientific progress in that it provides a basis for the
elimination of inadequate theories which in turn give rise to
new conjectures, new observations and hence the growth of new
10
theories which better explain the experimental data. The
element of risk is important, for, if a conjecture or
hypothesis is to be capable of being falsified, it must be
"incompatible with certain possible results of
observation ." 3 For Popper, a "good" scientific theory
forbids certain happenings; it excludes possibilities; and
the more a theory forbids, the better it is . ^ That is, the
more restrictive and risky the theory, the more it can be
decisively tested and falsified. Thus, such a theory is
better because it supports scientific progress.
Popper argues that psychoanalytic hypotheses are
irrefutable because they do not set forth what kinds of
behavior would be incompatible with the results of
observation. Psychoanalysis presents a set of explanatory
ideas and hypotheses which are used to explain any behavior
or dream that occurs. Psychoanalytic hypotheses thus take no
risks because they do not predict phenomena, nor do they
specify in advance observations or occurrences which would be
incompatible with the theory; any behavior can be explained
by the theory ret rod icti vely . Because the theory does not
exclude specific behaviors, it undertakes no genuine test of
its hypotheses and is thus immune to falsification. To the
extent that psychoanalysis does make predictions, these are,
according to Popper, too vague to make rigorous testing of it
possible. Hence Popper concludes that the theory is in
principle not falsifiable and thus it has no claim to
11
scientific status.
Popper s second and related charge against psychoanalysis
is that adherents of the theory adopt ad hoc immuniz ing
strategies to rescue the theory from falsification. Rather
than attempting to devise empirical tests which might falsify
the theory, adherents do not take seriously potentially
decisive falsification and instead cling to imprecise,
theoretical constructs which allow them to reconstruct their
interpretations and explanations in light of the new
findings. Because clinicians do not select out clinical
observations that are incompatible with a particular
hypothesis that could serve as a falsifying instance of it,
on Popper's view, they are not doing science.
Popper's claim that psychoanalysis is pseudo-scientific
because it does not meet his criterion of falsif iability is
echoed by other critics who assume that Popper has settled
the issue. Frederick Crews draws on Popper to bolster his
repudiation of Freudian explanations: "My position is Karl
Popper's: a body of theory cannot be called scientific
unless its hypotheses can be exposed to tests for
falsification. By this criterion psychoanalysis, though it
states laws of development and behavior and may be right on
many points, is no science." Reuben Abel dismisses the
scientific status of psychoanalysis because it cannot be
verified by prediction. "Freudianism is clearly no more
falsif iable than fatalism or than divine providence.
12
Freudians do offer some piecemeal empirical verification
. but specific consequences can seldom be deduced and
predicted. Any kind of fact whatever could be interpreted
either as hostility, for example, or as repressed hostility.
(Heads I win, tails you lose .)" 6 Frank Cioffi, in his
attack on B . A . Farrell, who holds that it is logically
possible to refute psychoanalysis, argues that "refutability
principle is not an adequate criterion of the genuinely
empirical character of an enterprise ." 7 Cioffi thus points
to Freud's methodologically defective procedures to show how
Freud's procedures cover up potentially falsifying evidence
in order to avoid refutation. Cioffi hence concurs with
Popper that psychoanalysis is pseudo-scientific.
Similarly, Hans Eysenck draws on the eminence of Karl
Popper's stature as a philosopher of science to impugn the
probative role of experimental data from the clinical setting
as capable of meeting the requirements for testability.
Eysenck even goes so far as to invoke Popper's self-confessed
friendliness toward psychoanalysis in order to gainsay the
view that Popper was simply operating with positivist
O
prejudices. While Eysenck maintains that "we can no more
test Freudian hypotheses 'on the couch' than we can
adjudicate between the rival hypotheses of Newton and
9Einstein by going to sleep under an apple tree," he,
unlike Popper, holds out the possibility that psychoanalysis
is testable, but only in the extra-clinical setting of the
13
laboratory or otherwise controlled contexts.
A number of critics, basing their claim on Popper's
relegation of psychoanalysis to the status of myth, proclaim
the death of the science question. Eysenck states:
"Psychoanalysis as a self-contained system claiming to afford
a scientific view of human nature is dead, even though the
embalmed corpse may still be exhibited to the faithful ." 10
Similarly, the biologist, Peter Medawar, praising medical
achievements that utilize "risky" hypotheses in Popper's
methodological sense, asserts: "The opinion is gaining
ground that doctrinaire psychoanalytic theory is the most
stupendous intellectual confidence trick of the twentieth
century: a terminal product as well—something akin to a
dinosaur or a zeppelin in the history of ideas, a vast
structure of radically unsound design and with no
posterity ." 11 These death knells and animadversions
against the scientific status of psychoanalysis stand out
against its continued prominence as a therapy and theoretical
orientation, not to mention the resurgence of philosophical
interest in its claims to scientific status. Hence if we are
to make sense of Popper's dismissal of psychoanalysis it
behooves us to examine his notion of science in a bit more
detail. The rationale behind Popper's proposals for what
constitutes scientific inquiry is marked by a belief in
science that unwittingly carries forward the positivist
identification of knowledge with science and the concomitant
14
reduction of epistemology to a philosophy of science
understood as a normative, methodological undertaking.
Popper's View of Science
Popper stakes out the boundaries of science to accord
with what he takes to be cases of good science. He draws on
the picture of the great scientists, such as Kepler, Newton
and Einstein, and their activities to serve as his paradigm
for science. Hence his starting point privileges the
physical sciences and their predictive capacity. In the
first place, what distinguishes the great scientists for
Popper is the boldness of their conjectures. Kepler's,
Newton's and Einstein's theories not only proposed new
outlooks, new explanatory hypotheses, which conflicted with
prevailing views, but also risked being proved false in
predicting observable appearances or outcomes. For example,
Newton's theory predicted deviations from Kepler's laws,
predictions which had not previously been observed and
predictions that risked being falsified by empirical evidence
to the contrary.
At first glance, it might seem that Freud's theory ought
to have a place within this scheme, for if nothing else,
Freud's theory certainly clashed boldly with accepted views.
Freud's postulation of unconscious thought processes and his
theory of infantile sexuality were bold conjectures,
explanatory hypotheses that opened up a new domain of inquiry
15
and attempted to provide a means of explaining hitherto
inexplicable phenomena. However, the boldness of a
hypothesis or conjecture is not merely determined by its
radical nature. Boldness in the first sense is for Popper
akin to my thmak ing
,
^ an <3 while it is important to science,
it is also a feature of great metaphysical system building
which is not scientific. For a conjecture to be bold in the
scientific sense it must take the risk of being proved false,
of clashing with the reality it postulates. It is the
boldness of prediction which Popper is emphasizing here as a
feature of empirical science and it is this feature, together
with the readiness to look out for tests and refutations,
which constitutes Popper's proposal for demarcation between
empirical science and pseudo-science. Freud's theory is not
bold in this second sense according to Popper.
Popper contrasts the situation of psychoanalysis with
that of Marxism to highlight the way in which his
methodological rule of accepting falsification, though vague,
is sharp enough to distinguish science from pseudo-science.
Marxism was once a scientific theory in that it predicted
that capitalism would lead to socialism and the conditions
under which this would happen. Marx's predictions were
testable and hence his theory of history was not immune to
falsification to start with. However, once the predictions
were falsified by empirical events, Marxists re-interpreted
the theory and evidence in order to rescue the theory from
16
1
3
refutation. This immunizing strategy broke the
methodological rule of accepting falsification and hence,
according to Popper, Marxism can no longer lay claim to being
sc ient i f ic
.
Popper's discussion of the line demarcating science from
pseudo-science, while it is meant to be subtle, privileges a
notion of scientific prediction based on universal laws. in
basing his proposal for demarcation on the "great"
physicists, he biases his conception of the nature and
methodology of science in line not only with philosophical
tradition but also with the development of science
historically. As George Simpson notes, the physical
sciences, as we now define them, do have primacy, not
logically, but historically. 14 Consequently, our paradigms
of scientific activity have tended to focus on features of
science such as lawlike predictability and hypothesis
testing— features that have allowed for the growth of
scientific knowledge in a realm such as physics where
scientific prediction can be more robust since it is carried
out in a domain where invariant empirical regularities may be
assumed. A domain such as biology or psychology, where the
objects of study are not homogeneous is hence problematic.
That these fields are somewhat suspect in terms of a
Popperian picture of science casts suspicion on the narrow
focus on the physical sciences as the paradigm for scientific
activity
.
17
I will now focus on the narrow boundary that Popper draws
around science in an attempt to highlight the rigidity of
Popperian f als i f iabi 1 ity when it is brought to bear on
disciplines that, though considered by many to be scientific,
do not fit the more mathematical paradigm of physics.
According to Popper, conditional scientific predictions
are the norms in science and these make claims about what
will happen in certain experimental circumstances.
"Unconditional scientific predictions can sometimes be
derived from these conditional scientific predictions,
together with historical statements which assert that the
conditions in question are fulfilled." 15 Now this state of
affairs does not obtain in evolutionary theory according to
Popper, which leads him to regard biological evolutionary
theory as a suspect candidate for scientific status.
Since evolution looks at species, the difficulties in
predicting genetic make-up are enormous given the number of
random mutations and changing environmental pressures.
Scientific prediction is hence not possible except to the
extent that one abstracts from the slow evolutionary changes
and treats the biological system in question as stationary.
Against Popper's charge that the theory of natural selection
is not a testable scientific theory, Gerhard Wassermann has
shown that major population genetic equilibrium theories,
which utilize natural selection to explain adaptation of
organisms to their environment, are falsifiable according to
18
Popper's criterion and that Popper failed to distinguish
between different uses of the term 'natural selection .' 17
In general, however, evolutionary theory is neither
established nor sufficiently tested by prediction in Popper's
sense. It cannot predict the course of evolution. For
Popper, there are no universal laws of evolution, and there
can't be because the evolution of life on earth is a unique,
historical process. Though such a process may be governed by
causal laws, the search for such universal laws could not
proceed within the bounds of scientific method because there
would be no way to test a law that refers to a single
historical process. A single statement of an
evolutionary sequence is not a scientific law because there
is only the actual historical sequence. Here we see that
Popper is concerned about repetition of observations and
testing possibilities.
At this point, I want to call into questions Popper's
dismissal of evolutionary theory's scientific status. There
is something suspicious about the way he rules it out because
it does not fit his characterization of normal, scientific
prediction, a normalcy based on models of more reductive
sciences. After all, unique events occur and as Simpson
points out, "evidence on them is acceptable if there is
confidence that anyone in a position to observe them could
have observed them." This does not get around the lack
of predictive power, but neither prediction nor manipulation
19
of variables is a necessary feature of experimentation.
Rather, in making observations, even if they are not
repeatable / we can put our beliefs at risk. Further, given
the recognition prior to Darwin that evolution has occurred,
Darwin’s explanation gave an account hitherto unavailing to
science. He thoroughly overturned the teleological view of
the universe with his theory of organic evolution based on
natural selection. This was a bold, new, unifying idea that
revolutionized biological theory and provided the foundation
for new fields within biology. Darwin proposed a "theory as
to how natural processes could produce organic
2 0adaptation, and his explanation of adaptation accounted
for observational data that no rival theory could better
account for. The kind of explanations he gave were not
grounded in a metaphysical teleology, but rather showed the
possibility of a natural science explanation.
While the line Popper draws is being called into question
here, it is not being suggested that Popper has a simplistic
notion of falsification To clarify Popper's methodological
fals if icat ionism in distinction from dogmatic
fals if icat ionism, a variant of the positivist verifiability
criterion and a notion often mistakenly attributed to Popper,
it is vital to note that Popper's fals if iabil ity criterion is
not a criterion of meaning; it therefore is not a criterion
grounded in certainty. For Popper, all observations are
theory-laden, so there are no simple observation sentences
20
against which a theory can be tested. Scientific
explanations are deductions from potentially falsifiable
sentences. The f als if iabi 1 ity criterion enables us to find
satisfactory hypotheses to use in scientific
explanations. We then subject these hypotheses and the
deductive predictions to tests by looking for falsifying data
that will prove our predictions to be false. Fals if iabi lity
is a logical notion, while falsification involves actually
deciding that a falsifiable sentence is false. 22 The
decision as to what kinds of data will falsify a hypothesis
is made in advance and cannot depend on logic alone. It is
in this sense that falsification depends on methodological
rules that are determined by context. The context will
depend upon the accepted standards of gathering data in a
given field which is established historically. Thus
methodological rules can be modified over time. These
methodological rules, upon which falsification of a
hypothesis depends, are, according to Popper, necessarily
somewhat vague for they depend on methodological discussion
and decision by scientists as to the circumstances under
which we should regard the hypothesis or theory as falsified.
What makes fals if iabil ity a problematic notion when
brought to bear against biology and medicine is the
difficulty involved in isolating relevant facts that would
falsify a theory or hypothesis. Biology, like medicine, does
not operate in terms of only one level of explanation. For
21
example, biological explanations utilize data and explanatory
principles from the harder physical sciences and integrate
them at a higher or more global level of abstraction, that is
at the level of the living organism. The "how" question is
typical in the physical sciences and this level of
explanation, though it operates in biology, (for example,
How is heredity transmitted?") is the more reductionist
23one. Popper's criterion would be relevant at this lower
level of explanation where data may be more easily isolated
and manipulated. However, in biology, functional questions
such as "What for?" and "How come?", questions that involve a
historical or evolutionary factor, must be added to the
reductionist question if we are to have a fully biological
explanation. To say that the latter are a kind of
teleological question as opposed to a question seeking an
efficient cause need not imply that they are metaphysical
ones. Darwin's achievement was to bring functional questions
into the domain of science by explaining functional
adaptation in terms of natural processes. Biological
explanation is more complicated than explanation in the
physical sciences in that it must move to this broader level
of explanation.
At this point we can see that biology shares a
hierarchical model of explanation with that of medical
science. The clinical diagnosis of diseases is complicated
by the fact that diseases themselves are described
22
and understood using terms from the vocabulary of different
fields, such as physics, chemistry, psychology, etc.
Different levels of explanation in medicine refer to these
different levels of organization: atomic, molecular,
cellular, physiological system, entire patient.
Medicine is concerned with phenomena at all of these
levels. Low-level explanations, explanations that refer to
low-level objects such as electrons, atoms and molecules, are
attractive because the objects are simpler, involve fewer
descriptive predicates and are hence able to be more sharply
defined. As we move up a level of analysis, for example from
the level of sub-atomic particles to that of atoms, we
discover emergent properties, that is, properties of the atom
that are not merely the result of the sum of its parts and
their properties. In other words, we discover properties we
might not have predicted, given the properties of electrons
and protons at the sub-atomic level. Emergent properties
arise at every shift to a higher level but do so more rapidly
as we move to the higher levels. As is obvious, the higher
level objects will be more complex, will be less exactly
described, and will be more difficult to formalize or render
mathematically.
Due to the simplicity of the lower-level explanations,
the tendency in biology and medicine as in the history of
science in general has been to carry out a "downward" or
reductionist analysis in order to detect "upward"
23
causation. in other words, the tendency has been to
descend the hierarchical levels in order to locate causation
at a lower level. The problem with this kind of analysis
(though it has been the more successful) is not only that it
is not always possible (due to the problem of emergent
properties) but also that, at the lower-level attributes of
diseases (for example, physics and chemistry), we capture
only partial aspects of the phenomena. While the
reductionist approach is more prevalent, biology and medicine
utilize the opposite approach as well, carrying out an upward
explanation by detecting downward causation. Psychosomatic
disorders and stress-related diseases are a good illustration
that causation proceeds downward as well as upward.
We need the language of all these various subfields of
medicine in order to find the causal connections that operate
in both directions of the hierarchy. This is particularly
true in light of the fact that patients are often not aware
of low-level abnormalities and symptoms are often described
at higher levels of analysis. The distinction between
low-level and high-level findings more clearly reflects the
status of evidence for diseases than do the terms 'objective'
and 'subjective.' We have a tendency to regard a patient's
report of dizziness as subjective, while we regard as
objective evidence of an abnormality low-level dysfunctions
that we detect through the use of instruments. This tendency
to equate subjectivity with higher level accounts misses
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the mark. It's not the case that high-level accounts are
merely subjective. As Marsden Blois remarks, some diseases,
such as schizophrenia, may have "striking, high-level
abnormalities which cause the patient severe distress and yet
have no known lower-level dysfunctions ." 26
Causality in medicine works in both directions. The
causal connections that medicine seeks are ultimately between
events in the world (e.g., stress on the job) and the
behavior of cells and molecules in our bodies, and the
causality may run up or down the hierarchy
.
26 Causal
claims can be subjected to empirical tests but the hypotheses
will often not be framed in a way that specifies what would
falsify them. Medical diagnosis and research indicate that
scientific explanation which takes as its object multiple
ontological processes is often not amenable to a Popperian
methodology. Another case in point here is what Robert
Ackermann describes as the problem of "currently available
experimentation." "A theory may make a proposal whose
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consequences can't be tested by any known means." Though
a theory may be potentially falsifiable, we may lack the
means to test it. For example, in the case of medical
research which involves experiments on human subjects,
ethical considerations are involved that problematize
testing
.
Popper gives the following example of scientific
prediction in medicine. "If a physician has diagnosed
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scarlet fever then he may, with the help of the conditional
predictions of his science, make the unconditional prediction
that his patient will develop a rash of a certain kind."^
Now this instance of predictability is neat in the abstract
but in fact it ignores the complexity and practice of the
diagnostic process. Making a diagnosis in the first place is
largely a matter of guesswork and it is difficult to frame
fals if iable hypotheses that would prove a diagnosis false.
The failure of a stated outcome would often not be grounds
for rejecting a diagnosis. Two cases in point here are the
existence of asymptomatic diseases and the problem of false
negatives. Also, many diseases, while labeled
diagnostically, are not understood in sufficient detail to
allow for causal explanation, much less prediction.
Diagnosis asks not only "How and why this symptom?" but also
"What is this indicative of?". Diseases have their own
history and develop in response to changing environmental
cond it ions
.
Given that medicine presents problems for a Popperian
methodology, it is important at this point to call attention
to the gap within medicine between theory and practice.
Although clinical medicine draws on the biomedical sciences,
the history of medicine indicates that there is no convincing
evidence that theoretical advances in a scientific field
related to medicine were initially important for the practice
of medicine. This fact lends credence to the view that
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in medicine
,
theory and practice are decoupled, theory
proceeding independently of medical practice. This
discrepancy between theory and practice is not simply due to
the fact that medical practice clings to rigid, dogmatic, or
timeworn methods of treatment. In many respects advances in
the biomedical sciences are not yet translatable into
convincing practical results. As Alvan Feinstein argues,
despite the fact that "anticoagulants, antibiotics,
hypotensive agents, insulin and steroids have been available
for 15—40 years, many of their true effects on patients and
diseases are unknown or equi vocal ." Uncertainty is not
just a feature of medical practice, but it is more prominent
in practice for the simple reason that the subject matter is
the whole, complex, particular patient, whereas in biomedical
research one can to some extent artificially isolate observed
sequences and the conditions under which they occur.
The point of this discussion is to highlight the way in
which Popper's normative restriction of science to bold
conjectures and severe attempts to refute them draws a
boundary around science that excludes much of medical
practice and even some low-level medical research. Popper's
notion of science focuses on whether a theory or law is
suitable for use in a scientific explanation. This notion of
science is more geared toward ideal science rather than
science as it is often practiced.
More recently Popper cautions against a dogmatic
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adherence to the acceptance of refuting criticism, realizing
that scientists do not and often should not give up their
falsified theories too quickly. For abandoning a theory too
quickly in the face of apparent refutation could result in a
failure to discover the possibilities inherent in a theory.
He sums up the methodological form of his criterion of
demarcation as follows:
Propose theories which can be criticized. Think about
possible decisive falsifying experiments— crucial
experiments. But do not give up your theories too
easily not, at any rate., before you have critically
examined your criticism. 1
Despite this softening of his original position, Popper has
not changed his position on the status of psychoanalytic
theory
.
^ ^
Unlike Marxism, which immunized itself by ad hoc devices
after its predictions were falsified, psychoanalysis,
according to Popper, was immune to falsification from the
very beginning; it was simply non-testable and
3 3irrefutable. It undertook no tests of his hypotheses and
furthermore did not even put forth potentially falsifiable
hypotheses. One might argue here that an individual
practicing analyst might be able to empirically test
psychoanalytic explanations by selecting out clinical
observations that are incompatible with a particular
hypothesis that could serve as a falsifying instance of it.
But on Popper's view this strategy would be unavailing since
the clinical observation that could falsify the hypothesis
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must be a matter of public observation. It cannot, for
example, be left up to an individual analyst to decide on the
basis of her feelings about the character of a patient's
resistance whether or not an interpretation is correct or
whether or not a repression has been lifted. What mars
psychoanalytic theory here is the lack of public
f a 1 s i f iab i 1 i ty and public rules of testing.
Griinbaum's Critique of Popper's Pronouncements
Popper's treatment of psychoanalysis is very cursory. He
never draws on any of Freud's case material or clinical
papers. What makes his charge even more remarkable is that,
as Grunbaum notes, "even a causal perusal of the mere titles
of Freud's papers and lectures yields two examples of
f a Is i f iab i 1 i ty . " In light of the fact that Popper
presents no evidence that he is familiar with Freud's
hypotheses and mode of procedure, his casual dismissal of
psychoanalysis bears more comment.
Popper acknowledges that he developed his view of science
in reaction against the attempts of Marx, Freud and Adler
whose theories, once accepted, could find confirming
35instances everywhere. While Popper's intuition about the
looseness of these theories may have merit, his own loose
characterization of psychoanalysis and inductivism betrays
the way in which he is using psychoanalysis as a straw man
both to bolster his demarcation criterion that privileges the
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physical sciences and to rail against inducti vism
. Popper
conflates enumerative and eliminative inductivism under the
term ' inductivism,
' which he sees as warranting the
scientific claims of psychoanalysis. As Grunbaum notes, the
real philosophical target for Popper is inductivism rather
than psychoanalysis. 36 By charging that by inductivist
standards the claims of psychoanalysis are scientific despite
their irrefutability and that his own criterion is more
restrictive, Popper can mount a case for the superiority of
his own methodological criterion.
As previously stated, Popper does not document his
allegations against psychoanalysis by referring to actual
Freudian hypotheses and explanations and he seems unaware of
the fact that Freud ever altered or modified his views in
light of clinical evidence to the contrary. That Freud found
ways of accommodating unexpected data to his theory is a
commonplace but it is equally the case that Freud was aware
that falsifying evidence was a problem to be reckoned with.
A prime case in point here, and one which Grunbaum uses
against Popper's charge that adherents saw confirming
instances everywhere, is Freud's 1915 paper, "A Case of
Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the
37Disease." In this piece Freud acknowledges that his
hypothesis that repressed homosexual love is causally
necessary for affliction by paranoid delusions is not
confirmed in the case of the paranoiac before him. For in
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this particular case no trace of a struggle against
homosexual attachment is evident. Freud asserts: "The
present case emphatically contradicted it (the relation
between paranoia and homosexuality)." 38 Freud then goes on
to say:
In these circumstances the simplest thing would have beento abandon the theory that the delusion of persecutioninvariably depends on homosexuality, and at the same timeto abandon everything that followed from the theory.
Either the theory must be given up or else, in view ofthis departure from our expectations, we must decide withthe lawyer and assume that this was no paranoiac
combination but an actual experience which has been
correctly interpreted
.
y
Here Freud countenances falsifying instances of his
hypothesized paranoia etiology and avows the conditions for
its falsification. It turns out that during the second
session, Freud did uncover clinical data which indicated both
delusional affliction and homosexual attachment, both of
which accorded with his original hypothesis and thus he did
not abandon his etiological hypothesis. But this outcome
does not militate against the point that in principle, "The
psychoanalytic etiology of paranoia is empirically
falsifiable (d isconf i rmable) and that Freud explicitly
recognized it." 48
Another example of an instance in which Freud confronts
the problem of irrefutability can be found in his 1937 paper
"Constructions in Analysis" 43 in which he addresses the
charge that psychoanalysis protects itself by means of the
concept of resistance. Specifically, the charge was that "in
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giving interpretations to the patient we treat him upon the
famous principle of 'Heads I win, tails you lose.'"^ So
that if the patient assents to the interpretation, then we
affirm that the interpretation is correct; and if the patient
denies the interpretation, we interpret this denial as a sign
of her resistance, thereby guaranteeing its correctness.
Here, again, Freud confronts the problem of fals if iabi 1 ity
and adduces the conditions under which a "yes" or a "no" from
a patient warrants confirmation of an interpretation.
Just to show that Freud was cognizant of the problem of
when he ought to regard a hypothesis or interpretation as
falsified is not to show that he actually proceeded according
to a Popperian methodology, nor is it to show that the theory
is falsifiable, but it does indicate that Freud was not as
methodologically naive as Popper's indictment and that of his
followers suggest. Griinbaum's critique of Popper's charges
against psychoanalysis illustrates that psychoanalytic theory
is falsifiable and hence is not pseudo-scientific by Popper's
criterion. We will now turn to this critique.
Recall that Popper in 1962 denies even the logical
possibility of testing psychoanalysis empirically. Referring
to the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Adler, Popper
states: "They were simply non-testable
,
irrefutable. There
was no conceivable human behaviour which could contradict
them. Again as late as 1974 in response to his critics.
Popper reiterates his charges against the two psychoanalytic
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theories: "What prevents their theories from being
scientific in the sense here described is, very simply, that
they do not exclude any physically possible human
behaviour ." 44 Griinbaum, in several articles as well as in
his most recent book, has given numerous examples of Freudian
causal hypotheses which are falsifiable. Indeed, it is
strange that Popper did not deem it necessary to subject some
of the many causal hypotheses in the Freudian corpus to an
examination, for Freud's etiological hypotheses, in
particular, are quite specific and at times quite "risky" in
Popper s sense. At the very least, the causal claims exclude
possible behavior.
To return to the paranoia example, note that the stated
etiology, namely that a homosexual conflict is causally
necessary for the affliction by paranoid delusions, is
falsified according to Freud when the absence of the pathogen
(the homosexual conflict) occurs in conjunction with the
diagnostic disorder. Freud's hypothesis thus predicts that
anyone not subjected to the pathogen will be non-paranoid,
and it retrodicts that anyone who is paranoid also harbors a
homosexual conflict. Freud's etiological hypotheses
generally stated that a particular pathogen was causally
necessary and not causally sufficient for a particular
disorder. This tempering of his universal etiological
hypotheses was deemed necessary due to the unknown influence
of heredity in a particular case. Thus Freud recognized that
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the development of paranoia would be positively affected by
an experience of homosexual conflict or attachment, though
his hypothesis could not predict whether a given exposure to
the pathogen would cause paranoia in every case.
By analogy with the medical tradition, Freud's
specification of a particular pathogen for a disorder was an
attempt to isolate a pathogen that was rarely an etiological
factor in the pathogenesis of any other nosologically
distinct syndrome. Hence, given a differential diagnosis
of a disorder, the etiological hypothesis, which specifies
the pathogen responsible for it, is empirically falsifiable
despite the fact that the hypothesis cannot predict that the
mere presence of the pathogen will guarantee that the
disorder will develop. Freud postulates four different
concepts of causality that can be identified when talking
about neurotic pathology in an attempt to clarify the role
that he assigns to a specific etiological cause. To identify
a specific cause as opposed to preconditions, concurrent
causes and precipitating causes is to hold that this factor
is the one which is never missing in any case in which the
effect takes place. Further, this cause suffices, if present
in enough quantity and/or intensity, to bring about the
effect provided only that the preconditions are
fulfilled. Hence the specific cause and the
preconditions are both necessary causes but the specific
cause is distinguished by the fact that "it is found in no
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other etiological equation, or in very few."^”^
Freud's Rat Man case provides an example of the
falsification of the specific etiology hypothesized for an
obsessional neurosis. Also the abandonment of the infantile
seduction etiology of hysteria illustrates that Freud
modified his theory in the face of empirical evidence which
disconfirmed his views.^ Another example of a case of
revision occurs in Freud's 1933 lecture "Revision of the
Theory of Dreams" in which he modifies the wish-fulfillment
as the motivation for dreaming in light of the evidence
provided by the recurrent anxiety dreams of war neurotics.
For Freud acknowledges that these dreams, unlike punishment
dreams which can be handled in terms of the theory, falsify
his universal claim that all dreams are the fulfillment of a
wish. He thus weakens his hypothesis to the claim that "the
dream is an attempt at the fulfillment of a wish."^
Grunbaum's examples of Freudian hypotheses which are
falsifiable include hypotheses which qualify as "risky" in
Popper's sense since they make prediction against which rival
theories either could or do disavow. For example, Freud's
argument for the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment over
against the rival treatment of hypnotic therapy is predicated
on the claim that only psychoanalytic intervention can
uncover the repressed conflict of which the symptom is only a
compromise formation between the repressed idea and the ego's
defense against it. Hence a therapeutic focus at the level
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of symptomatology and a failure to lift the repression, which
only the analytic method accomplishes, will most likely
engender a new symptom, precisely because the unconscious
idea still persists and needs to be defended against.
Grunbaum points out that Freud's prediction of symptom
substitution qualifies as risky, since rival theories such as
behaviorism disavow this expectation.^
Grunbaum also notes that Freud's postulated etiology of
paranoia makes a statistical prediction that qualifies as
"risky" with respect to any rival theory that denies the
etiological relevance of repressed homosexuality for
5
1
paranoia. in the case study analysis of Dr. Schreber,
Freud ties the resulting anxiety and guilt, which ensues from
the failure to repress homosexual impulses, a failure which
in turn calls into play the defense mechanisms of reaction
formation and projection which are attempts to deal with this
guilt, to the social taboo on male homosexuality. Thus
Grunbaum asserts that
if repressed homosexuality is indeed the specific
etiologic factor in paranoia, then the decline of the
taboo on homosexuality in our society should be
accompanied by a decreased incidence of male paranoia.
And, by the same token, there ought to have been
relatively less paranoia in those ancient societies in
which male homosexuality was condoned or even
sanctioned. For the reduction of massive anxiety and
repression with respect to homosexual feelings would
contribute to the removal of Freud's conditio sine qua
non for this syndrome."
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Popper's charge that the theory is simply irrefutable and
untestable is simply too crude. Indeed Popper, as Grunbaum
points out, has offered no proof that "none of the
consequences of the theoretical Freudian postulates are
empirically testable ." 53 To furnish such a proof, Popper
would have to establish the falsity of the claim that "there
exists at least one empirical statement about human behaviour
among the logical consequences of the psychoanalytic
theoretical postulates ." 54 But such a proof is unavailing
to Popper since he denies that we can deductively falsify by
any finite set of basic observation sentences an existential
statement which asserts that a certain member of an infinite
class has a certain property.
Popper's attack on the non-testability of psychoanalytic
postulates is predicated on loose ascriptions of what
constitutes a Freudian or Adlerian explanation, as seen in
the one example he does provide:
Neither Freud nor Adler excludes any particular person's
acting in any particular way, whatever the outward
circumstances. Whether a man sacrificed his life to
rescue a drowning child (a case of sublimation) or
whether he murdered the child by drowning him (a case of
repression) could not possibly be predicted or excluded
by Freud's theory; the theory was compatible with
everything that could happen—even without any special
immunization treatment.
First of all. Popper does not utilize or invoke any actual
Freudian or Adlerian explanation in support of his assumption
that these theories license the unrestricted postulation of
conditions which motivate people to act in various ways.
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Second, if we take seriously Popper's earlier charge that the
theory does not exclude any physically possible behavior,
then what sense does it make to say that the theory, no
matter what the initial conditions, deductively explains a
particular behavior ? 56 Grunbaum argues that, since to
explain deductively is to exclude, insofar as the
consequences of a theory are vague and/or it is unclear just
what empirical statements the theory entails, the testability
of the theory is problematic. But these two properties of
"consequence vagueness" and "deductive indeterminacy" would
not only hinder the empirical f alsif iability of Freud's
theory but would also undercut its explanatory capability and
its inductive confirmability
.
57 Hence Popper's indictment
of inductivism as licensing the ubiquitous confirming
instances of psychoanalysis falls by the wayside if we allow
him the assumption that psychoanalysis does not exclude.
As Griinbaum's critique of Popper is designed to show, at
least some of the major psychoanalytic postulates are
empirically falsifiable. Furthermore he provides examples of
instances in which Freud set forth what sort of finding would
constitute a refuting instance of a particular hypothesis and
instances of Freudian retractions of major etiologies and
C O
theoretical claims. Hence Popper's charge that in
principle the theory is irrefutable and that it was immune to
falsification to start with clearly seems untenable. Even
Popper's claim, that the criteria of refutation, which must
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be laid down beforehand, are in the case of psychoanalysis
difficult to establish or nonexistent due to the vagueness of
the analytic concepts, does not lend credence to the view
that psychoanalysis is thoroughly marred by a lack of public
falsif iability
.
Popper uses the example of the vague term 'ambivalence'
illustrate his point that such a concept makes agreement
on criteria for falsifying the explanatory relevance of it
CQ
close to impossible. To this, Griinbaum points to Freud's
ascription of ambivalence to children (the Little Hans case)
and suggests that "to predicate ambivalence of children
toward their parents is to say that there will be some
behavioural manifestations of hostility as well as some overt
expressions of affection, and one of these two contrary
affects may be largely unconscious or covert at any one
time." The term 'ambivalence' under this description
does lend itself to testability, precisely because if there
is no evidence of both sorts of behavioral orientation, then
the imputation of ambivalence is d isconf irmed . Though Freud
does not predict which of the two affects a child will evince
with respect to a given situation, Griinbaum is quick to point
out that such nonpredictability does not amount to
6 1
untestability. Popper's obvious objection here would no
doubt be that even the above obser vat iona lly based
description of ambivalence is too vague since individual
analysts might interpret behavior differently or impute
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unconscious manifestations of an act where there are none.
This objection, however, ignores the very real possibility of
laying down criteria of agreement which specify either
beha viora lly or verbally what counts as evidence for the
explanatory use of certain concepts. Given Popper's cursory
examination and/or lack of familiarity with Freudian
hypotheses and explanations, his failure to identify testable
consequences and to isolate obser vat ionally based referents
for Freudian concepts is more indicative of his own
shortcomings than those of psychoanalysis.
Even if Popper did provide examples from Freud's corpus
(which he does not) in support of the claim that Freud
immunized the theory against refutation, this evidence in and
of itself ought not to be conflated with the issue of whether
or not the theory is in principle falsifiable. For if Freud
and/or his followers were unwilling to accept evidence that
was adverse to their expectations, this methodological
defectiveness on their part does not speak to the issue of
whether or not the theory is falsifiable. The closest Popper
comes to supporting the charge of methodological
defectiveness in the form of Freud's resistance to
falsification is the following: "Adler's break with Freud
was more Adlerian than Freudian, but Freud never looked on it
6 2
as a refutation of his theory." Here we have to ask
ourselves the question, on what grounds ought Freud to
consider it a refutation? Is Popper referring to Adler's
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instantiation of his own "masculine protest" theory as
evidence that Adler's break with Freud is itself a refutation
of Freud's psycho-sexual theory? what does it mean to say,
as Popper does, that "Freud himself was clearly a Freudian
case, and Adler an Adlerian case"? 63 Indeed, as Grunbaum
asserts, if Freud's theory is as empirically empty as Popper
suggests, how can Popper know that Freud is clearly a
Freudian case, how can he know that the personalities of
Freud and Adler instantiate their respective theories? 6 ^
Furthermore, why would the mere existence of Adler's rival
theory be grounds for giving up the theory that spawned it?
In view of the fact that Popper offers no actual Freudian
examples of aversion to falsification or of ad hoc rescue
attempts of the theory, his depiction of psychoanalysis as
loosely interpreting any evidence whatsoever as confirmation
of the theory borders on dishonesty. Though it may well be
the case that Popper encountered defenders of the theory who
"saw confirming instances everywhere" and who introduced ad
hoc assumptions after the fact to explain unexpected
behavior, this situation does not necessarily bear on
Popper's charge against Freud. To provide evidence of the
methodological failings of Freud, Popper ought to cite him.
Instead, Popper uses for his case in support of the
unfals i f iabi 1 ity of psychoanalytic theory the purported
methodological laxity of its founder and the looseness of its
hypotheses and explanations of which he gives us no examples.
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Up to now we have examined and critiqued Popper's charges
that the clinical theory is in principle not falsifiable and
that adherents of the theory adopt ad hoc immunizing
strategies rather than subjecting the theory or hypotheses to
tests. Though we have touched on the problems that Popper
raises with respect to the untestable character of the
clinical data, Popper's reproaches against psychoanalysis in
this regard bear more comment, especially in view of the fact
that Griinbaum shares with Popper a profound skepticism about
the probative value of the clinical data.
Recall that for Popper, clinical observations are always
theory-laden; they are always interpretations in light of
theories. For this reason criteria of refutation must be
specified in advance. To this point Popper asks what kind of
clinical responses could be laid down beforehand that could
serve as criteria of refutation? Even give the possibility
of staking out such criteria, a possibility Griinbaum
illustrates with regard to Freud's use of the term
'ambivalence' and the at least logical possibility of testing
for it, Popper calls into questions the probative value of
the clinical evidence obtained in the analytic session
against which criteria of refutation could be brought to
bear
:
Moreover, how much headway has been made in investigating
the question of the extent to which the (conscious or
unconscious) expectations and theories held by the
analyst influence the "clinical responses" of the
patient? (To say nothing about the conscious attempts to
influence the patient by proposing interpretations to
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C * Years a go I introduced the term "Oedipus
effect to describe the influence of a theory or
expectation or prediction upon the event which itpredicts or describes: it will be remembered that thecausal chain leading to Oedipus' parricide was started bythe oracle s prediction of this event. This is a
characteristic and recurrent theme of such myths, but onewhich seems to have failed to attract the interests ofthe analysts, perhaps not accidentally. 5
Despite the fact that Griinbaum concurs with Popper that
contamination by suggestion undermines the probative value of
the clinical data, he is quick to admonish Popper for his
uninformed claim that the problem of self-fulfilling
predictions actuated by suggestion has escaped the attention
of analysts. in support of Freud's grasp of the epistemic
problem of spurious data due to the doctor's suggestive
influence, Griinbaum calls attention to Freud's early 1888
account of several kinds of suggestion, their effects and the
need to take into account the role of different kinds of
suggestion in isolating the symptomatology of hysteria. 66
Subsequently, in 1905 Freud distinguishes between the
harnessing of the suggestive influence of the therapist in
analytic treatment and the way in which his analytic
technique differs from hypnotic treatment by suggestion. For
the superiority that Freud claims for his psychoanalytic mode
of intervention over that of hypnotic treatment is predicated
on the capacity of his technique to remove the pathogenic
idea behind the symptoms via the lifting of a repression.
Thus analytic therapy, rather than introducing new ideas,
attacks the resistance or in other words exposes the defenses
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which keep the unconscious conflict in a state of repression
and it does so by utilizing and directing the charged,
affective transference relationship between the therapist and
the patient. Finally, as Griinbaum notes, Freud's 1917
lecture "Analytic Therapy" 68 is an attempt to establish the
objectivity of psychological discoveries that issue from the
analytic session. Here Freud explicitly addresses the charge
of the spuriousness of clinical data wrought by the role that
suggestion plays in the transference relationship and in the
interpretative constructions offered to the patient. Though
Griinbaum argues that Freud's defense of the clinical evidence
ultimately fails to circumvent the contamination issue, this
failure is due not for want of methodological sophistication,
but for empirical reasons. Hence Popper's accusation that
analysts are oblivious to the contamination problem is yet
another instance of his failure to acquaint himself with
69Freud's writings.
Grunbaum's critique of the probative value of the
clinical data will be discussed in chapter four. Suffice it
to say here that Grunbaum's critique of Popper's charges
against the clinical confirmability of psychoanalysis is
aimed at discrediting both Popper's exegetical rendering of
Freudian theory and procedure and his indictment of
inductivism. For according to Popper almost any human
behavior could be claimed to be a verification of the
theory. Against Popper's claim that psychoanalytic theory
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serves as an illustration of the greater stringency of his
demarcation criterion in that by inductivist criteria of
confirmation the clinical observations of analysts verify
their theories, Grunbaum argues that it is "precisely Freud's
theory that furnishes poignant evidence that Popper has
caricatured the inductivist tradition by his thesis of easy
inductive confirmability of nearly every theory.
"
7
^ For a
careful look at Freud's etiological and causal hypotheses
reveals that psychoanalysis is falsifiable and hence
scientific by Popper's criterion. Yet, ironically, by
inductivist standards, Freud's theory has not yet met the
challenge of providing independent evidence that satisfies
the canons necessary to rank as scientific. Hence to the
extent that Grunbaum shares with Popper a skepticism
regarding the probative value of clinical data, he holds that
Popper's case against the clinical confirmability of
psychoanalysis does not discredit inductivism as a method of
scientific theory validation. 71
My examination of Popper's charges against psychoanalysis
and Griinbaum's critique of these charges has shown that
Popper's account of psychoanalytic theory and methodology is
marred by a failure to come to grips with the theory he seeks
to criticize. My analysis has concurred with Griinbaum's
judgement that psychoanalytic hypotheses can be falsified,
though like Grunbaum, but for different reasons, I question
whether fals if iabi 1 ity is an appropriate criterion for
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establishing psychoanalytic theory's scientific status.
A major problem with Popper's fals if icat ion is t view of
science when brought to bear on the judgement of whether
psychoanalytic theory is scientific is its focus on
hypothesis testing. Recall that Popper admonishes analysts
for not subjecting their hypotheses to rigorous tests. It is
true that much of Freud's work did not involve hypothesis
testing in the way that Popper takes as paradigmatic from the
physical sciences. This is a point which Griinbaum does not
emphasize most likely for the reason that, in order to mount
a case for the falsif iability of psychoanalytic hypotheses,
he needs to focus on causal claims and the possibility of
deriving refutations of them. In this regard, Grunbaum's
case against Popper is an attempt to establish the
possibility of testing psychoanalytic theory empirically in a
way that Griinbaum deems scientific. Grunbaum's polemic with
Popper operates out of a similar conception of scientific
activity, one that involves hypothesis testing. Furthermore,
Griinbaum utilizes psychoanalysis in a manner akin to Popper
to show that Popper's criterion of demarcation is less
stringent than eliminative inductivism, at least with respect
to psychoanalysis. Griinbaum, on one level, is thus extolling
the greater stringency of his canons against Popper's claims
of stringency for his demarcation criterion. Both Popper and
Griinbaum are out to defend their conceptions of scientific
status. They hold conceptually similar views of science in
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that they both focus on rigorous testing of hypotheses, but
they ask different questions. Popper asks: "what qualifies
a statement as worthy of any attention at all from
scientists?" while Grunbaum asks: "what makes a statement,
which science has accepted as scientifically meaningful,
scientifically credible ?" 72 These different questions are
both motivated by a conception of scientific activity that
views science as legitimated by methodological norms, norms
that have been established in areas of science where
invariant empirical regularities hold.
To return to the point at issue here regarding the lack
of Freud's focus on hypothesis testing, we note that much of
Freud's work was directed toward establishing the domain and
range of the psychical and the language appropriate to it.
Psychical phenomena and processes are the objects of
psychoanalysis and it is these that Freud was interested in
explaining. Freud's proposals and evidence are in many
instances attempts to persuade his listeners to take notice
of what they previously regarded as inconsequential. His
explanations, then, often serve the function of clarifying
and demonstrating what the phenomena are that he wants us to
focus on. Freud's struggle to establish and win recognition
for a new domain of inquiry is not captured by a
fals if icat ion ist view; neither, for that matter, is it
sufficiently regarded as part of scientific practice by
Grunbaum's eliminative inductivism.
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Grunbaum's focus on Freud's causal etiological hypotheses
to show that psychoanalysis is falsifiable emphasizes Freud's
objective claims, claims in which general interpretations
get fixed and are used to derive specific interpretations.
In this way, he slides over Freud's more complicated accounts
of causality and change. In chapter four, I will argue that
Grunbaum's conception of natural science, while more flexible
than Popper's, is still too rigid. in particular, Grunbaum's
standards for establishing causality are so high, that it is
debatable whether we can ever prove causality in medicine.
At this point, we need only note that Freud's causal
explanations do not merely refer to connections between
empirical events; they also refer to experiential
connections. Understanding can hence be a cause. In this
regard, while we can retain the insight that some of Freud's
hypotheses can be empirically falsified, it would be a
mistake to carry over fals if icat ionism as an adequate
conceptual tool for understanding what Freud was claiming for
his therapeutic treatment.
In conclusion, Popper's falsif icationist view of science,
because it both presupposes and legislates norms of
scientific procedure (which it takes to a large extent from
physics)
,
is problematic when brought to bear on the question
of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis
was first and foremost the development of a language and
methodology for the understanding, explanation and treatment
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of unconscious psychical conflict. Freud's early treatment
success with hysterical patients, who evinced dramatic
physical symptoms, spurred him to investigate and to apply
his theoretical postulates to other areas of psychical life.
Popper's view of science regulates scientific activity to
such a degree that he rules out some possibly fruitful and
certainly ground-breaking research as non-scient if ic for the
simple reason that it does not fit his model.
Simplicity or oversimplification is not always a virtue,
though Popper deems that it is the mark of good science.
Specifically, the advocacy of simplicity or
oversimplification, which is essentially an aesthetic
criterion, can be ideologically coercive when applied to the
domain of human behavior, where the objects of investigation
are complex. Freudian explanations are complex and often
tortured. But he is a good example of a theorist who refused
to reduce human motivation to simple, rationality
calculations grounded on the assumption that people are
conscious of what it is they want and what it is their
problems are. For Popper, science begins with problems and
attempts to solve them. Freud's work problemat izes this very
starting point. Perhaps this fact, more than anything else,
explains why Popper was both anxious and quick to dismiss
Freud
.
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CHAPTER 3
HERMENEUTICS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
In this chapter I will present the hermeneutic position
on the scientific character of psychoanalysis and Grunbaum's
critique of this position. The hermeneut icists work within a
natural/human science dichotomy and place psychoanalysis
within the latter category, whereas Grunbaum argues that
psychoanalysis ought to be evaluated as a natural science.
Thus the preliminary issue in the controversy between the
hermeneut icists and Grunbaum concerns the sorts of standards
against which psychoanalytic knowledge claims ought to be
assessed. After briefly introducing the hermeneutic
position, I will address the claims and arguments of both
sides as to why psychoanalysis ought to be evaluated as a
natural or as a human science. I will argue that the claims
about Freud's self-understanding and misunderstanding, that
Grunbaum and the hermeneut icists appeal to in order to
establish their position, are inadequate and problematic as a
basis upon which to ground how we ought to evaluate
psychoanalysis. I will then turn to a more detailed
examination of the hermeneutic interpretation of
psychoanalysis and Gruiinbaum's critique of it, situating
myself with respect to these two positions.
Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas bring to their
examination of psychoanalytic theory a conception of science
that is much broader than the unified conception of the
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scientistic group. For the hermeneuticis ts
,
the natural
science model of science is not the only one. This model is
characterized by the explanation of particulars by
subsumption under general laws that allows for prediction and
retrodiction. The hermeneut icists call into question the
dominance of this model of science by pointing out that
textual interpretation, history and social theory, for
example, utilize explanation and make knowledge claims and
therefore these kinds of disciplines ought to be considered
sciences
.
Both Ricoeur and Habermas presuppose a distinction among
kinds of science which since Dilthey has often been grounded
in methodological differences. These in turn can be traced
to differences in the relationship between theory and
fact,'*' the relationship between theory and fact being one
of explanation in the natural sciences and understanding in
the human sciences. 'Understanding' is the term often used
to refer to the wider form of explanation that operates more
exclusively in the realm of the human sciences. While
Habermas and Ricoeur operate within a natural/human science
dichotomy, they do not hold that an explanation/understanding
dichotomy is an adequate demarcation of the different
scientific endeavors. Habermas accepts this methodological
distinction as it applies to what he calls the empirical-
analytic sciences and the hermeneutical sciences but situates
psychoanalysis outside of these two categories of science.
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Ricoeur repudiates the very dichotomy of explanation/
understanding inherited from Dilthey. On his view, this
dichotomy is an inadequate characterization of the
methodology of the natural and human sciences. Hermeneutics
and the natural sciences utilize both explanation and
understanding. The use of explanation in the human sciences
need not be seen as parasitic on the methodology of the
natural sciences. After all, not all explanation is causal.
In turning to an examination of the scientific status of
psychoanalysis, the hermeneut icists stress the fact that many
different "Freuds" can find support from the texts. Since
different readings of Freud can be gleaned from the vast
Freudian corpus, various "Freuds" can be pitted against one
another. Therefore, the attempt to make pronouncements on
the scientific status of psychoanalysis depends in part on
the textual emphasis and prejudgments that one brings to the
endeavor
.
Habermas and Ricoeur repudiate Freud's claim that
psychoanalysis is a natural science. They hold that, unlike
a positivistic science methodology, psychoanalytic theory,
which developed from the clinical encounter, was based on a
special form of interpretation. Freud's postulation of
unconscious thought processes arose out of a logic of inquiry
which focused on the seemingly meaningless and inexplicable
communications of the patient. In an attempt to explain the
existence and significance of various inexplicable
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communications (e.g., slips, neurotic symptoms, etc.),
psychoanalysis parted company with physiological medicine.
Symptoms are signs full of meaning; they have a sense of
their own. Symptoms are intentional communications and are
not simply signs from which we can infer physical
correlates. As intentional communications that are
unconscious, the verbalizations and symptomology of the
patient are akin to a distorted text in need of translation
and hence the clinical encounter may be likened to the task
of textual interpretation. Because the hermeneu t icis ts view
the i n t e r sub j ec t i ve
,
clinical encounter, in which the analyst
deciphers the meaning of a distorted text, as the foundation
of psychoanalytic theory, and because this encounter does not
accord with their notion of the aims and methodology of
natural science, they must view as mistaken Freud's claim
that he is doing natural science as well as any attempt to
construe the theory along natural scientific lines.
While neither Ricoeur nor Habermas argues that
explanation modeled on a natural science paradigm is alien to
psychoanalytic theory, in that Freud did construct lawlike
generalizations, from which predictions could be made, they
do hold that, due to the nature of the object under
investigation in psychoanalysis and due to the interests or
aims that motivate knowledge of the object, psychoanalysis is
first and foremost hermeneutically grounded and should be
seen as an interpretative discipline that opens up a
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dimension of meaning and knowledge that a positivistic,
natural science methodology closes off. For Ricoeur and
Habermas, psychoanalysis is a human science, a science that
arises out of an intersub jective inquiry that derives from
analytic practice.
My treatment of the hermeneutical construal of
psychoanalysis will primarily focus on the position of
Ricoeur, since, in fact, in many key respects his view and
Habermas's view are the same. However, before proceeding, I
will pause to note some slight differences in Habermas's
position on Freud.
Habermas calls psychoanalysis depth or critical
hermeneutics and uses it as a tangible example of a
reflective, critical social science that incorporates
methodical self-reflection. Having drawn a distinction
between the empirical and hermeneutical sciences and the
knowledge and interest structure constitutive of each,
Habermas uses psychoanalysis to point to a third kind of
science, a science that incorporates into its consciousness
an interest which directs knowledge toward emancipation and
self-reflection. The empirical sciences are motivated by a
technical interest in that they seek to control, while the
hermeneutical sciences are motivated by a practical interest
in that they aim at communication. Instrumental control and
communicative understanding represent the knowledge
constitutive interests of their respective fields of
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inquiry. Interest structures are embedded in life structures
and dictate the form of a science. The third interest is
discovered by reflecting on the experience of reflection,
(that is, on the reflexive nature of the experience of
reflection)
,
that is inherent in the hermeneutical sciences
but which was not developed by the practitioners of this
science who primarily practiced what Habermas refers to as
"philological" hermeneutics. This third interest is
emancipatory. Critical or depth hermeneutics is emancipatory
in that knowledge coincides with the interest in autonomy and
responsibility. Using psychoanalysis, Habermas points to the
model for a critical science that will allow us to reflect on
the social structure projected and realized through the other
two sciences. In this way, these sciences themselves become
subject to evaluation and criticism. Psychoanalysis is the
model for an emancipatory form of science that frees us for a
methodical reflection on the coercive, distorting forces of
the social structure.
Habermas wants to preserve in his idea of critical
science the moment of self-reflection that Freud's science
incorporates. Yet he sees in Freud's own metapsychological
writings Freud's failure to construe adequately the
scientific status of his own endeavor. Freud's
metapsychological writings were general theories about his
clinical discoveries that explained mental phenomena
according to their location in the psychical apparatus in
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terms of energy distribution. Habermas charges Freud with a
scientistic self-misunderstanding because he holds that Freud
hypothesized correlations between his clinical and
metapsycholog ica 1 theories and then via these stated
correlations accorded a natural science status to his
clinical theory. But this theory was really grounded,
according to Habermas, interpretati vely
. Freud, in according
his theory the status of natural science, is thus guilty of
construing his project in a way that shuts off the
emancipatory process which it originally opened up. Suffice
it to say that in relation to the point Habermas seeks to
make using psychoanalysis, he must reject any natural science
reading in favor of critical theory and practice. Having
isolated forms of science, Habermas cannot allow
psychoanalysis to be counted as a science dominated by a
technical interest, for then it could not serve as a
reflective, critical science.
Habermas's charge regarding the self-misunderstanding of
psychoanalysis as a natural science is supported by Ricoeur,
who argues that the clinical encounter which is primary often
gets recast into the positivist, naturalistic language of the
metapsychology. In this way, the work of interpretation,
which is fundamental, is reconstructed in terms of
. 2theoretical models that have become autonomous. Before
proceeding to a detailed examination of Ricoeur's
interpretation of psychoanalysis, I will address the charge
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of scientism brought against Freud by Ricoeur and Habermas
and Grunbaum's critique of this charge.
The Debate Over Freud's Self-Understanding
"Truth is unobtainable
, mankind does not deserve it."
- Freud^
In taking up Habermas's and Ricoeur 's charge that Freud
is guilty of a scientistic self-misunderstanding, it is
important to distinguish two different questions. My major
concern is to evaluate the scientific status of
psychoanalysis. This is a separate question from that of
what Freud thought he was doing. Freud stated that he was
doing natural science. When the hermeneut icists charge Freud
with the failure to understand his own project, they are
taking him to task on the latter question. Operating out of
a framework that presupposes the parameters of explanation in
the natural sciences, the hermeneut icists argue that, though
Freud thought he was doing natural science, he wasn't and
that psychoanalysis ought to be evaluated as a human science.
More specifically, Habermas and Ricoeur concur that it is
the clinical encounter between analyst and analysand that
prompted the descriptive language of the clinical theory.
The clinical theory and not the metapsychology derives from
analytic practice and is hermeneutically grounded. The term
'metapsychology' refers to Freud's speculative concepts and
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theorizing. Unlike the clinical theory, the metapsychology
is a conceptually stable construction that enables Freud to
theorize further about the empirical data. Freud's
metapsy cholog ica 1 papers construct general theories or models
of the structure and function of the psychic apparatus using
more sharply defined referents and are scientifically useful
because they allow him to psychologize about broader areas of
psychological concern. As long as the metapsychology is seen
as the systematization of what occurs in the analytic
relationship, the language of the metapsychology is not
problematic for the hermeneut icists
,
for the language of
force does capture the experience of psychical conflict. The
metapsychological edifice is in part an abstraction from the
clinical theory; it is a speculative, hypothetical
construction from which, however, Freud often made deductions
that he then could apply to his clinical practice. To the
extent that Freud did use the metapsychology as a deductive
theory, working downwards to a clinical interpretation, he
paved the way for the kind of criticism that the
hermeneut icists level against him.
For they claim that Freud ostensibly invested the
metapsychology with a scientific status by hypothesizing
correlations between clinical and metaphyschological
concepts. Due to the ontologically reductive nature of the
metapsychology, the hermeneut ic is ts charge that Freud's
assertion of natural science status for the clinical theory
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is parasitic on the reduction of its hypotheses to the
metapsychology which they claim Freud deemed primordially
scientific. 4 Habermas states:
^
UrelY f^umed tacitly that his metapsychology,
which severs the structural model from the basis ofb
^
ween d°ctor and patient and insteadattaches it to the energy-distribution model by meansefimtions, represented an empirically rigorous
scientific formulation of this sort.^
of
The clinical practice which is interpret
ostensibly gets justified scientifically
that Freud then used the metapsychology
clinical theory a natural science status
accused of a "scientistic" misunderstand
atively grounded thus
because they hold
to accord his
. Freud is hence
ing
because he idolatrously endowed the clinical theory with
natural science status by misext rapolat ion from the
metapsychology via the stated correlations. And
furthermore, his view was purportedly a
"self-misunderstanding" to the extent that it involved aphilosophical misconception of the clinical theory, abody of hypotheses which he himself had wrought.
The charge of scientism" that the hermeneut ic is ts level
against Freud's construal of the status of his clinical
theory refers
basis of what
to Freud's proclamation of scient if icity on the
they hold are techniques and procedures alien
to the epistemological ground of psychoanalytic theory.
Against this charge of scientistic self-misunderstanding,
Grunbaum argues that after 1896, that is, after Freud
abandoned
Scientific
theory and
the reduct ionistic program of "The Project for a
Psychology," it was on the basis of the clinical
the direct evidential support he claimed to have
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for it, that Freud assigned a natural science status to his
enterprise. Quoting Freud, Grunbaum adduces evidence in
support of the view that Freud "forsook his initial,
ontologically reductive notion of scientific status in favor
of a methodological, epistemic one ." 7 So that when Freud
asserts that the psychoanalytic enterprise has the status of
natural science he is referring to his observat ionally based
clinical theory upon which his most fundamental hypotheses
rest
.
Furthermore, according to Grunbaum, Freud did not use his
metapsychology to accord his theory natural science status as
Ricoeur and Habermas charge, for he firmly believed that his
metapsychological hypotheses could be discarded without
damaging the psychological structure or clinical theory. He
formulated his metapsychology precisely because he wanted to
extrapolate from his psychoanalytic observations and he was
conscious of the speculative nature of this enterprise.
Freud explains:
I made an attempt to produce a "metapsychology." By this
I meant a method of approach according to which every
mental process is considered in relation to three
co-ordinates, which I described as dynamic, topographical
and economic, respectively.
Freud goes on to say that he abandoned this venture because
it seemed that theoretical predictions of this nature were
not at the time fruitful. Clarifying the status of his new
metapsychology, he states that his latest speculative works
have been concerned with analytically distinguishing the
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mental apparatus in terms of id, ego, and super-ego. Aware
of the limitations of language, Freud sees it as useful to
treat and separate analytically the processes of mental
functioning as if they are kinds of objects. it becomes
useful to objectify processes in order to establish
referents. Freud states clearly that the ideas formulated in
his metapsychology "are not the foundation of science, upon
which everything rests: that foundation is observation
alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole
structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without
damaging it ." 9 And later, writing in his "Autobiographical
Study," he refers to his metapsycholog ical notions as ideas
which are "part of a speculative superstructure of
psychoanalysis, any portion of which can be abandoned or
changed without loss or regret the moment its inadequacy has
been proved ."'*' 9
If we are to argue from Freud's self-understanding,
Griinbaum's textual evidence in support of Freud's own
understanding of the status of the metapsychology seems to
vindicate Freud of the charge that Habermas and Ricoeur level
against him. Indeed Freud explicitly admits the close
association between fantasizing and his metapsycholog ical
speculation,^ an admission that hardly suggests that it
was the metapsychology that he deemed primordially
scient if ic
.
But despite this textual evidence of Freud's assertions,
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he often did assume that certain consequences would follow
from the energy model which he could then apply to his
clinical practice
.
12 On the one hand, these deductive
explanations could be viewed as suggestive directives, but on
the other hand, to the extent that these explanations operate
out of a closed system, they could direct attention away from
the ana ly sand and the clinical encounter which is itself a
resource for corrective interpretative explanations. This
very tendency along with the mixing of the language of energy
and force from the metapsychology with the dynamic,
descriptive language of meaning from the clinical theory,
leads Ricoeur to claim that Freud "tends to reverse the
relations between theory (metapsychology)
,
on the one hand,
and experience and practice on the other, and to reconstruct
the work of interpretation on the basis of theoretical models
that have become autonomous ." 13 if we take Freud at face
value and grant that he was aware of the speculative nature
and derivative status of his metapsychology, we may decide
with Griinbaum that Ricoeur's claim about Freud's
self-understanding is based on a confusion. But to do so
requires that we assign a marginal status to the
metapsychology
.
The hermeneut icists and Griinbaum agree that Freud thought
he was doing natural science but disagree as to how we ought
to evaluate psychoanalysis. Before further elaborating the
hermeneutic reading of Freud and the basis for their
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evaluation of psychoanalysis as a human science, it is
important to clarify the relevance, if any, of Freud's own
thoughts about what he was doing. As we've seen, the
hermeneut icists argue that Freud misunderstood his own
project in calling it natural science, so they bring in the
issue of Freud's self-assessment in order to pave the way for
their reading of Freud. Grunbaum argues against their
accusation by simply trotting out passages in which Freud
asserts that his enterprise has the character of natural
science. On this basis, he argues that we ought to evaluate
psychoanalysis by Freud's own standards of scientif icity . If
we take Freud's self-assessment and claims about the nature
of his metapsychology as unproblematic, then Griinbaum's
criticism of the hermeneutic charge, that Freud used the
metapsychology to grant the clinical theory natural science
status, seems accurate.
However, Grunbaum overlooks the hermeneutical problem
involved in assessing someone's self-understanding. Either
we must take Freud at face value or we must attempt to
rethink what Freud meant by "natural science" when he claimed
this status for his clinical theory. Taking Freud at face
value is problematic for two reasons. First of all, most
great theorizers or innovators fail to grasp fully the
. . . . . 14
significance and implications of their own work. What
one thinks one is doing and what one is actually doing often
diverge, as Freud would be the first to admit. Further, as
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Ackermann has illustrated with respect to the history of
science, the present "does not contain sufficient information
for us to grasp fully its significance." 15 The partial
opacity of the present bears on the ability of a theorist to
conceptualize adequately what she is doing, which leads us to
the second problem in taking Freud at face value.
Face value for Grunbaum seems to mean that psychoanalysis
is what Freud says it is and therefore it ought to be
evaluated as such. But whatever Freud means by "natural
science can't be what Grunbaum means by it, or, to put it
another way, even if we take Freud at face value, face value
can't mean that when Freud says he's doing natural science,
that's what Grunbaum means by natural science. Here again,
Ackermann is pertinent:
The distinctions that we can locate in the past from the
viewpoint of the present are likely merely to sort the
past according to the present, but are perhaps not likely
to be a representation of the past as it appeared to its
participants. The supposition that we can understand
what happened in the past on the basis of our current
descriptions of the past must rest on a suppos it ion
1
that
sound scientific practice doesn't change over time. 16
In as much as Grunbaum uses quotes from Freud to simply
contradict the hermeneut icis ts ' claims, his position rests on
a possibly naive reading of Freud's own assertions.
If we do attempt to rethink what Freud could have meant
by "natural science," we find grounds for suspicion that
Freud's view is the same as the one Grunbaum takes for
granted. A complete defense of a different reading of what
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Freud might mean by "natural science" would be out of place
here, so I will simply note the basis for suspicion.
Grunbaum, m defense of the view that Freud adhered
strictly to a commitment to natural science in Grunbaum's
sense, quotes from Freud: "The explanatory gains from
positing unconscious mental processes enabled psychology to
take its place as a natural science like any other. "I"7
However, what Grunbaum neglects to observe is the statement
made by Freud one paragraph later in which he states: "Every
science is based on observations and experiences arrived at
through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our
science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy
ends here." Grunbaum further extrapolates from the text
in defense of his view of Freud's self-understanding, quoting
Freud: Psychoanalysis is a part of the mental science of
psychology.
. . . Psychology, too, is a natural science.
What else can it be?" However, Freud's next sentence
states: "But its case is different." 19
If one reads Freud with a view toward understanding what
he means by natural science, the textual evidence suggests
that the term 'natural science' for Freud was an elastic
category, one that ranged over all areas included under the
rubric of science which in German includes any disciplined,
scholarly pursuit. Freud recognized the fact that different
disciplines (e.g., chemistry, anatomy, biology, etc.) may not
always be formulated in the same way and he specifically
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recognized that psychoanalysis was not identical in content
with established medical science. Freud uses the term
natural science' to describe his enterprise and he sometimes
highlights the way in which psychoanalysis differs from the
harder natural sciences but natural science for him means
science. The range of natural science may be extended to
cover areas that may not be formulated in the same way, but
there will be a connection.
Griinbaum, arguing against the hermeneutic contrast
between kinds of science, notes that Freud did not adhere to
a methodological separatism. Griinbaum is correct in pointing
out that the hermeneut icists ' claim, that lawlike
explanations in the natural sciences are context-free and
ah istor ical
,
misrepresents the explanatory import of
nomothetic explanations and draws a pseudo-contrast between
explanations in the natural and human sciences. Griinbaum
illustrates this pseudo-contrast by showing the way in which
nomothetic explanations in classical electrodynamics must
incorporate or take into account the history of and the
context of the object under study. His point here is that
lawlike causal connections do not exclude an experiential,
historical dimension. On this basis, Griinbaum argues that
the hermeneut icists ' appraisal is based on a lack of
understanding of the content and methods of the natural
sciences. Further, he holds that their anachronistic and
naive views of science are the basis for what he terms their
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"scientophobic" reconstruction of Freud's theory. While
Gr unbaunn is correct in pointing out the problems in the
methodological contrast that the hermeneut ic is ts invoke, he
is wrong in citing Freud's rejections of a methodological
separatism as evidence that Freud was claiming the status of
strict natural science in Grunbaum's sense for
psychoanalysis. In contrast to Grunbaum's claim, it appears
that Freud rejected this separatism because he did not
operate with it at all, natural science being a category that
covered science in general.
Indeed, Grunbaum may be guilty of anachronist ically
enlisting Freud in a methodological struggle that Freud might
repudiate altogether. Grunbaum writes, "Freud rebuffed the
antinaturalism and methodological separatism that was
championed by the Geis tesw issenschaften movement as a
framework for psychology and the social sciences." 20 But
Freud's 1933 lecture on "The Question of a Weltanschauung,"
though it defends the right of psychoanalysis to speak for
the scientific Weltanschauung, in no way contrasts this to
the Geisteswissenschaf ten movement. In saying that
psychoanalysis "is quite unfit to construct a Weltanschauung
of its own: it must accept the scientific one," 21 Freud is
rejecting the idea that psychoanalysis leads to a particular
view of the universe, a view that is outside the scientific
world view. For the scientific world view, though it assumes
the uniformity of the explanation of the universe, "does so
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only as a program, the fulfillment of which is relegated to
the future ." 22 Freud's denial that psychoanalysis attempts
to set up a self-contained edifice of its own is an attempt
to purge psychoanalysis of the epistemological claims to
certainty that characterize the manner in which religious and
metaphysical systems ground truth claims and encompass and
explain everything within their purview. By claiming that
there are no sources of knowledge of the universe other than
the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized
observations ,
" and that this is the scientific
Weltanschauung to which psychoanalysis adheres, he situates
his enterprise against claims to knowledge derived from
"revelation, intuition or divination
. There is no
evidence to suggest that Freud is rebuffing the
G e i s t e sw i s s en s ch a f t en movement, a movement based on none of
the above repudiated sources of knowledge. Rather, Freud
operates with a wider notion of science than does Grunbaum
and does not subscribe to a separatism regarding kinds of
science. Summing up his lecture on a Weltanschauung, he
writes
:
Psychoanalysis, in my opinion, is incapable of creating a
Weltanschauung of its own. It does not need one; it is a
part of science and can adhere to the scientific
Weltanschauung. This, however, scarcely deserves such a
grandiloquent title, for it is not all-comprehensive, it
is too incomplete and makes no claim to being
self-contained and to the construction of systems. ^
The reason for this focus on Freud's self-understanding
is twofold. Both the hermeneut icis ts and Grunbaum are guilty
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of approaching Freud's assertions about the status of his
enterprise with their own fixed views and preconceptions
about natural science. This fact forces the hermeneuticists,
in their philosophical re-interpretation of Freud, to assert
that Freud misunderstood his own project when he claimed
natural science status for it. As we will see, their
evaluation of psychoanalysis, though in many respects
accurate, widens the gulf between natural science and
psychoanalytic theory in the service of protecting it from
what they fear would otherwise entail a lapse into
scientism. Grunbaum's defense of Freud's self-understanding
amounts to nothing more than pulling out of context passages
in which Freud asserts psychoanalysis is a natural science.
As I've indicated, it may be the case that Freud's notion of
natural science is wider than Grunbaum's eliminative
inductivism, in which case Grunbaum's proposal for how we
should evaluate it does not rest on Freud's "own canon of
scientific status. jn any case, as I've shown,
arguments from Freud's self-understanding are problematic and
are not particularly fruitful in helping us to assess the
scientific nature of his theory.
Indeed, to pursue Freud's self-understanding in any depth
might require a psychoanalytic investigation into Freud's
modes of self-deception. One could venture the claim that
the metapsychology, particularly the texts on culture, is
Freud's attempt to extend the range of his theories and so to
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realize his own "original objective," philosophy. in a
letter to Wilheim Fliess (1896) Freud states: "I see that
you are using the circuitous route of medicine to attain your
f irst ideal, the physiological understanding of man, while I
secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same route at my
own original objective, philosophy." 27 Might it not be the
case that Freud's desire to bring his hypotheses into a unity
and his longing for a comprehensive understanding of mental
life were motivated by his identification of comprehensive,
system-building with the philosophical quest? A few months
later in his correspondence with Fliess, Freud claims that he
is in the process of realizing his early longing for
philosophical knowledge in his movement away from medicine
toward psychology. 28 But perhaps Freud's attraction to
philosophy is more riddled with ambivalence than this
suggests. Perhaps his psychology of the unconscious is meant
to overturn philosophical systems. His first published use
of the term 'metapsychology' occurs within a passage in which
Freud anticipates the possibility of transforming metaphysics
into metapsychology. Speculation of this sort about
Freud's motivations and evaluations gets us entangled in all
kinds of interpretative problems. Regardless of what Freud
thought he was doing or what motivated his theorizing, we
need to evaluate the status of what Freud did.
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Ri_coeur ' s Interpr etation of Psychoanalvs i R
We will now focus on Ricoeur's interpretation and
evaluation of psychoanalysis in an effort to glean from his
analysis the insights proper to the science Freud
established. Ricoeur's assessment of psychoanalysis
emphasizes the differences in objects and aims which mark off
psychoanalysis from what he considers traditional natural
science and the role of self-reflection in the analytic
situation which has a bearing on the way claims are
established. Insofar as Ricoeur does not judge
psychoanalysis against a restrictive, normative ideal of
natural science, he gives priority to the consideration of
the particular form that this science takes and attempts to
allow for the possibility of judging it in terms of an
epistemology that he sees as deriving from it. The
importance of this starting point for our purposes involves
the recognition that epistemology derives its principles from
the data supplied by the form that a science takes. In as
much as epistemology has been developed and determined in
terms of the more exact model of the physical sciences,
judging psychoanalysis against such a theory of knowledge
prejudices the assessment of it. 30
Ricoeur's philosophical interpretation of psychoanalytic
theory begins with the recognition that Freudian discourse is
a mixed one. Generally speaking, we can divide this mixed
discourse along clinical and me tapsycholog ica 1 lines whereby
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a theory of meaning dominates the clinical work and a theory
of forces is central to the metapsychology. But speaking in
this way is deceptive precisely because Freud's work
integrated these theories and ways of talking. indeed, as
Ricoeur states, "This mixed discourse is the raison d’etre of
psychoanalysis." 31 Both dimensions, that of the energetics
which speaks of a cathexis as a unit of force, and that of
hermeneutics which speaks of relations of meaning, as for
example, between a wish and a symptom, are necessary to
psychoanalytic discourse. Freud moved between these systems
and attempted to overcome any gap one might posit between
them by treating forces as if they were meanings and by
treating meanings (wishes, etc.) as if they were forces.
Hence, for example, a wish represents both a meaning and a
force. Ricoeur's reading is based on what he sees as a
correlation between energetics and hermeneutics, between
connections of forces and relations of meaning.
For Ricoeur, the insight proper to psychoanalysis lies in
"the reciprocity between interpretation and explanation,
o 2between hermeneutics and economics." Even the "Project
for a Scientific Psychology," Freud's 1895 essay which
represented psychical processes as quantitatively determined
states of specifiable material particles, is linked to the
work of deciphering symptoms, and so, according to Ricoeur,
hermeneutics is present in even this unlikely text. For the
notion of quantity is not something that is measured, rather
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it is inferred from his clinical observations of hysterics
and obsessional neurotics whose "excessively intense ideas"
spurred Freud to conceptualize affect in terms of
transformations and displacements of quantity. Hence
quantity is linked to intensity, an intensity that derives
from, in that it is observed in, the clinical encounter.
Ricoeur
, unlike Grunbaum, who views the metapsychology as
peripheral to the scientific status of psychoanalytic
3 3theory, traces the way in which the speculative
hypotheses of the metapsychology relate the hermeneutic
concepts such as hidden meaning, symptom, instinctual
representative, etc., with economic concepts such as
cathexis, displacement, substitution and projection. Ricoeur
is emphasizing throughout his work the legitimacy of the
metapsychology when understood as the systematization of what
occurs or is observed in the analytic encounter. Though
Freud fails to integrate completely into a single system the
findings of clinical experience, nevertheless, to the extent
that the metapsychology is seen in this context, it is
crucial to an understanding of Freudian discourse. It is
when the economic language is treated as an independent
construction, outside of the context of analytic experience
and practice, that we may be led to a scientistic
understanding of Freud. For as Ricoeur notes, the language
of the metapsychology is narrower than that in which analytic
technique is described
,
34
and it is analytic experience
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which engenders the writings on technique. Ricoeur
emphasizes the necessity of not separating the economic
language from its rhetorical function, for if we view the
metapsychology as systematizing referents outside of what
occurs in analytic experience, we risk lapsing into an absurd
hydraulics
.
35
Ricoeur states that: "The facts of psychoanalysis arise
both from the category of the text, and hence of meaning, and
from the categories of energy and resistance, and hence of
force." Psychical acts and psychical reality are the
objects under investigation and the language of energy and
force refers to the meaning of the psychical and not to
neurons or physiological and mechanical explanatory schemes.
On the one hand, the language of force refers to the
experience of conflict and by using this language Freud moves
us to experience "what has meaning," (i.e., our psychical
acts). At the same time this language gives an explanation
for the text distortion itself by accounting for the
processes distorting it. Hence it is not a question of a
disjunction between explanation in terms of the language of
energy or force and interpretation in terms of
representations or meanings. According to Ricoeur, Freud's
"mixed discourse is not equivocal but is appropriate to the
reality which it wishes to take into account, namely, the
binding of force and meaning in a semantics of desire. This
reading does justice to the most realistic and naturalistic
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aspects of Freudian theory, while it never neglects to treat
instincts,' the 'unconscious,' and the 'id' as significations
to be deciphered in their effects of meaning ."^ 7
Ricoeur uses the phrase "the semantics of desire" to
describe the reality that psychoanalytic discourse
investigates. According to Ricoeur, psychoanalytic theory
places the work of interpretation within the region of
3 8desire. Freud's mixed discourse, the energy metaphors
which account for the displacement of psychical conflict and
the meaning relations which account for the representation
and replacement of this conflict, captures the vicissitudes
of unsatisfied yearnings. in this regard, the very concepts
Freud uses are to be judged "according to their status as
conditions of the possibility of analytic exper ience . "
^
As Freud's texts on analytic technique exemplify, the method
of interpretation, a method based on an exchange of words, is
not divorced from the doctrines or theories that Freud
enunciates. Ideas, affects and the behavioral clues to them
are that which are subjected to scrutiny.
In order to clarify the nature of the reality that is the
subject matter of psychoanalytic investigation and
explanation, Ricoeur argues that "psychoanalysis is not a
science of observation; it is rather an interpretation, more
comparable to history than to psychology . As such,
attempts to reformulate psychoanalysis along lines of
academic psychology, which is an observational science
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dealing with the facts of behavior, not only miss the unique
origin of psychoanalysis as an exegetical science, but also
confuse the notion of a "fact" in psychoanalysis.
According to Ricoeur, the theory behind psychoanalysis
arose out of the confrontation between analyst and
ana ly sand
. From the very beginning the situation is an
intersubjective one. For this reason alone, the analyst
initially counts as data that which is supplied by the
analysand through her language and behavior. The data are
not reducible to mere observation but rather are initially
given interpretati vely
,
first by the analysand and second as
interpreted through the person of the analyst. What counts
as a fact and as data in psychoanalysis diverges from the
very beginning from notions of facts and data in academic or
behavioristic psychology. While facts are always embedded in
a theory, in psychoanalysis the facts are initially reports
ano as reports are claims about affective and cognitive
experience. These reports are not subject to direct or
immediate confirmation or d isconf irmat ion
. The
reformulations, which seek to operationally define terms, to
utilize experimental control groups and to predict behavior
so that the hypotheses and theory may be tested and confirmed
or d isconf irmed
,
can only deal with the results of a case
history that are detached from the analytic situation. What
becomes operationally defined is split off from its origin in
interpretation and extracted from the other data with which
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it is inextricably linked.
For Ricoeu r , because psychoanalysis deals with the
relationships of meaning between substitute objects and the
primordial (and lost) instinctual objects
,
41 it is not an
observational science in the way that behaviorism is.
Ricoeu r , m his early work on Freud states, "strictly
speaking, there are no 'facts' in psychoanalysis, for the
analyst does not observe, he interprets ." 42 m as much as
Ricoeu r uses as his paradigm for academic or scientific
psychology a reductive, behaviorist psychology where behavior
is treated as a dependent, observable variable, he is correct
in recognizing that the "facts" of psychoanalysis differ from
environmental variables that are manipulable by an outside
observer. However, as Grunbaum points out, this contrast
with obser vat iona lly based academic psychology ignores that
in physics and cognitive psychology reality is not directly
observable either and yet we can still speak of observables
and recognize the legitimacy of countenancing intrapsychic
4 3states. On this basis, Grunbaum accuses Ricoeur of
operating with a crude observation-theory dichotomy, and of
oversimplifying the contrast by relying on a reductive
behaviorist psychology as the paradigm for academic
psychology
.
While Grunbaum's point is no doubt true, Ricoeur's use of
the term "academic psychology" is not without support from
Freud. So let's first look at the sense in which Ricoeur's
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point is shared by Freud.
In the essay "The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud refers
to academic psychology in two ways: first as a discipline
whose explanations are non-psychological in his sense,
because mental acts are explained in terms of their
physiological connections, and second, as a discipline which
assumes that all mental acts are conscious, that
consciousness is the criterion of what is mental
.
44
In contrast to academic psychology, psychoanalysis is
depth psychology," a theory of the mental unconscious.
Freud expounds the value of this new psychology in terms of
its capacity to explain the origin and meaning of dreams and
symptoms and to explain the connections between mental acts.
He then goes on to describe analysis as an interpretative
art. The analyst begins by regarding the patient's remarks
and associations as distortions or allusions behind which
lies what must be revealed. "In a word, this material,
whether it consists of memories, associations or dreams, has
first to be interpreted ." 45 The analyst takes as her point
of departure the language and behavior of the analysand but
attempts to refrain from imposing her own expectations on the
material. Interpretation is arrived at not through a
rule-governed process but through submitting to one's own
unconscious activity in an effort to glimpse the analysand's
unconscious. The assumption behind Freud's characterization
of psychoanalysis as an interpretative art is that the
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material produced by the analysand can be viewed as
functioning like allusions.
The point that Ricoeur is trying to establish, using the
contrast with academic psychology is that, unlike academic
psychology which is an observational science that regards
symptoms as segments of behavior, psychoanalysis is firstly
an exegetical science which regards symptoms as segments of
meaning. Psychoanalysis does observe behavior, just as it
scrutinizes the language of the analysand, but these
observables function, according to Ricoeur, as "signifiers
for the history of desire.
. . . The object of the analyst's
study is the meaning for the subject of the same events the
psychologist regards as an observer and sets up as
environmental variables ." 46 it is the meaning that the
behavior or fact has assumed for the subject and in her
history that Ricoeur regards as primary in analytic theory.
Ricoeur, in emphasizing the semantic nature of what counts as
a fact in psychoanalysis, is trying to capture an important
feature of analytic experience.
According to Ricoeur, psychical reality and not material
reality is decisively relevant to analytic experience. From
a clinical point of view, what is psychically real need not
be an event that has actually occurred. Psychoanalytic truth
is not the truth of an ordinary historical past; this would
mean that a correspondence theory of truth holds and we could
speak, as Grunbaum does, of reconstructed past events
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tallying with what is real. Instead what is psychically real
may be substitute ideas to which affects are attached even if
these ideas to which they are attached are not the original
ones. Of course, Freud wanted to get at the originally
repressed ideas, but he recognized increasingly that reality
is a construction, not a fixed or given entity
.
47
Recall that Freud abandoned his infantile seduction
hypothesis, which avowed the father's actual seduction of the
child, in favor of an oftentimes fantasied seduction.
Repression does not act on experiences; it acts on memories.
In that experiences are repressed, they are so only in
retrospect, only in their being remembered
.
4
^ Freud's
early work on "screen memories" illustrates that memories are
constructed and are not records of objective traces of
events
:
It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories
at all from our childhood: memories relating to our
childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood
memories show us our earliest years not as they were but
as they appeared at the later periods when the memories
were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood
memories did not, as people are accustomed to say,
emerge; they were formed at that time. And a number of
motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a
part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the
memories themselves. y
Regardless of whether the memory, which is itself a
construction, is of a fantasy or an actual event, the fact
that a memory is sufficient to call into play repression
indicates that the very notion of psychical
claims about it is not captured by a common
reality and truth
sense, scientific
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naive realism.
Thomas Thompson states:
Psychoanalytic
the truth of an
truth is the pr
resistances and
the matching up
ideas with the
retrospectively
situation, like
which a person
truth, as Janet Malcolm points out, is not
ordinary historical past. Psychoanalytic
oduct of the working through of the
of the analyzing of the transference, not
of an independent set of statements orindependent reality to which they refer
. "Truth" in the psychoanalytic
it or not, is part of an inner
n
myth by
lives in his or her own world. ^
Thompson acknowledges that Freud would have rejected this
paradigm of truth if confronted with it, but he holds that
Freud's insights as a practitioner pointed to it. The
important point for our purposes is to recognize that
Thompson's and Malcolm's characterization of the truth claim
of psychoanalysis comes close to Ricoeur's reading of Freud.
To say this, however, is not to say that Ricoeur identifies
the data text of psychoanalysis with fiction. Ricoeur's
essay, "The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytic
Writings," is an attempt to stake out criteria for the
justification of the truth claims of psychoanalysis. In this
essay, Ricoeur argues that psychoanalytic explanations ought
not to be separated from the transformative process of
self-understanding that comes about through the analytic
experience. Given that Freud's theory is built upon what
takes place within the analytic situation, Ricoeur seeks to
justify its claims to knowledge by laying out the context in
which its claims are made.
In order to establish grounds for the verification of the
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theory
,
Ricoeur enumerates four criteria for "facts" in
psychoanalysis. As previously stated, "facts" are reports.
What enters into the domain of investigation is that part of
experience which is capable of "being said." This
restriction highlights that even symptoms which are directly
observable are objects of investigation only in their
relation to what is verbalized by the analysand. Because the
symptoms are mute, in the verbal sense, analysis is necessary
to uncover their meaning and because Freud likens all
psychical productions (slips, jokes, etc.) to the structure
of dreams and symptoms, he regards the analysand' s talk as
itself a symptom and as a clue to therapeutic treatment.
Secondly, a "fact" is not only what is sayable, but "what
is said or capable of being said to another person." For
Ricoeur, the transference marks out the intersub j ecti ve
nature of both the structure of desire and of talk. When
Freud speaks of wish-objects, the lost object, the substitute
object, etc., he is pointing to the intersubject ive structure
of desire, which has as its object another desire. What the
analysand repeats in the transference relation is a wish that
is always directed toward another person, an erotic demand
that in being acted out in the analytic relationship becomes
itself an object of analysis. What is demanded of the other
contains the history and the drama that constitutes the
meaning making processes of the analysand's past. The
analysand's perceptions and reports continue to be pervaded
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by her affect and by her fantasy life, which are constituted
by her past.
Thirdly, psychoanalysis deals with psychical as opposed
to material reality so that in the clinical setting, from an
epistemological point of view, the actual occurrence of
seduction, for example, is not decisively relevant. "What is
psychoanalytically relevant is what a subject makes of his
fantasies ." 51 Ricoeur holds that the criterion for
psychical reality is that it "presents a coherence and
resistance comparable to that of material reality.
Abandoned objects and their substitutes are real because they
have meaning for the analysand. Dreams, slips, symptoms,
hallucinations, etc., are substitute formations. "Their
reality is their meaning, and their meaning is their
capability of mutually replacing one another. it is in this
sense that the notions of the lost object and the substitute
object cardinal notions for analytic exper ience--deser ve to
occupy a key position in the epistemological discussion as
well." As Ricoeur makes evident using the illustration
of mourning, the lost object when introjected continues to
exist psychically. The work of analysis does not simply
dispel the lost object or eradicate the fantasy; rather, it
"recovers it as a fantasy in order to situate it, without
confusing it with what is real, on the level of the
54imag ina ry . "
On the one hand, Freud preserves the distinction between
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psychical and material reality, between the ideas and the
objects they represent, so that we remain cognizant of the
level of abstraction we are talking in terms of when We speak
of reality. But on the other hand, his own theory
obliterates this distinction in that his notion of a wish is
that of a representation of something that orginally gave
rise to it. The projection of a fulfilled wish depends on
the prior experience of a fulfilled wish. We said previously
that a wish as an erotic demand in the transference has
another desire as its object, but its aim is satisfaction.
What gives rise to a wish is an original experience of
satisfaction, an experience of a psychosomatic unity that
grounds the possibility of the emergence of a split, a split
between material reality understood as necessity and
psychical reality (which strictly speaking is the
unconscious) understood as the quest for pleasure, or the
avoidance of unpleasure.
Freud traces the meaning of psychically real ideas to
abandoned wish-objects, which, as he tells us, we never
really abandon, but rather erect substitutions. A wish is a
repetition in the form of a substitute satisfaction of lost
objects of satisfaction. Hence the realm of the imaginary is
not diametrically opposed to a fixed material reality because
the realm of the imaginary is a mode of reality, a psychical-
material reality which is constructed and projected. To
situate a fantasy or wish on the level of the imaginary is to
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locate the lost object and the substitute formations that are
derivative of it on the symbolic level. This is why Ricoeur
holds that substitute formations have a relationship of
meaning to what presents itself as lost. The substitute
formations are substitutes, they are distorted and they are
derivative; and they would be none of these did they not
refer to or designate lost objects of desire. Their
reference to these lost objects and their substitutability
for them is their meaning; had they not this relationship,
they would not be psychically real. What presents itself as
lost and is expressed symptomatically is not the "real"
history (understood as an objective, in a correspondence
sense, recording of events), but rather the figurative
history
.
The fourth criterion for what counts as "fact" in
psychoanalysis concerns the putting into a narrative
structure one's own story and the facts which constitute this
figurative history. The work of analysis consists in
overcoming the resistance and the repetition of old patterns
of relating in the service of filling in the gaps in memory.
But since "screen memories" as opposed to actual memories are
often as far back as one can trace the origin of neurotic
conflict, what the work of remembering consists in is the
ability to constitute in a meaningful, coherent order one's
own past. A fact must be able to be put in a narrative
structure. This last characterization of a "fact" in
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psychoanalysis, like the other three characterizations,
illustrates that "facts" arise within the dynamic of analytic
experience and may take on a different significance in the
course of analysis. They are not in any predetermined way
isolatable outside it.
Having explicated the peculiar nature of facts in
psychoanalysis, Ricoeur argues that the relationship between
facts and theory in psychoanalysis is properly understood
when seen as mediated by Freud's procedure for investigation
and method of treatment. The coordination of these two
aspects of psychoanalysis provides the link between theory
and data. The procedure in the observational sciences links
theoretical terms to observables by means of correspondence
rules. But here the interpretative method, generated out of
the language of meaning that dominates the investigatory
procedure, together with the language of force that dominates
the method of treatment, mediates facts and theory. Analytic
practice is both a work involving a struggle against the
resistances of the analysand and a deciphering of symptoms,
dreams, etc. We do not grasp the meaning of the distorted
text if we construe the task of deciphering along lines of
exegesis. To be sure, the relations of meaning between a
symptom and a cause, between the manifest and latent content
of a dream, are discussed in terms of their symbolic
connection. Still, in explaining the mechanisms of the
dream-work and the compromise character of symptom formation,
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Freud gives a dynamic, causal account in terms of the
mechanisms of force (repression, resistance, displacement,
regression, etc.) operating between conscious, preconscious
and unconscious systems. This explains also why and how the
meanings are distorted and in need of translation. Ricoeur
states that analytic practice, as procedure for investigation
and methoo of treatment, "constitutes the specific mediation
between theory and fact in psychoanalysis ." 55 The practice
generates both the facts and the theory; the accommodation of
both to each other must be placed inside the parameters of
practice
.
Ricoeur shares with Habermas the view that the theory is
an attempt to explain the meaning of the distorted text of
the ana ly sand (i.e., to restore the split off meaning) and
the meaning of the forces distorting the text. This is why
psychoanalysis goes beyond philological hermeneutics. Both
the economic metaphors and the philological metaphors have
their place and neither can be reduced to or replaced by the
other. In that psychoanalysis shares with critical social
science the aim of examining modes of false consciousness and
explaining distorted communications, Ricoeur and Habermas
view it as an emancipatory form of science. The language
Freud uses to reify mental functioning has its place provided
we view it as capturing the processes of our self-
alienation. For we do, when we take ourselves as objects of
thought, often view ourselves as we view things. In this
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regard, thought is incurably metaphysical. This is not to
say, however, that it is legitimate to reduce unconscious
processes to the status of objects.
Both Ricoeur and Habermas think that psychoanalysis, in
seeking causal connections, utilizes forms of explanation
operative in the natural sciences. However, in that they see
potential problems with the way in which reification must be
seen in the service of referring to the experience and modes
of self-alienation, they emphasize that the mechanisms of the
unconscious are better understood as "split off symbols."
Hence conversion hysteria, phobias, slips, etc., are
distorted communications, symbolic communications, that have
become privatized. Viewing symptoms as "split off symbols,"
which both reveal and conceal, enables us to understand how
analysis as "talking cure" makes possible the restoration of
meaning and how it changes our functioning. After all,
analysis in the process of working-through proceeds through
an exchange of words.
Freud states:
Words are the essential tool of mental treatment. A
layman will no doubt find it hard to understand how
pathological disorders of the body and mind can be
eliminated by "mere" words. He will feel that he is
asked to believe in magic. And he will not be so very
wrong, for the words which we use in our everyday speech
are nothing other than watered-down magic. But we shall
have to follow a roundabout path in order to explain how
science sets about restoring to words a part at least of
their former magical power.
It is the power of words themselves, over against their
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use in hypnotic suggestions, that marks off Freud's treatment
of hysterics from the hypnotic treatment of Charcot. if
Freud's form of treatment does uncover causal connections,
then speaking of unconscious mechanisms as split off symbols
explains the possibility of analysis' efficacy. Analysis,
according to Ricoeur, involves a "reappropriation that
inverts the process of splitting off symbols.
As we've seen, this focus on "split off symbols" or the
semant icizat ion of unconscious thought processes and their
experiential causal connections is not without support from
Freud, who recognized early on that the analysand's language
and the structure of her story function as clues to diagnosis
and treatment. Commenting on his case histories of
hysterical women, Freud writes:
I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other
neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local
diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me
myself as strange that the case histories I write should
read like short stories and that, as one might say, they
lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself
with the reflection that the nature of the subject is
evidently responsible for this, rather than any
preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis
and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of
hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental
processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works
of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few
psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of
insight into the course of that affection. Case
histories of this kind are intended to be judged like
psychiatric ones; they have, however, one advantage over
the latter, namely an intimate connection between the
story of the patient's sufferings and the symptoms of his
illness— a connection for which we still search in vain
in the biographies of other psychoses.
The paralysis of conversion hysterics exemplifies
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behavior is ti cal ly , both by the absence of what is not said
and by what is said bodily, that which must be put into
language in order to become decipherable. For it is not a'
diseased organ that is the cause of that symptom, but an idea
related to that organ. Hence the language of the analysand
is a central focus. The therapeutic process is one in which
words and so thoughts give expression and form to symptoms
and gradually come to replace them.
Ricoeur's view, that "the proper object of psychoanalysis
is the effects of meaning
. .
." and that "for the analyst,
behaviour is a segment of meaning ," 59 likens the symptom or
dream to a verbal message and in this respect attributes
intent iona lity to unconscious thought processes. The
explanatory role of meaning and its etiological significance,
however, do not mean that for Ricoeur psychoanalytic theory
can be reformulated along lines that exclude explanation in
terms of causes. Just as the theory is not grasped if one
literally reifies the economic metaphors thereby losing sight
of the nature of what is explained, neither is it grasped if
one invokes a motive/cause distinction assimilating
psychoanalytic explanations to accounts of motives as reasons
for an action. This reason/cause distinction, which
separates the domains of action and movement and which may be
viewed as a variant of the methodological distinction between
understanding and explanation, is rejected by Ricoeur as an
inadequate construal of the nature of psychoanalytic
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explanations. For what requires explanation is not only the
meaning of unconscious intentions and their disguised link
with conscious ones, but also the very mechanisms of disguise
and the means by which what becomes unconscious does so and
remains so.
Ricoeur's rejection of the reason/cause distinction in
his later article on the question of proof represents a
change in his earlier position, in which he stated that
motives were irreducible to an explanation through
6 0causes. in this regard, Ricoeur endorses Michael
Sherwood's criticism of the separate domain position
.
61 On
this view, psychoanalysis explains human action in terms of
reasons, motives, and intentions, in contrast to explanations
in the natural sciences which invoke physical causes to
explain body movements. Ricoeur, following Sherwood, argues
that Freud ignored the distinction between motive and cause
and that it is legitimate to do so. As previously noted in
chapter two, Freud distinguished four different kinds of
causes, all of which are causally relevant factors. A
psychoanalytic explanation attempts to account for the origin
of a neurosis, the genesis of a particular symptom, its
function and significance, so in order to have a fully
psychoanalytic account, these levels of explanation must be
integrated. Depending on what Freud is concerned to explain,
that is, depending on the explanatory context in which an
incongruity presents itself, he may explain a particular
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symptom using the language of cause or motive. Explaining
the significance of a dream or symptom, for example, presumes
talk in terms of meaning. But at the same time, Freud will
connect this significance to the dream's or symptom's
function and may talk in terms of motives whether conscious
or unconscious. But explanation by reference to motives will
in turn be connected to an explanation that inserts these
motives into a causal account of the development of a
neurosis as well as into an account of the working-through
process of analysis. Ricoeur states: "What is remarkable
about psychoanalytic explanation is that it brings into view
motives which are causes and which require an explanation of
their autonomous functioning ." 62 Because the notion of the
unconscious problemat izes any simple minded view of motives
or intentions, we can see that intentions are deemed relevant
only insofar as they are explained by a network of causal
factors which at the same time reveal their significance. As
Ricoeur states:
To say, for example, that a feeling is unconscious is not
just to say that it resembles conscious motives occurring
in other circumstances; rather it is to say that it is to
be inserted as a causally relevant factor in order to
explain the incongruities of an act of behavior, and that
this explanation is itself a causally relevant factor in
the work— the working through—of analysis. 5
Ricoeur uses his depiction of the facts and relationship
between theory and analytic experience to stake out an answer
to the question of the nature of the truth claim of
psychoanalytic statements and the verification appropriate to
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such statements. By returning to the criteria for facts in
psychoanalysis, Ricoeur specifies a truth claim appropriate
to these facts. Unlike Habermas, who attributes to the
ana ly sand privileged cognitive access and so grants her the
position of epistemic arbiter regarding the truth of
interpretative constructions, Ricoeur holds a more
complicated account of the truth claim which, for him,
resides in the case histories and the constellation of
factors that constitute these case histories.
As regards the first two criteria for facts, truth,
according to Ricoeur, "is closer to that of Greek tragedy
than to that of modern physics ." 64 it involves a process
of recognizing ourself in the past which we re-enact in the
therapeutic encounter. This is why Ricoeur holds that the
realm of truth is characterized by that of a "saying-true" as
opposed to a "being-true," for the movement, from forms of
misunderstanding to recognition of both ourself and the other
as that to whom we direct demands and wishes, involves a
coming to self-knowledge through struggle, a struggle marked
by disguise and illusion in which "saying-true" has a
precarious status initially. However, the analysand, in
being brought to experience her past from new perspectives,
dramatically renders or repeats the sources of
misunderstanding. Hence "saying-true" becomes a possibility
in that the process of recognition is one of standing outside
ourself and seeing ourself as both actor in and author of a
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script which we recognize as our own.
The positive role that Ricoeur assigns to fantasies and
so the problem of supplanting truth with fiction or a
'reasoned mythology" is tempered by what he, following
Sherwood, calls the "narrative commitment." A psychological
case history is one which integrates incongruous phenomena
into a sequence of events that explains the isolated
phenomena and inserts them into the context of a larger,
unified narrative. The criterion of narrativity must retain
a critical dimension in order to be set against a rhetoric of
persuasion or mere adaptation to social norms. To accomplish
this, Ricoeur ties narrative intelligibility to the structure
of stories and story-telling which has both a tradition and
history by which we judge their intelligibility.
Having set the context for the kind of truth operative in
the domain of psychoanalysis within the narrative structure
of the facts, Ricoeur claims that the means of proof or
criteria of validation "reside in the very articulation of
the entire network constituted by the theory, the
interpretative procedures, the therapeutic treatment and the
narrative structure of analytic experience ." 65
Verification is a cumulative process in which the different
means of proof must reinforce one another. Ricoeur holds
that these different means are not viciously dependent on one
another but rather, together, form a constellation by which
to judge the accuracy of an explanatory statement. Ricoeur
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does not explicitly spell out the means by which the
non-narrative
, explanatory commitments of the theory are to
be verified and this is a serious shortcoming. However, in
reaching outside the narrative statements by invoking the
criteria of the theory itself which includes generalizations,
lawlike propositions and hypotheses concerning the
functioning of the physical apparatus, he does not confine
the means of proof to that of a hermeneutics of
understanding. Further, the interpretative procedures and
the therapeutic treatment can be viewed as independent of the
other two criteria in that the interpretative procedure may
uncover new facts which the theory does not cover and the
therapeutic treatment relies on a change in the analysand.
While Ricoeur states that this verification process is both
complex and problematic, he concludes that "when these
criteria of validation do not derive from one another, but
mutually reinforce one another, they constitute the proof
apparatus in psychoanalysis ." 66
Appraisal of Griinbaum's Critique of the Hermeneutic
Interpretation
Griinbaum argues that the hermeneutic interpretation does
not do justice to the claims and methodology of
psychoanalytic theory and therapy. Furthermore, he argues
that their account is incoherent. Hence we will now turn to
this critique and to my position with respect to this
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critique
.
Grunbaum contends that Ricoeur truncates the domain of
facts relevant to psychoanalytic theory by restricting them
to the verbal productions of the analysand. For as Grunbaum
claims
, Freud's etiologies as well as his dream theory spring
the confines of Ricoeur's speech acts
.
67 Now in an obvious
sense this is true. Freud's wish-fulfillment theory of
dreams and his etiological hypotheses are held to be
applicable to human beings whether they are in analytic
treatment or not. For example, Freud's interpretative
explanations of dreams, though they rest on the verbalized
reports of the dreams, purport to explain not only the
significance, function and origin of particular dreams, but
also the motives for dreaming and the function that dreams
serve for everyone. Grunbaum mounts his defense of the claim
"that the import of Freud's clinical theory defies the
ontological restraint of Ricoeur's verbalistic
straight jacket " by adducing the above-mentioned subject
matter as outside the analytic setting yet clearly within the
domain of psychoanalytic concern. All sorts of
phenomena—transference, parapraxes, defense mechanisms,
etc.—occur and are relevant outside the treatment setting.
Freud's utilization of the transference in treatment is
predicated on the claim that the analysand is repeating or
transferring onto the analyst her defensive patterns and
unconscious conflicts which are connected with her neurosis.
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But more generally, he recognizes that the unanalyzed as well
are caught in the shackles of transference; all of our adult
relationships are repetitions of an internal drama in which
we play out and cast others into roles which are repetitions
of our early parental and sibling relationships.
Granted that Ricoeur shrinks the domain of "facts," let
us recall that he does so precisely because he holds that
"psychoanalytic theory ... is the codification of what
takes place in the analytic situation ." 69 in as much as
this is his starting point, Grunbaum's emphasis on the range
of relevance that extends beyond this is somewhat pedantic.
Furthermore, Ricoeur's emphasis on the intersub j ective
clinical encounter marks off the empirical basis upon which
Freud constructed his theory. It is true that the observance
of a parapraxis, for example, is a public, "objective" event
and one that Freud explained in terms of conflicting or
interfering intentions. His approach to the explanation of
parapraxes applied to slips inside or outside the treatment
setting. But this is not the point. Freud collected data
from the analytic encounter; his theory was based on the
empirical data gleaned from this encounter. The full
explanation of a parapraxis became possible because he had
available to him a willing participant who agreed to free
associate and thereby to comply with his method of
investigation. It is not so much that Ricoeur shrinks the
subject matter to just what occurs in the treatment setting
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but rather that he holds that this is the empirical domain
which constitutes the basis of proof. Repressed, infantile
motives for dreaming are not excluded from the purview of
Ricoeur's interpretation of psychoanalytic theory just
because he deems the verbal dream reports to be that which is
analyzed or that which is a "fact." Freud never found
empirical verification for his inference of repressed
infantile motives outside the empirical data derived from the
analysis of the language of the analysand, though he applied
the verification he received from treatment to the
explanation of phenomena outside of it. A "fact" is more
pregnant with data than Griinbaum's view is willing to allow
and in this sense Ricoeur's interpretation widens rather than
truncates the purview of Freudian theory. Griinbaum neglects
to consider that in the actual Freudian data base, that is,
the data that Freud attends to and reports when he's relaying
his case histories, how something is said is as important as
what is said. For example, in the Rat Man case, Freud
reports: "He proceeded with the greatest difficulty."^
Freud also attends to the facial expression and the
omissions, as well as the analysand's choice of words. The
point is that the intersub j ective
,
interpretative component
is central. We can concede that Ricoeur's "facts" are facts
even though they have yet to be tied causally to their
referents .
Griinbaum observes that Ricoeur waffles on the issue of
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the nature of causal explanation as it pertains to the
evaluation of the status of Freudian theory. m appealing to
the non-narrative means of proof by invoking the criteria of
the theory which utilizes causal hypotheses to explain
behavior, Ricoeur acknowledges that Freud explains human
actions causally. Unconscious motivations are causally
relevant to the symptoms that manifest them. Grunbaum's
charge, that Ricoeur's account of the epistemological truth
claim of psychoanalysis is incoherent, is based on Ricoeur's
acknowledgment of the role of causal explanation and at the
same time a rejection of the means of proof appropriate to
such explanation. From Grunbaum's perspective, if
psychoanalytic explanations are causal then "the
establishment of a causal connection in psychoanalysis, no
less than in 'academic psychology' or medicine, has to rely
on modes of inquiry that were refined from time-honored
canons of causal inference pioneered by Francis Bacon and
John Stuart Mill.""'7 !
Griinbaum is correct in pointing out that Ricoeur's
account needs to specify by what means causal connections are
to be established. Ricoeur's vagueness as to the nature of
causal explanation and as to how causal claims are to be
established is exemplified in his remark that psychoanalysis
must include "in the process of self-understanding operations
7 2that were originally reserved for the natural sciences."
Causal explanation of an unspecified sort is a means of proof
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for Ricoeu r , when taken in conjunction with the other three
means of proof, these being the interpretative procedure, the
therapeutic treatment and the narrative structure of analytic
experience. Though Ricoeur repeatedly tells us that he is
not attempting to set up a rigid dichotomy between
explanation in the natural and human sciences, in holding
that psychoanalysis is a human science and in failing to
specify how causal claims are to be established, he
equivocates on the whole issue of causality and the
verification procedure necessary to establish it.
Grunbaum decries Ricoeur's appeal to the explanatory role
of meaning as both a misinterpretation of how Freud uses the
term 'meaning' and as incapable of validating the causal
claims of psychoanalytic theory. it is here that we get to
the heart of his critique. Grunbaum assumes that the
hermeneutic appeal to relations of meaning depends on the
attribution of intent iona 1 ity and therefore agency to the
unconscious. On his reading, to construe symptoms as
intending or referring to the underlying wish or conflict
that is the cause of it is incoherent. Grunbaum holds that
causal connections between mental events are the foundation
for Freud s theory and not logical connections between
intentional relations of meaning. Causation is necessary for
science, and the hermeneut icists have not established that
there is causation. At best, semantic relationships are only
a hint that causal patterns might exist.
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To be sure, Freud speaks of the meaning of a symptom or a
dream, but Grunbaum argues that he uses the term 'meaning' in
the non-semantic sense of definite causal origin
.
73
The
symptom is not a linguistic representation of its unconscious
cause; it does not denote or semantically stand for the
repressed wish. The symptom is a trace or sign having no
intention though it can be likened to a linguistic symbol,
having semantic meaning, once conceptualized
psychoanalytically, precisely because, in interpreting the
sign in terms of its cause ret rod icti vely
,
we infer the
presence of repressed impulses or intentions. Thus as
Grunbaum states, neurotic symptoms can be called "symbols"
in virtue of having the conatively vicarious function of
affording substitutive gratifications or outlets and the
epistemic function of attesting to repressed yearnings .
"
7 ^
The fact that we can talk about symptoms as having meaning
does not license the assimilation of the symptom qua trace to
a linguistic representation which is intentional.
Grunbaum draws on the work of Robert Shope to defend his
interpretation of how Freud uses the term 'meaning.' Shope
holds that symptoms, dreams, parapraxes, etc., are signs that
are clues to the investigator
.
75 in this way they have the
same relation to their meaning as the relation between an
organic symptom and the cause of it. Grunbaum argues that
the "meaning kinship" that the hermeneuticists locate between
a repressed idea and a neurotic symptom cannot itself account
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for the hypothesized causal role of the repressed idea. For
a thematic affinity alone does not show that the repressed
idea caused or engendered a particular behavior or symptom
and it is precisely this causal connection that must be
established. On Griinbaum's reading, we cannot claim to
uncovered a hidden intention on the basis of a thematic
affinity where no causal connection has been established
trading on the word 'meaning' the hermeneuticists talk o
unconscious intentions and semanticize symptoms, rather
viewing them as compromise or substitute formations. in
way, they give up the need to substantiate the causal
connection between the symptom and the repression that
engendered it. For Griinbaum, the symptom has no
propositional meaning; it is not a message from the
unconscious and ought not to be construed as such.
Unconscious thought processes, on Grunbaum's view, intend
nothing. Paranoid behavior, for example, is not a linguistic
representation of repressed homosexuality, nor is it an
attempt to communicate these yearnings.
Griinbaum s point, that a "meaning kinship" does not
establish that there is a causal connection, is correct.
However, he seems to miss the fact that parapraxes, symptoms,
dreams, etc., take on an individual character which is
explained only by semantic relationships involving material
peculiar to the individual involved. This individual nature
of a symptom or parapraxis makes neurotic symptoms somewhat
have
. By
f
than
this
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unlike other diseases or disorders.
Grunbaum's likening of neurotic symptoms to traces or
signs having no semantic content follows Jones's
interpretation of Freud's symbolism. According to Jones,
"symbolism arises as the result of intrapsychic conflict
between the repressing tendencies and the repressed.
Only what is repressed is symbolized; only what is repressed
needs to be symbolized ." 76 Griinbaum is correct in noting
that for Freud a symptom or dream is a compromise formation,
a substitute satisfaction that is engendered by a
repression. According to Griinbaum, if we speak of symbols in
this context we must understand that symptoms as symbols are
not linguistic vehicles of communication, though we can view
them as disguises for what is repressed in the sense that
they manifest the repression. Griinbaum quotes from Freud in
defense of his view: "A dream does not want to say anything
to anyone. It is not a vehicle for communication ." 77
However, Freud's next phrase states: "on the contrary, it is
meant to remain misunderstood."
Who means it to remain misunderstood? Is Freud using
"meant" here to refer to the purposive function of
unconscious thought processes? Is he giving a functional as
opposed to an intentional account? If so, we need not
attribute intentionality to the unconscious. Freud states:
"all dreams have meaning. Their strangeness is due to the
distortions that have been made in the expression of their
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meaning. Their absurdity is deliberate and expresses
derision, ridicule and contradiction ." 78 Here we get
evidence that Freud is giving more than a purposive account
of dreams in terms of ends. The dream may not want to say
anything to anyone, but does something else want to say
something? Freud assumes that dreams are intelligible, that
they have a meaning, but it is not at all clear that he
thinks that we have to posit agency in the unconscious in
order to make explicable this meaning. A look at the way in
which he talks about the interpretation of "typical dreams"
may help clarify this point.
Ricoeur notes that Freud's discussion of typical dreams
and the representability of the symbols in them makes use of
a sedimented, cultural symbolism, a symbolism that is not the
product of the dream-work and the interpretation of which
does not require that the dreamer free associate. Freud
a is t ingu ishes the symbolic relation between a dream-element
ana its translation from the relation uncovered via the
associative, analytic technique. In typical dreams this
relation between a dream-element and its translation or
meaning is termed "symbolic." Freud states that the dream
element is a "symbol" of the unconscious dream thought
.
79
Typical dreams make use of symbolization which is already
present in unconscious thinking, the very same unconscious
thinking and use of symbolization that is projected in
mythology, religion, art, linguistic idioms, etc. This view
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of symbolism in part explains why Freud emphasizes the
importance of instruction in the history of civilization,
mythology, the psychology of religion and the science of
literature for analytic training
.
80 The interpretation of
the symbolism of typical dreams is the work of the analyst,
for the ana ly sand rarely has associations to these elements.
The translation of these typical dreams is more a matter of
empirical investigation in that the analyst draws on her
knowledge of a shared, cultural symbolism.
This particular use of the term 'symbol' has an important
place in analytic work. Ricoeur holds that to say dreams
have a meaning is to say they are intelligible and that we
can substitute for the dream account another account with a
semantics and a syntax
.
81 it is not at all clear that the
hermeneut icists hold that symptoms and dreams intend their
underlying causes. Grunbaum may be guilty here of
misconstruing the hermeneutic position with regard to this
aspect of the issue of meaning. The unconscious may be
intentional just in virtue of the fact that by influencing
our speech and/or our actions it does say something.
8 2Freud, as Moller notes, attributes no neuroses to
inner organs, only to the whole person. This suggests that
the person speaks, not an underlying repressed wish. The
whole complicated, conflicted person can be forced to speak
because she is influenced by causal processes. Of course,
what is said is rarely unambiguous. Generally, symptoms both
109
conceal and reveal and this very opposition would account for
their compromise character. When Freud talks about the
meaning of obsessional symptoms or actions he traces them
thematically to the significant scene or event which the act
IS a repetition or representation of. For example, the
hysteric who complained of piercing pains between her
eyebrows was found to be suffering from reminiscences of a
piercing, enquiring look from her grandmother. Freud cites
examples such as these to illustrate the symbolic relation
between the determining cause (significant event) and the
particular symptom. This use of the term 'symbolic relation'
is consistent with Griinbaum. Freud states: "it is as though
there were an intention to express the mental state by means
of a physical one; and linguistic usage affords a bridge by
which this can be effected ." 83 The hermeneutic construal
of the link between a symptom and its postulated cause is a
semantic one. As we see, this semantic link is often the
starting point for a psychoanalytic explanation. The problem
with stopping at the semantic link is that this connection
cannot provide evidence for a causal connection.
It's not so much that the hermeneut icists give up the
attempt to establish a causal connection. They hold that
Freud did establish one, but it's a connection at the level
of communicative understanding rather than at the level of
physical causes. The hermeneut icists want to establish what
Freud's science accomplished. Freud's proof that symptoms
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could be explained in terms of their causes was the fact that
a cure was sometimes effective. Freud held that a causal
connection between physical events was operative, but since
talk was the means of cure, a reduction of mental to physical
causes was not yet possible. The hermeneut icists pick up on
the language of intentionality that Freud uses to explain the
significance, function and development of a neurosis. Freud
refers to the "intention of the obsessional action " 84 and
when he does so, he gives it a propositional meaning. The
intention is saying something or rather the obsessional
action is saying something. However, to grant this is not to
say that the symptom intends its cause or underlying wish.
In many cases the symptom manifests the wish while also
serving as a defense against it. Hence the symptom may not
intend anything but the conflicted person may.
In order to highlight the tension between Griinbaum and
the hermeneut icists and the evidence for it in Freud's
writings, let us return to the problem of interpreting
"typical" dreams and symptoms. In his case analyses, Freud
traces the meaning of a neurotic symptom, dream or parapraxis
to its connection with the individual's past experiences.
What makes an "historical" interpretation possible is in fact
the idiosyncratic, individual features or manifestations of a
symptom. However, through his investigative, clinical work,
Freud discovered typical symptoms which are practically
identical and which often accompany a particular neurotic
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disorder. Similarly, there are dreams which may be called
typical in that they occur in large numbers of people and
display an identical content. Now while these common,
typical symtoms appear to resist an easy interpretation on
historical lines, and so are difficult to connect with the
patient's life, they are, according to Freud, what enables us
to take our bearnigs in forming a diagnosis
.
85
Forming a
diagnosis involves positing explanatory-causative factors,
which give rise to the particular cluster of symptoms. The
problem lies in the fact that the typical symptoms resist
along historical lines any interpretation that links them to
a common experience. Freud, commenting on the failure of
historical factors to account for the preponderance or the
why of typical symptoms states:
So we are now faced by the depressing discovery that,
though we can give a satisfactory explanation of the
individual neurotic symptoms by their connection with
experiences, our skill leaves us in the lurch when we
come to the far more frequent typical symptoms. 8
Freud is seeking to develop an explanatory science that
will relate these typical symptoms to a common experience and
when he finds no common experience this throws the historical
interpretative method into doubt. Just as an individual form
of a symptom is related to that individual's past
experiences, so Freud thought this ought to hold for symptoms
that were shared in common. In an attempt to account for
this problem, Freud conjectures: "If the individual symptoms
are so unmistakably dependent on the patient's experience, it
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remains possible that the typical symptoms may go back to an
experience which is in itself typical-common to all human
beings ." 87 it is clear that, while Freud's hypotheses seek
to move beyond an individual, historical interpretation (one
that the hermeneuticists give priority to) toward an account
of psychological structures and processes that are more
universal, he holds to the centrality of pursuing the
historical interpretation of symptoms.
Grunbaum overlooks the experiential character of analysis
that is at the heart of Ricoeur's reading of Freud. If "the
dream is meant to be misunderstood," if "its absurdity is
deliberate, might it not be the case that Freud is
describing the experience of unconscious conflict—a conflict
in which the very substitute gratifications in their
idiosyncratic detail acquire significance by reference to
their experienced cause and to the resistance against this
cause? In analysis, analyst and analysand alike proceed as
if behavior is a segment of meaning. The resistance and the
transference are crucial precisely because they are
indicators in the present of past conflicts. From an
experiential point of view, regarding a slip, dream or
symptomatic act as intentional is part of what is involved in
adopting a psychoanalytic perspective. The analysand's
attention is directed toward what she may previously have
regarded as inconsequential. Converting to a psychoanalytic
viewpoint, viewing symptoms as deliberate distortions, marks
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a change in the analysand's attitude toward her functioning
ana allows for an experience of change. What seems alien,
what is split off is given the possibility of being
apprehended
.
Grunbaum ignores that the phenomena of transference and
resistance are the more immediate indicators of the
pathogen. They are present in the analytic encounter and are
the access to the pathogenic cause in a way that repression
can't be precisely because the resistance hides it. in
focusing on Freud's general etiological claims, Grunbaum
makes programmatic what Freud in his case histories worked
into an individualized, narrative history. Furthermore,
Grunbaum's focus on the lifting of a repression to the
exclusion of the more predominant tool of analytic therapy
(i.e., analysis of the transference and resistance) belies
his exclusion of the experienced domain of the clinical
encounter and the facts which come to light there.
Freud's claim for the efficacy of psychoanalytic
treatment was based on veridical insight but veridical
insight was not a sufficient condition. Memories, alone,
were not reliable and this was why analysis of the
transference was central. Furthermore, merely informing the
analysand of the meaning of her repression was not
sufficient. In many cases such a move only served to
intensify conflict, resistance and other defensive
maneuvers. Analytic interpretations in and of themselves do
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little to effect therapeutic change. Insight to be
efficacious must be experienced. As Freud says: "To have
hearo something and to have experienced something are in
their psychological nature two quite different things, even
though the content of both is the same ." 88 The attention
to the analysis and use of the transference and resistance is
crucial because they are the here and now repetitions of
unconscious conflicts and yearnings. Through their enactment
and analysis in the present, the analysand experiences her
wishes, fears, conflicts and ambivalence as her own. Slips,
symptoms, dreams, etc. that serve as clues to conflicting
intentions are experienced as communicative clues, by analyst
and analysand. Insofar as the analysand is committed to
understanding the causes of her conflicts and the way in
which she remains cut off from her functioning, viewing these
psychical acts as intentional communications affords the
possibility of allowing repressed ideas into consciousness.
Further, it affords the possibility of recognizing the agent
of the intentional communication as part of herself, that
part who in the course of analysis, no longer wants to be cut
off from the way she constitutes meaning and so from the way
she is influenced by the experiences of her past. We might
say that the extent to which the analysand does regard her
psychical acts as communications is the extent to which she
can reappropriate her unconscious wishes as her own.
In this regard, we need to consider Griinbaum's critique
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of Habermas's claim that psychoanalytic therapy "owes its
efficacy to overcoming causal connections themselves ." 89
On the face of it, it is incoherent, as Griinbaum charges, to
say that the causal linkage between a repression and the
neurosis the repression engenders is overcome or dissolved in
the therapeutic conquest. Griinbaum argues that "far from
being dissolved' by the therapeutic conquest of the
neurosis, this very causal linkage even entails the
therapeutic conquest ." 90 To speak, as Habermas does, of
overcoming causal linkages only makes sense if we understand
him to be referring not to the dissolving of the causal
connection, which as Griinbaum points out the therapy makes
use of, but rather to the dissolving of the hold that
repression exerts on us. In other words, Habermas is
referring to the experience of self-reflection that is a part
of therapeutic insight. The causal efficacy involved in the
lifting of a repression only becomes relevant,
psychoanalyt ically
,
insofar as the analysand experiences the
repression in the present.
While Habermas mistakenly assumes that psychoanalytic
therapy does not make use of known causal connections as does
9 1medicine, he is correct in pointing out that
psychoanalysis can overcome causal connections in the sense
that genuine, experienced insight into the cause of a
neurosis can change our relationship to our functioning.
Knowledge is in this sense a form of action. Self-
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reflection, which analysis is supposed to bring about, is a
transformative process; the pathogenic idea is no longer
alien. By recognizing it as ours, we can dissolve its power
over us. This notion of transformative knowledge differs
from knowledge about the causes of a physical disease. For
reflection on the causes of measles, for example, does not
change the fact that we manifest that disease.
Of course one could argue that if you come to understand
a repression, this very understanding can have a causal
effect. Understanding can itself be a cause if we are causal
organisms. On this view psychoanalysis would make use of
causal connections in the same way medicine does, only
instead of influencing the organism at the physical level,
the influence would enter at the level of understanding. In
this case, Habermas is wrong to rule out causal efficacy.
But nevertheless, he is correct in pointing to the experience
of self-reflection that psychoanalytic knowing fosters.
Understanding as a cause is not pinned down physically, and
therefore it can't be likened to the taking of a drug to cure
a disease. The hermeneut icists capture an experience of
change that operates at the level of the whole person.
Understanding a cause does not mean the mere intellectual
grasp of it. There is an element of choice in what Habermas
is trying to capture in his use of language that Griinbaum's
critique rules out. Psychogenic causes may operate like
some somatogenic ones, but since our access to these causes
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is only through our psychical apparatus and since our
experienced past is the determining cause, we experience
these causes as meaning structures.
Habermas and Ricoeur focus on the intersub jective
,
constructive, historical uncovering of meaning and use as
their model the full analysis of dreams, the case histories
and the writings on therapeutic technique. Like Grunbaum,
they argue that the clinical encounter prompted the
descriptive and dynamic use of language, but unlike Grunbaum,
they place emphasis on the explanatory role of meaning.
Though chronologically Freud's analytic work began with the
treatment of hysterics and neurotics and the interpretation
of symptoms, methodologically, in his writings he often used
the dream model, a model that illustrated the workings of the
unconscious in normal as well as pathological cases, to
clarify the work of deciphering the sense of neurotic
symptoms. Freud's explanation of the workings of the
unconscious via dreams locates psychoanalysis within a wider
domain than that of a psychology of pathological processes.
The possibility of extending the dream model, a model
that specifically draws on the fields of literature,
mythology, and philology, etc., to interpret symptoms and
other psychical productions, is what invites the
hermeneutical classification of psychoanalysis as a human
science. Habermas's and Ricoeur's appraisal of the
scientific status of psychoanalysis focuses on psychoanalysis
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as a form of praxis, not simply therapeutic practice, but
praxis understood as the interpretative explanation of
psychical productions ranging from neurotic symptoms to
dreams, art, morality, religion and culture. However, to
recognize that psychoanalysis draws on the humanities and
even takes them as its subject matter, does not force us to
place it within the realm of the human sciences. Freud
highlights the difference between medical science and his
science by stating: "The experience of an analyst lies in
another world, with other phenomena and other laws ." 92
This statement does not entail a separation of kinds of
science, though it does call attention to the role of
experience, a role that the hermeneuticis ts give priority to.
To say, as Freud does, that the only way it is possible
to understand psychoanalysis is by undergoing an analysis 93
is not to claim that psychoanalytic theory cannot be grasped
via its theoretical elaboration alone. But it is to say that
the transformative nature of analytic truth is only grasped
in the experience of it. Though psychoanalytic theory
developed from analytic practice, the bond between
therapeutic success and theorizing widened as Freud grew to
realize the difficulties involved in the whole conception of
a cure. In this regard, Griinbaum's focus on the therapy, as
that which lends credence to Freud's scientific claims, may
be misdirected.
Recall that Grunbaum assigns a peripheral status to the
119
metapsychology in arguing against the hermeneutic charge of
Freud's scientistic self-misunderstanding. Grunbaum holds
that Freud was claiming a natural science status for his
clinical theory and since the clinical theory does not depend
on the status of the metapsychology, the clinical theory
alone is what needs to be assessed. In contrast, Ricoeur
attempts to show that while the economic language of the
metapsychology is problematic if viewed literally, when seen
as systematizing what occurs in clinical practice, it
constitutes the unique discourse appropriate to analytic
theory. Ricoeur does not hold that the metapsychology is
historically derived from analytic practice. Rather he holds
that Freud brought to his metapsychological systematization
of what occurs in practice the language and models of the
natural sciences of his day. The analytic encounter is
epistemologically prior but insofar as the hermeneutic
reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory gives priority to the
intersub jective, clinical encounter, it closes off the
possibility of seeing the way in which the metapsychology
could function as an early model for a science of
psychology. Clinical practice would on this view be the
basis for the scientific theorizing.
The hermeneutic insight that the metapsychology is
central needs to be retained particularly if we are to follow
the later Freud. The early Freud did abandon "The Project
for a Scientific Psychology" but he anticipated a future in
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which the study of mental processes could be integrated with
somatic processes, thereby filling in the gaps in his
theoretical articulation of the psychology of mental
processes. Freud's claims that the theory was independent of
its medical application to the treatment of neurotics, that
the use of analysis for the treatment of neurotics was only
one of its applications, and that he did not want the therapy
to destroy the science ,® 4 illustrate that the
metapsychology
,
though a primitive attempt to lay the ground
for the science of psychology, was the systematization of a
new discipline that had yet to become fully scientific.
The point I am trying to stress here is that, though
psychoanalytic theory was built upon the success Freud had in
the clinical treatment of neurotics, this application of the
theory functioned as a proof that the theory was scientific
or at least on the road toward being so. The bond between
cure and research that Freud acknowledges to be the basis for
his discovery is restrictive if one limits the scope of the
theory to dependence on this bond. The later Freud, aware of
the repressive demands of civilization, became increasingly
pessimistic about effecting cures. Regardless of whether
psychoanalysis was able to overcome the resistances of the
analysand and to lift repressions, Freud held that the theory
at least explained why this was not always possible. Just as
there exists a gap between medical science and medical
practice as well as a gap between a scientific discipline and
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its fields of applicability
,
so Freud's metapsychology can be
viewed as an attempt to stake out a field of inquiry that is
independent of its applicability, though its research
depended upon the knowledge gained in analytic practice.
Drawing a parallel with the origin of other disciplines,
Freud states:
The possibility of its application to medical purposes
must not lead us astray. Electricity and radiology alsohave their medical application, but the science to whichthey both belong is none the less physics. Nor can theirsituation be effected by historical arguments. The wholetheory of electricity had its origin in an observation of
a nerve muscle preparation; yet no one would dream today
of regarding it as part of physiology.
What is being argued here is that Freud's metapsychology
was the scientific component; it was to be the foundation of
the field of psychology. Here we can distinguish between
psychology as a science and therapeutic practice. In the
case of psychoanalysis, clinical practice suggested
directions or possible lines of connection for the future
scientific advancement of the theory. On the basis of this
as yet incomplete and hypothetical model (the
metapsychology), Freud extended the theory's application to
the domains of anthropology, sociology, literature, art,
religion, etc.
Psychoanalysis dealt with phenomena that biology,
chemistry, psychiatry and other branches of medical science
could provide no account of. The gulf between the physical
and the mental could as yet not be overcome. Psychical
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phenomena and their causes were investigated using a
psychoanalytic method, a method that Freud acknowledged was
one sided in that it restricted itself to particular
subjects, points of view and methods
.
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Approaching the
explanation of neurotic symptoms by looking for somatic
causes led nowhere. Psychoanalysis as a depth psychology
could provide the groundwork for the future birth of a
scientific psychiatry.
Given this view, the language of drives that the
hermeneut icis ts find objectionable is not really the
problem. The mechanistic character of this language serves
to point ambiguously to the possible future connection
between somatic and mental processes. The metapsychology
systematizes and gives a causal account of the meaning
relationships that Freud uncovers in his therapeutic
practice
.
The hermeneutic focus on the meaning relationships is
absolutely basic. Freud extended medical practice by
focusing on the gap between appearance and reality in human
speech and behavior and by systematizing explanations for
it. What he discovered was a set of individual diseases,
although they could be collected under such general rubrics
as "neurosis." The point here is that one individual's
parapraxis or neurosis is different from another individual's
because it has to do (semantically) with particular,
individual fears and experiences. Hermeneutics and
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interpretation are involved and must be involved because
these disorders stem from our interactions as people with
important others. This individual, interpretative component
forces a different model for evaluating the status of
psychoanalysis from that provided by Grunbaum.
Because I have argued that the natural/human science
division is more problematic than illuminating, especially
given the tension within psychoanalysis between theory and
practice, I do not follow the hermeneuticists in classifying
psychoanalysis as a human science. Their reading widens the
gulf between natural science and narrative explanation more
than is necessary. However, I do wish to retain their
insight that an epistemology adequate to the form that
psychoanalysis takes needs to be established.
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CHAPTER 4
GRUNBAUM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
My examination of the scientistic and hermeneutic
evaluations of psychoanalysis has drawn heavily on Griinbaum's
analysis of these positions. in agreeing with much of
Griinbaum's critiques, I have also pointed out where my
position differs from Griinbaum's, but I have not yet
subjected Griinbaum's position to a close examination. in
this chapter I will isolate the presuppositions of Griinbaum's
evaluation of psychoanalysis and call into question the J
adequacy of the epistemological- and methodological norms that ij
he brings to his analysis of psychoanalytic theory. I will
begin my critique of Griinbaum by noting that the normative |
*
methodological principles that Griinbaum invokes become
i
problematic once we dislodge his assumption that he is
following an immanent critique of Freud in assessing
psychoanalysis against Freud's own methodological conception
of science. I will then examine Griinbaum's major arguments
in support of the denial that there are at present "good"
scientific grounds for accepting Freud's theoretical claims.
I will also argue that, while Griinbaum distances himself from
Popper in that he holds that psychoanalysis meets minimal
requirements for scientific status, Griinbaum operates out of
the same conceptual framework as does Popper in that he
brings a rigid notion of methodology to bear on the
scientistic and hermeneutic readings. Griinbaum's
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methodological restrictions may not be defensible when
psychoanalysis is taken to develop methodologically out of
medical science rather than out of physics. Grunbaum uses
physics as his paradigm model for science, and in so doing
allows that model to dictate the methodological norms against
which all scientific claims to knowledge are assessed.
Freud's Canons of Science Those That Grunbaum Ascribes toHim?
Grunbaum begins his critique of psychoanalysis by stating
that he is going to "appraise Freud's arguments for his
monumental clinical theory of personality and therapy by his
(Freud's) own standards ." 1 Separating himself from the
hermeneut icists who reject Freud's self-assessment that
psychoanalysis is a natural science and the scientistic
proposal that psychoanalysis be evaluated as a natural
science, Grunbaum holds that his verdict will not be
"predicated on the imposition of some extraneous
methodological purism," because he is utilizing Freud's
own standards. Now it is precisely this point that I wish to
unsettle. When Grunbaum pursues this immanent critique he
unwittingly reads his conception of natural science into the
term ' natural science ' that is advanced by Freud. This is an
error that a subtler hermeneutical approach to reading Freud
might have avoided. We want to understand what Freud meant
when he (Freud) said that psychoanalysis was a natural
131
science. The possibilities are more varied than Grunbaum
seems to realize, probably because Grunbaum is reading Freud
after several decades of sophisticated philosophical
reflection on scientific methodology.
Unlike Popper
, Grunbaum is thoroughly acquainted with the
vast Freudian corpus. He consequently does not make
uninformed claims about Freud's statements on methodological
issues. However, as I argued in the preceding chapter,
Grunbaum's conception of Freud's self-understanding is
anachronistic. In arguing against the hermeneut icists
•
charge that Freud misunderstood his own project when he
labeled it na tural science and their proposal that it should
be evaluated as a human science, Grunbaum cites the evident
passages in which Freud reveals that he thought of
psychoanalysis as a natural science. The basic hermeneutical
problems involved in assessing Freud's self-understanding in
these texts given intervening methodological discussion cast
suspicion on the idea that Grunbaum's notion of natural
science is necessarily identical with Freud's and these
problems have already been noted. Indeed, there is evidence,
as I have indicated, to support the idea that Freud's notion
of natural science is considerably wider than Grunbaum's, in
which case Grunbaum's methodologically sophisticated
proposals for how we should evaluate the scientific status of
psychoanalysis may not be coincident with Freud's own
standards. Grunbaum may still hold that Freud's arguments
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are flawed, but he cannot hold that he is criticizing Freud
on Freud's own terms if in fact he is misreading Freud's
terminology by subtly substituting a modern conception of
natural science that Freud could not have intended.
As I argued in the preceding chapter, Freud does not
subscribe to a separatism as regards kinds of science, and
works with a quite general notion of science. He speaks of
different sciences, but physics, chemistry, mythology and
literature, for examp le, all fall under the rubric of
science
.
Any estimate of psycho-analysis would be incomplete if it
failed to make clear that, alone among the medical
disciplines, it has the most extensive relations with the
mental sciences, and that it is in a position to play a
part of the same importance in the studies of religious
and cultural history and in the sciences of mythology and
literature as it is in psychiatry.
Griinbaum claims that Freud's standards or "criteria of
validation are essentially those of hypothet ico-deduct ive
inductivism" and he cites passages from Freud to document
this allegation. ^ What is perhaps most striking about the
passages to which Griinbaum refers is not their compatibility
with the hypothet ico-deduct ive model of explanation but their
general focus on the empirical nature of scientific activity
and the pragmatic value of basic concepts. One can find
passages in Freud's texts which assert that psychoanalysis is
related to lots of sciences, but the major claim that is
almost always made is that psychoanalysis is an empirical or
natural science, a science based on investigations that are
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grounded on observation and experience. it might have been
the case that Freud would have recognized a less
observations lly based science, such as literature or
mythology, as non-empirical or non-natural, but it would not
follow that he would have regarded these disciplines as
unscientific.
We need to remember that Freud's emphasis on the
observational basis of his clinical theory is not predicated
on a reductive empiricism. The psychoanalytic method of
investigation is fundamentally grounded upon inferences from
observation. Basic to the ontology of psychoanalytic theory
is an inference to the unconscious, something that we can
neither directly observe nor directly be conscious of. Freud
says that what warrants the inference of the existence of
phenomena such as the unconscious are "other proofs or
signs ." 5 These other proofs or signs are given in clinical
experience. Freud refers to Bernheim's experiment of
post
-hypnotic suggestion as one such proof, but interestingly
enough labels laboratory productions or proofs as artificial
facts in contrast to natural facts which are instantiated by
neurotic patients. Here we see the medical thinking immanent
to Freud s theoretical remarks. His reference to signs in
the quotation above specifically suggests that he is thinking
of psychoanalysis as a science utilizing natural science
techniques analogous to those already implicated in
medicine. Freud's use of observation and experience, his
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theorizing from them and his reliance on the evidence of
clinical proofs or signs point to the fact that medicine, and
not physics, provides the scientific model that legitimates
its natural science status.
It is of course true that medicine utilizes hypothetical-
deductive explanations
,
but it is also true that this form of
explanation often fails to compel a particular therapeutic
practice in connection with a particular case of a particular
disease. For example, in clinical medicine the specific sick
person is the focus of investigation and the relevant data
that need to be incorporated into a diagnosis of suggested
treatment of the illness include her particular symptoms as
well as her environmental background (her history prior to
illness, her habits, life style, etc.). This interactive
complexity and uniqueness is difficult to encapsulate into
the hypothetico-deductive model. In medicine, as in
psychoanalysis, the idiosyncratic details are often the most
revealing. In diagnosis, or even in therapy, chains of
hypothetico-deductive inference may be utilized that will be
appropriately supplemented by the physician's personal
recognition of the situation. The model of physics, based on
a conception of experimental sampling from large homogeneous
populations, does not exhaust the thinking involved in a
medical or psychoanalytic situation.
Hypothetical-deductive explanation is often inadequate
when applied to discussions about the etiology of a
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particular medical disorder. The term 'etiology' is defined
as the study of the causes of disease. Diseases are often
recognized as having an aggregate of causes and not just one
cause. "Etiology applies to the entire mass of factors that
relate, somehow, to the disease in question. To speak of
a necessary cause in medicine generally involves abstracting
from an aggregate of causes in the interests of therapeutic
efficiency, thus reducing a recognized complexity of context
to a focal point for treatment. Lester King explains that
using the term 'necessary cause' in medicine carries
distorting overtones and that a better gloss of the term
'causa sine qua non' would be "indispensable factor ." 7
Generally, more than one indispensable factor is required for
a definition of the cause of a disease. Freud enunciates
universal hypotheses, but when he applies them to the
interpretative explanation of a particular clinical case,
their universal character is tempered by a specific life
history in which remote and, at first, seemingly
insignificant causes can prove most revealing and relevant in
suggesting diagnosis and therapy. Depending on the context,
Freud emphasizes different remote causes when he is
explaining the "why" behind a particular response or
psychical production. When Freud is speaking in terms of
generalities, the hypothetical-deductive model seems more
appropriate to capture what he is asserting. What is
noteworthy, however, is the fact that from some general
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diagnostic and etiological hypotheses one would not be able
to deduce a convincing psychoanalytic interpretation that was
specific to an individual partly because of the complexity
and peculiarity of individual cases. As Sherwood notes:
The process of psychoanalytic explanation is not one of
beqin wUh an P!Vchoanalytic explanationsg ith individual case history, and the real
-jobof explanation occurs through ordering the mass of
3
biographical material and attempting to organize it into
so^e sorfof
h ° le
- JhiS iS ^constructing1 poss^ aCCOUnt COntaini "9 as ™»=h of the
Grunbaum's hypothet ico-deduct i ve model is not used by Freud
except in unusual cases. Freud's practice in selecting
particular relevant etiological factors is close to the
practice associated with medical treatment. Grunbaum seems
to be using the wrong immanent model to grasp Freud's
self-understanding.
i
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The point that I am trying to highlight and one which I
will further clarify in the next chapter is that causal
explanation and validation in medicine as well as in
psychoanalysis, may vary from the models of causation and
explanation in the physical sciences. Freud's familiarity
with explanation in the medical sciences and the fact that
his domain of inquiry was initially confined to the treatment
of patients growing out of medical settings would suggest the
medical model. If this was Freud's model, and if this model
is significantly different from the model of explanation in
physics, then Grunbaum is imposing standards of assessment
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for scientific status that are inappropriate for assessing
the foundations of psychoanalysis. However, even if i am
wrong and Freud did not specifically have in mind a medical
model, a point that would be difficult to establish in view
of the thin nature of the relevant textual material, this
fact does not vitiate my claim that medicine is the
appropriate model against which psychoanalysis ought to be
assessed
.
Lest my aim in calling for the medical model as the
standard for scientific evaluation in the case of
psychoanalysis be misinterpreted, let me remind the reader
that I am not suggesting that psychoanalysis be viewed as a
subdiscipline or specialized branch of medicine. What I am
suggesting is that the relationship of theory to data in
medicine is more like the relationship encountered in
psychoanalysis than it is like the relationship encountered
in physics, where more direct testing of claims is
possible. The practice of methodologists has simply not
been sensitive to the possibility of a medical science with a
distinctive methodological structure.
Using the medical analogy, one is tempted to view the aim
of medicine as that of curing illness, and, by extension, the
aim of psychoanalysis could be taken to be the cure of mental
illness. In fact, Freud's initial therapeutic conception of
neurosis was that it was a hidden disease that could be
brought to a crisis in therapy, and overcome. This is
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precisely the trajectory of the successful treatment of an
infectious disease. Later, Freud tempered this original
model, treating the neuroses as more like chronic illnesses
which pass through periods of apparent remission and then
break out again with renewed symptoms. The same
developmental trajectory can be seen in Freud’s descriptions
of the therapeutic situation, where Freud in his later
writings substitutes the term 'analyst' for that of 'doctor,'
indicating that he is breaking with any simple analogy to
medical practice
.
9 Freud's extension of medicine forces
breaks with the medical model. Further, psychoanalysis is
more than a medical treatment and its theoretical insights
reveal why and how the whole notion of a "cure" is deeply
problematic. What is being argued for here is that medical
science provides the relevant epistemological model for an
initial assessment of methodology in psychoanalytic theory.
In the debate between methodologists over the scientific
status of psychoanalysis, there is a need to address the
question of the scientific status of medicine. Once this is
done, different guidelines for evaluating psychoanalysis
become available.
Therapeutic Effectiveness and the Tally Argument
My discoveries are not primarily a heal-all. My
discoveries are a basis for a very grave philosophy. 9
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Having set up the terms of assessment, Grunbaum proceeds
to evaluate psychoanalysis as a natural science
, using his
const rual of that term's denotation. ‘ He focuses on what he
takes to be the logical foundations of psychoanalytic claims
and Freud s arguments and evidence in support of them.
Grunbaum's scrutiny of the relationship between these claims
and the evidence in support of them highlights the
epistemological and methodological pitfalls that beset the
verification of these claims. His analysis of the
epistemological liabilities that plague the clinical data and
of the problems in establishing the hypothesized, causal
connections between a pathogen and a neurotic disorder
concludes with the pronouncement that psychoanalytic theory's
scientific credibility is not well-founded. According to
Grunbaum, it may be the case that some of Freud's theoretical
insights will turn out to be correct, but Grunbaum argues
that such confirmation cannot come from the clinical
setting. This verdict also follows from his logical
reconstruction of Freud's defense of his therapeutic method
as warranting the testing of psychoanalytic hypotheses within
the treatment setting, a defense which Grunbaum claims fails
to uphold the conclusions which Freud drew from it. But
perhaps Grunbaum proves no more than that the linkage of
theory and data in medicine and psychoanalytic theory is
different from the linkage in physics. Because he is not
sensitive to this possibility, he resolves his arguments by
140
an implicit appeal to the only methodological standard that
he recognizes.
As previously noted, Griinbaum restricts his evaluation to
Freud’s clinical theory because he holds that Freud claimed
natural science status for psychoanalysis on the basis of it
and therefore it is what needs to be assessed. in chapter
three I argued that when Griinbaum assigns Freud's
metapsychology a peripheral scientific status, he closes off
the possibility of viewing the metapsychology as the early
systematization or theoretical elaboration of a future
science of psychology, and of noticing the complex
relationship between clinical practice and theorizing about
it. Griinbaum' s emphasis and focus on Freud's clinical
arguments assumes that therapeutic success is the only
evidence that can lend credence to Freud's scientific
claims. Now it is quite clear that Freud viewed therapeutic
success as a kind of proof of diagnostic correctness and that
he viewed clinical practice as an appropriate arena within
which to test knowledge claims. However, this is not to
establish that the link between therapeutic effectiveness and
the truth of psychoanalytic theory is that therapeutic
success and failure confirms or refutes theory in the same
way that physical theory is confirmed and rejected by the
truth or falsity of its deductive observational consequences.
If we take medicine as our model, we note that
satisfactory forms of therapeutic practice are often retained
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m spite of wide shifts in theory, perhaps because the
linkage between theory and therapeutic practice is not
obviously deductive. For example, Harvey's discovery of the
circulation of the blood, though it refuted the theory of
humors and thereby removed any theoretical foundation for the
practice of bleeding, entailed no immediate shift in medical
therapeutics, and the practice of bleeding continued as an
accepted treatment until the nineteenth century. By
contrast, discoveries about the germ transmission of disease
led to immediate shifts toward more aseptic practices.
^
Just as theoretical advances can affect therapeutic practice,
so insights gleaned from therapy can advance changes in the
body of medical theory, but a shift in one or the other
sphere need not force or entail a shift in the other sphere.
The link between theory and therapeutic practice in medicine
may well be different from the link between theory and
experiment in physics.
Griinbaum carefully documents Freud's reasoning in defense
of the probative value of the clinical data. Freud's
vindication of the psychoanalytic method of investigation as
capable of licensing psychoanalytic interpretations rests on
what Griinbaum labels the "tally argument." According to
Griinbaum, the tally argument was Freud's reply to the charge
that psychoanalysis worked by means of suggestion. It was,
therefore, his defense of the objective validity of his
clinical interpretations. Griinbaum's focus on the tally
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argument is central to his examination of the scientific
credibility of Freud's theory. On the one hand, he praises
Freud for his attempt to justify psychoanalytic knowledge
claims. Freud's strategy, according to Grunbaum, indicates
his methodological sophistication as well as his genuine
concern to lay to rest the contamination of data by means of
suggestion problem. Having extolled Freud's acumen in this
regard, however, Grunbaum demonstrates how the argument is
flawed and why Freud was forced to abandon it. He then
indicts Freud for continuing to regard the clinical data and
the repression etiology as validated once he acknowledged the
falsity of the premise upon which he had rested their
legitimacy
.
The crucial passage from which Grunbaum constructs
Freud's defense is from his 1917 "Analytic Therapy" lecture.
In it
, Freud
, countering the objection that psychoanalysis
works by means of suggestion, asserts: "After all, his
conflicts will only be successfully solved and his resistance
overcome if the anticipatory ideas he is given tally with
what is real in him." 12 Grunbaum spells out the
assumptions behind this claim and refers to it as Freud's
necessary condition thesis" which Grunbaum formulates as
follows
:
(1) Only the psychoanalytic method of interpretation and
treatment can yield or mediate to the patient correct
insight into the unconscious pathogens of his
psychoneurosis, and (2) the analysand's correct insight
into the etiology of his affliction and into the
unconscious dynamics of his character is, in turn,
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neurosis.
r5CeSSarY ^ the theraPeu tic conquest of his
Given these two premises in conjunction with the
therapeutically successful analysis of a patient, Freud could
legitimate the objective certainty of his clinical
interpretations. The tally argument, as Grunbaum construes
it, ties the truth of clinical interpretations to therapeutic
success thereby making the therapy the epistemic guarantor of
the veracity of the psychoanalytic method. Grunbaum states
the two conclusions which follow from the argument as
follows
:
Conclusion 1. The psychoanalytic interpretations of theldden causes of P's (a patient's) behavior given to himby his analyst are indeed correct and thus as Freud putit— these interpretations "tally with what is real" in P.
Conclusion 2. Only analytic treatment could have wroughtthe conquest of P's psychoneurosis. 14
The tally argument as Grunbaum formulates it assumes a
correspondence view of truth whereby the interpretations, in
order to be true, not only must seem to be true to the
ana ly sand (i.e., tally with what is real in her) but also
must be true in the sense that they must correspond to some
state of affairs. Grunbaum argues that the questionable
premises of the tally argument undermine the credibility of
the clinical evidence that Freud used as support for his
theoretical claims. In this way Grunbaum mounts his case
against the possibility of testing psychoanalytic hypotheses
within the clinical setting.
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The tally argument fails first and foremost in Griinbaum-s
eyes because the premises are in serious question. For in
stating that correct insight is causally necessary for
therapeutic success and that correct insight is meditated
only by the psychoanalytic method, the necessary condition
thesis rules out such events as the spontaneous remission of
symptoms and cures by other therapeutic treatment
modalities. Grunbaum cites comparative studies on treatment
outcome using rival therapeutic models which show that
psychoanalysis is often not provably more therapeutically
efficacious than its rivals. Indeed, Grunbaum argues that it
might not be therapeutically effective at all, at least not
for the reasons claimed, given that the spontaneous remission
rate is so high, and given that existing studies have not
established specific factors which can bring about
therapeutic change.
Grunbaum notes that Freud in his later years abandoned
the necessary condition thesis when he acknowledged phenomena
such as remission of symptoms due to ext raclinical life
events. The later Freud declaring that he has "never been a
therapeutic enthusiast" comments on the therapeutic
achievements of psychoanalysis by remarking, "I do not think
our cures can compete with those of Lourdes. There are so
many more people who believe in the miracles of the Blessed
Virgin than in the existence of the unconscious . Here
Freud acknowledges the possible psychogenic role of faith or
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belief in any type of cure. Grunbaum doesn’t come to grips
with the role of belief, expectation or suggestion in the
treatment process viewing these rather as contaminants that
must be controlled. Grunbaum uses the possibility that
psychoanalytic therapy may work due to an inadvertent placebo
effect to discredit the claim that favorable therapeutic
outcomes must be explained by psychoanalytic theory. But he
never considers how placebos work or why they work. That
they work at all requires an explanation that Grunbaum cannot
give in terms of his paradigms of physical causation. It is
ironic that Grunbaum can rely on skeptical studies involved
in medicine to discuss the effectiveness of therapy without
apparently recognizing that the very existence of the placebo
effect may ultimately require a psychogenic explanation. How
can there be a placebo effect unless there are psychogenic
causes of a kind that Grunbaum is attempting to rule out by
means of his use of placebo studies? We will return to this
problem in the final chapter.
Freud knew his cures could not compete with Lourdes, in
the same way that he ironically recognized that the
conversion to a psychoanalytic viewpoint seemed necessary for
therapeutic effectiveness. The later Freud avowed that there
were many other methods for treating neurotics, yet still
clung to the claim that psychoanalysis was the most
1
6
powerful. We need to ask on what basis he could maintain
this claim. Grunbaum simply uses the fact that Freud gave up
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the claim that insight was necessary for any change (a
therapeutic conquest of the neurosis) and the fact that
therapeutic success is questionable to drive home the point
that psychoanalytic interpretations as the mediators of
correct insight are not guaranteed as they would be if the
premises of the tally argument were true.
Griinbaum states: "Once Freud gave up NCT (the necessary
condition thesis), he seems to have simply disregarded his
own 1917 avowal that the authenticity of clinical data is
epistemically parasitic on therapeutic achievements." 17
This oversight is a devastating one, according to Griinbaum
for, if in t r a c 1 in ica 1 validation is to carry any weight,
there must be some grounds for holding that therapeutic
success is due to the veracity of psychoanalytic insight
rather than to some other factor. In particular, the
suggestibility problem comes back to haunt the clinical data
as well as the therapeutic improvement.
Griinbaum argues that psychoanalytic treatment has not
proven itself to be the paragon of therapies but he doesn't
specify what actually constitutes therapeutic success. Freud
changed his mind on this issue. This by itself indicates
that Freud wasn't projecting "a priori" hypotheses about
causes and notions of disease. As previously indicated,
Freud's more externalist conception of neurosis as a disease
that could be brought to a crisis in therapy gradually
shifted. He moved from an externalist, organicist conception
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Of medicine to a more generalist or holistic conception,
viewing disease, and in particular, psychopathology, as
conflict or disequilibrium and as a struggle to regain
equilibrium. This shift, when viewed against the background
of medical theory and medical history is scientific in the
sense that it was gradually forced by accumulating
therapeutic evidence.
Freud s later conception of therapeutic success was more
in line with a chronic disease model. Therapeutic success,
for Freud, does not mean that the analysand's symptoms and
neurosis are permanently removed. This kind of success is
currently claimed only by such more recent therapies such as
behavior therapy. in a sense, rival therapy usually claims
to attain more secure objectives than psychoanalysis.
Therefore, Grunbaum’s claim that rival treatments have the
same kinds of success is curious. It is curious because no
other therapy claims the same objectives or shares the same
conception of success as do the psychoanalytic schools. Once
psychoanalytic therapeutic success is spelled out, the facts
that behavior therapy effects some cures, that faith-healing
causes remission of symptoms, and that favorable life events
can cause anxieties and the symptoms that manifest these to
disappear, cannot be used as the basis for arguing that a
psychoanalytic treatment success rests on an inadvertent
placebo effect. Such an argument conflates the different
notions of success involved into an umbrella term of dubious
148
significance. From a positivistic point of view, cures
across treatment modalities may look the same, but the kind
of cure psychoanalysis claims is based on changing the
awareness of the person under treatment. 18 Psychoanalytic
cures do not hold out the promise of happiness. Commenting
on the fact that most men live in a hell, Freud says: "My
knowledge, my theories and my methods have the goal of making
men conscious of this hell so that they can free themselves
from it." 19 Consciousness is the main goal here; Freud
does not guarantee that, given insight by the therapeutic
process
,
the analysand will choose to act on that insight.
Griinbaum's discussion of the failure of the tally
argument drives a wedge between therapeutic effectiveness and
the possible truth of psychoanalytic theory, but at the same
time his very discussion fails to consider that the complex
relationship between theory and practice is not just a
problem that could be overcome if one resorted to laboratory
experiments, instead of clinical data. Psychoanalytic theory
is about total human beings and it is in humans that it must
be studied. Laboratory experiments designed to screen out
the individual complexities of neuroses can only test partial
aspects of human beings. All Griinbaum can prove in
connection with the tally argument is that there is as yet no
logical or necessary relation between therapeutic
effectiveness and the truth of psychoanalytic theory. For
Griinbaum, the clinical evidence may provide only spurious
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confirmation of the theory, and for this reason, he concludes
that the verification of psychoanalytic hypotheses must
inevitably also involve extra-clinical studies. As Lieberson
notes, Grunbaum's conclusion is not as controversial as
Grunbaum at times suggests. Orthodox analysts have put forth
similar views and as Philip Holzman rightly states: "many
such theories in the history of science have not been
testable by the methods from which they arose ." 20 Hence
the fact that adequate experimental tests have yet to be
designed to test many of Freud's hypotheses is not itself a
compelling argument against its scientific status. Parallels
with the open development of medicine are obvious. it is
rare that medical practice can "close the book" on diseases
or their cures given the complex interaction of disease
origins, the human hosts of disease and forms of mutation in
both
.
This much said, what is striking about Grunbaum's
critique is the fact that having drawn out the consequences
of the failure of the tally argument and Freud's recognition
of it, he continues to drive home the point that the clinical
data and the theories which explain it are bereft of
scientific credibility. According to Grunbaum, there is no
sound argument that licenses the causal inferences that Freud
drew. Rather than asking, "On what grounds Freud might have
continued to regard his insights and interpretations as true,
given the failure of the tally argument?" Grunbaum persists
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m uncove r ing the methodological flaws in Freud's reasoning
and the problems associated with verification within the
clinical setting. Though he has shown that therapeutic
success cannot vouchsafe the scientific claims of
psychoanalysis, Grunbaum continues to argue as if some
logical link, based on a physical paradigm, between
therapeutic success and the establishment of psychoanalytic
claims was the basis upon which Freud rested the truth of the
theory, despite the fact that he acknowledges that Freud
abandoned the tally argument. What Grunbaum misses is the
possibility of a development like that of medical science, a
development hampered by the complexity of the irreducible
unit of the person. It is mere philosophical arrogance to
call for the sudden attainment of inappropriate standards in
a medical science. While Griinbaum's careful analysis of
Freud's early reasoning in defense of the probative value of
the clinical data is instructive, it glosses over the whole
problem of what Freud may have meant by correct insight and
therapeutic success, as well as the reasons behind Freud's
changing conception of a cure.
Grunbaum construes Freud's line, "tally with what is real
in him" in a straightforward, naive realist sense. The
problem with this assumption of a common sense correspondence
theory of truth is that it ignores the increasing weight that
Freud gave to a possible psychical reality (as opposed to the
material reality given by ordinary medicine) and the changing
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character of the reality that the analyst and analysand are
in the process of constructing in the analytic encounter.
Therapeutic success is not necessarily with the same person
who entered analysis. Of course, analysis aims at learning
what is true about the analysand, but Freud was driven by the
nature of the clinical data to accept the possibility that
this truth was not confined to a relation between a set of
statements about a fixed personal identity and some external
events in the world. Grunbaum brings to psychoanalysis a
conception of truth that is a methodological dogma which
becomes obvious when he states: “an event that never
happened could hardly have been the pathogen ." 21 But
someone’s belief that something happened can be a pathogen.
If this ultimately can be grounded in the current ontology of
physics, Grunbaum doesn't supply so much as a clue as to how
that could be done.
Grunbaum' s notion of reality is based on a conception of
reality as revealed by physics and it is decidedly
non-psychoanalytic. A pathogen can be an idea. This is a
fundamental psychoanalytic premise, one that distinguishes
psychoanalysis as a form of diagnosis and treatment from the
old medical paradigm. As Freud describes the diagnosis of
some neurotics: "the signs of their illness originate from
nothing other than a change in the action of their minds upon
their bodies
. . . and the immediate cause of their disorder
is to be looked for in their minds ." 22 Do ideas really
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happen? is this even a meaningful question? Of course ideas
refer, but not necessarily to events that actually happened.
For, as indicated in the previous chapter, Freud held that
repression acts on memories rather than on experiences and
memories are in turn constructions rather than objective
traces or recordings of events, while there are many
mysteries about ideational discourse, at present, it is our
only means (as it was for Freud) of describing the events for
which a scientific explanation is ultimately to be sought,
and to which psychoanalytic theory is addressed.
Marshall Edelson describes the analytic treatment process
as the search for closer and closer approximations to "what
is true of the analysand
.
1,23
of course this includes what
actually happened, it includes her history, but it also
includes her mental life, her fantasies, her wishes, her
propensities to interpret ambiguous experience in one
particular way rather than another, her particular
configuration of projections and especially her feelings.
Veridical insight is more than one interpretative statement
or etiological claim put forth by an analyst which tallies
with something real, where "real" is understood as "what
happened. Edelson's statement, while it captures the nature
of the psychoanalytic quest, would come closer to the
dynamics of the therapeutic process if he said that treatment
is the search for what is becoming true of the analysand in
the course of therapeutic interaction. The reality
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constructed in the analytic encounter is not static.
The reality that psychoanalysis unmasks is first of all a
reality riddled with projections and illusions. Veridicality
from the viewpoint of the analyst and analysand must begin
with the real nature of these projections and illusions where
real" stands for the felt, lived character of these
projective understandings in terms of which the analysand
structures and moves within the world. To come to recognize
these projections as projections changes the nature of what
is real and what is illusory and this is the way in which
psychoanalytic knowledge is transformative. The experiential
nature of the mode of truth operative in psychoanalysis is
not restricted to the experience of the analysand. The
analyst is also a measure, a clinical instrument, trained to
utilize her own feelings as a guide toward recognizing
defenses and resistance in the analysand. The process of
uncovering these patterns of meaning is gradual. What the
analysand says is true is not taken at face value; this
so-called truth may be yet another mask, defense or
resistance designed to ward off the recognition of another,
perhaps more painful truth. The task of peeling off the
projective layers that constitute reality is ongoing. Final
truth is never attained. Projective layers always
con j ectu ra 1 ly remain, which is to say that we never know
ourselves completely. At different times we come up against
limits, partial truths which explain a way that we are.
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Correct insight is not a straightforward assertion that is
either true or false. The insight itself shifts the knower
to a new understanding of the insight, but in so doing
retains its own partiality, even when progress, marked by
refinement and coherence of the explanatory, narrative
account, is obviously achieved.
The notion of correct insight is a complicated one and
Freud certainly recognized that it was not necessary for
therapeutic success, where success is understood as relief
from symptoms. As far as therapy goes, the later Freud could
accept whatever worked. But it seems that he held to the
idea that psychoanalytic therapy was at that time the most
powerful because of its explanatory depth, a depth made more
comprehensive by the language of the theory. Summing up a
lecture on the applications of psychoanalysis Freud explains:
I have told you that psychoanalysis began as a method of
treatment; but I did not want to commend it to your
interest as a method of treatment but on account of the
truths it contains, on account of the information it
gives us about what concerns human beings most of
all—their own nature—and on account of the connections
it discloses between the most different of their
activities
.
Freud states here that psychoanalysis contains truths,
but on what basis? First of all perhaps because it has
pragmatic value, but more fundamentally the theory
systematizes an organized body of data and phenomena and
gives an account of them. Some of these phenomena are
conceptually conjectured as clear notions on the basis of
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very messy data, but clarifying the facts to be explained by
conceptual organization is not foreign to science. Freud’s
account changes the way the world looks; it changes our
relationship to our functioning and so our relationship to
ourselves. Freud does make a weighty, perhaps debatable,
assumption here: that what concerns humans most of all is
their own nature. The fact that this assumption does not
hold for many people may account for the failure of analytic
treatment, for this very kind of motivation is important for
a certain kind of therapeutic success, one which I would
j
.describe as a peculiarly psychoanalytic therapeutic success.
J
This success involves learning how to apply the theory and
insights one has acquired in analysis to oneself and in such
a way that one is able to continue a process of understanding
and analysis that began in the treatment setting.
Grtinbaum s response to this claim would no doubt be that
a therapeutic success, as I've defined it, is viciously
circular. For the insights may rest on fictions and the
successful analysand may be she who can continue to create
fictional accounts about her unconscious motivations and
mental functioning. Though the truth claim must be tied to
something, that something need not be external to the reality
being discussed. Griinbaum has failed to allow for the
development or conceptualization of that reality, by
restricting the domain and range of psychical reality to that
which can be correlated with material reality.
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As a method of treatment, Freud increasingly came to
restrict the domain for which psychoanalysis could expect to
be the treatment of choice. He revised his claims about the
prophylactic power of psychoanalysis and stressed the
limitations of the therapy due to individual, constitutional
factors and to societal restraints. Freud was also quite
pessimistic about the capability of his techniques for
handling psychosis, although the psychoses could be
recognized and conceptualized to a degree within the Freudian
framework. To the extent that Freud did rely on therapeutic
efficacy as a kind of proof, the guarantor of the link
between truth and efficacy seems to have resided in the
experience of analysis. Freud was himself convinced by his
experience, by his own self-analysis. Psychoanalysis was
true for him because it was the only coherent explanation of
these psychical phenomena.
A psychoanalytic cure based on insight turns out to be
more akin to an education than to a medical cure. The fact
that the analysand has acquired knowledge about herself does
not guarantee that she will act on these insights or change
her behavior in one way rather than another. By analogy with
the educative process, a psychoanalysis does not entail that
the learner will utilize in a particular way the knowledge
gained. The link between a successful analysis and correct
insight is complicated by this unpredictable factor of what
looks like human choice. Commenting on the limitations of
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therapy, Freud states: "after all, analysis does not set out
to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the
patient's ego freedom to decide one way or the other ." 25
Another factor complicating the whole notion of a
therapeutic success, and a factor that Grunbaum does not
explore the implications of, is the fact that according to
psychoanalytic theory the demands that society places on us
(our institutions, customs, laws, traditions, etc.) play a
large role in causing the neuroses. Biological factors as
well, for example, our prolonged dependence on our family,
must be thrown into the etiological equation. Civilization
is built upon or requires the repression of instincts, and
the psychoneuroses are substitute satisfactions or compromise
formations that are the result of the denial or repression of
impulses that if allowed expression would arouse excessive
anxiety. An individual cure must be seen in the context of
that individual's position within society and the demands it
places on her. This is why, paradoxically, psychoanalysis
offers the most promise for those who suffer least, at least
those who suffer least from the material hardships and
repressive demands of a harsh social reality. Psychoanalytic
theory is critical of society and its role in causing
neuroses; much of Freud's pessimism with regard to a cure
stems from his recognition that society, as a powerful,
coercive entity, forces a neurotic character; society imposes
renunciations of desire and offers only substitute
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gratifications. Regression to deeper desires is a permanent
possibility, a possibility that highlights the instability of
the domain being theorized. Adjustment to a neurotic society
cannot be the aim of a successful psychoanalysis, and
further, it ought not to be the aim since relief from
neurosis is why one seeks treatment. In one sense, a
successful analysis, one which involves making the analysand
conscious of her own defensive functioning, leads inevitably
to a critical examination of the defenses of others and the
externalizat ion of these defenses in the social structure to
wnich she belongs. As social criticism, psychoanalytic
theory pushes toward exposing the features of a society that
inevitably make people neurotic. As Freud recognized, in as
much as psychoanalysis criticizes society and destroys
illusions, society will strike back and therapeutic success
will have a temporary and paradoxical character. The
permanently well-adjusted person is the fiction, and the
"cured" are cripples who can at best achieve restricted
goals
.
Freud viewed what he called the "gain from illness," the
flight from conflict into neurosis, as too high a price to
pay for relief from anxiety. He nevertheless acknowledged
that life circumstances sometimes contraindicated pursuing
psychoanalytic treatment. This is clearest where
circumstances produce afflictions that are more pernicious
than neuroses. Arguing against therapeutic fanaticism, Freud
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states
:
Neuroses have in fact their biological function as aprotective contrivance and they have their social
ITl ication: Tt? e "9ain fro/illness” th
r
ey°pJovide ist always a purely subjective one. is there anv one ofyou who has not at some time looked into the causation ofa neurosis and had to allow that it was the mUdeft
sacrifice°burned
° f the/ itUation? And should such heavye ma e in order to eradicate the neuroses in^
misery?^"'
the W° rld iS ful1 ° f other unavoidable
For Freud there was no easy answer to this question. The
"gain from illness" was ultimately harmful to the individual
and to society at large, and psychoanalysis as therapy and as
education could help change the conditions which contributed
to bringing about this misery. But at the same time,
understanding one's psychodynamics and those of others was no
guarantee for happiness. After all, psychoanalysis was the
basis for a very grave philosophy precisely because it
neither promised nor claimed to be capable of fulfilling our
longings. We cannot have our lost objects of desire, though
we can acquire some knowledge of what those longings are.
On the one hand, the gap between therapeutic success and
psychoanalytic theory can be explained by the theory itself,
but on the other hand, this gap is not an anomaly if we adopt
medicine as our scientific model. Freud's essay, "Psychical
Treatment," notes that psychical or mental treatment is
historically the oldest medical treatment. By psychical
treatment Freud is referring to treatment, of either mental
or physical disorders, which aims at curing the disorder by
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influencing the patient's mind. The fact that miracle cures
and faith healing have worked throughout history and have
influenced diseases of mental and physical origin requires
explanation. Beliefs and expectations affect treatment
outcome. Freud acknowledges that the patient's faith is also
a powerful force in his own medical efforts. In this regard,
he's in step with medical tradition. However, he's extending
medicine insofar as his focus on psychogenic causes is a
movement away from the prevailing mechanist (externalist)
concept of psychopathology. Freud explicitly harnesses
,
il
patient faith, expectation and belief by developing and *
exploiting the transference relationship, making it an object
of analysis while at the same time using it as a treatment
tool
.
I suggest that the reason Freud continued to view the
treatment setting as a scientifically credible arena in which
to test psychoanalytic hypotheses had to do with his
recognition and familiarity with the factor of mental
influence and the variability and uncertainties associated
with it. In the "Psychical Treatment" essay, Freud states:
All the mental influences which have proved effective in
curing illnesses have something incalculable about them.
Affects, concentration of the will, distracting the
attention, expectation coloured by faith—all of these
forces, which occasionally remove an illness, sometimes
fail to do so without there being anything in the
character of the illness to account for the different
result. What stands in the way of regularity in the
therapeutic results achieved is evidently the autocratic
nature of the personalities of the subjects, with their
variety of mental differences.
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What distinguishes psychoanalysis as a kind of psychical
treatment is the attempt to understand the nature of the
personalities involved and the psychical processes, and to
make more predictable the incalculable character of mental
influences. Therapeutic uncertainty was and is endemic to
medicine
.
^
.
enepression T he°ry ! is It Well-Founded? Ts Tt
Griinbaum's second major argument against the scientific
credibility of psychoanalysis focuses on the logical
foundations of the theory of repression. He argues "that
even if clinical data could be taken at face value ," 28
that is, even if the clinical data were not epistemically
contaminated, there is as yet no clinical evidence capable of
supporting the causal role that Freud assigns to repression.
According to Griinbaum, Freud's major hypotheses and
theoretical claims rest on the cogency of his reasoning about
repression and that reasoning is fundamentally flawed.
Before looking at Griinbaum's criticism of Freud's reasoning,
I want to call into question a fundamental premise upon which
Griinbaum rests his case.
Griinbaum utilizes the doctrine of repression and its
theoretical significance to illustrate Freud's early view
that repression is causally necessary for the initial
development of a neurotic disorder and for its maintenance.
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This etiological hypothesis is the pillar of the clinical
theory according to Griinbaum. Though repression is only one
etiology, Griinbaum restricts his analysis to this one
etiological case, a case where his logic can get a grip.
According to Griinbaum, Freud assimilates other psychical
productions to that of neurotic symptoms and explains their
significance by reference to and on the basis of the dynamic,
causal role assigned to repressed ideas. in defense of the
centrality of the repression etiology, Griinbaum quotes from
Freud: "The theory of repression is the cornerstone on which
the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests." 29 Armed with
this assertion, Griinbaum's strategy consists in undermining
the grounds for inferring the pathogenic role of repressed
ideation, and in this way attempts to weaken, if not topple,
the foundations in repression for the psychoanalytic edifice.
The problem with this foundational claim and Griinbaum's
use of it is that it freezes the significance of
psychoanalytic findings in ways that misrepresent what Freud
was doing and claiming. Repress ion is not a hypostatized
concept, nor an unalterable cornerstone of the structure of
psychoanalysis, but rather a concept that changes as Freud
studies it. The mature Freud can in fact, be taken to have
significantly narrowed his concept of repression. In 1925
Freud revives the original term 'defensive process' which he
had replaced by the term 'repression.' He suggests reverting
to this concept of defense, using it to refer to the
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techniques the ego makes use of in dealing with conflicts
which may lead to neurosis. That is 'defense' covers the
many processes which we now refer to as defense mechanisms
which serve to exclude from awareness instinctual demands or
thoughts which threaten the ego. Repression then is viewed
as special method of defense and is subsumed under it as a
special case
.
30
Freud's revision of the referent of
repression demonstrates that repression is not fundamental to
all that is psychical; it is but an aspect of unconscious
thought processes and thus causally relevant sometimes in a
direct sense and sometimes not. Hence, although many of
Freud's accounts of psychical processes are formulated in
terms of repression, oftentimes he is using 'repression' to
refer to defense processes in general.
Grunbaum's focus on the repression etiology to the
exclusion of other "cornerstones" which Freud at different
times enunciates 33 narrows the diversity and range of
pathogens and instigators of the psychoneuroses as well as of
parapraxes and dreams. By holding that repression plays the
pathogenic role, Grunbaum ignores Freud's characterization of
intrapsychic conflict and the variety of motives and defenses
which Freud invokes to explain the phenomena or behavior in
question. He cleanses Freudian interpretations and
hypothetical claims of ambiguity in order to more decisively
discredit them. It is not at all clear that Freud held that
repression is always involved in mental disorders, though it
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is clear that he used the term often as the analogue of the
pathogen
.
Grunbaum's persistence in holding Freud to the
hypothetical claim that "repression is the sine qua non for
the pathogenesis of the patient's psychoneurosis " 32 aims at
showing the lack of evidence for this hypothesis. He
examines Freud's reasoning in defense of this hypothesis and
shows how the suggestibility problem as well as the
possibility of a placebo effect contaminate the results used
to explain the therapeutic value of lifting repressions.
Grunbaum reconstructs Freud's early reasoning and empirical
rationale for the postulation of the repression etiology and
then shows how this rationale was undermined in a number of
ways by Freud's clinical findings. Grunbaum then goes on to
chastise Freud for extrapolating from the repression
hypothesis of the psychoneuroses to explain dreams and
parapraxes along the lines of mini-neuroses when, in fact,
these latter phenomena lacked the therapeutic base that
grounded the causal claims of the psychoneuroses. On
Grunbaum's reading, reliance on the method of free
association as a probative clinical tool also depends on the
soundness of the repression theory, since free association is
held to uncover repressed ideas, ideas which are held to
stand in a causal connection to the slip or symptom they
engender. With the failure of the repression theory, we get
the image that the whole Freudian edifice has crumbled.
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As I indicated earlier, Freud revises the repression
theory and this revision needs to be considered in its own
tight. Griinbaum treats revisions that move away from
deductive predictability as methodological flaws. in doing
this, Griinbaum is not sensitive to the experiences and data
that Freud took to force a change in his theoretical
insight. it is at least as important to understand Freud's
movement of thouaht- -j •»- ; ^ _ • ,n gn as it is to point out that psychoanalytic
theory has methodological problems when it is assessed
against the standards imposed by the current philosophy of
science. Freud's continued attention to the clinical data
and to revisions of the metapsychology indicate that the
medical model may have been guiding or at least providing the
methodological rationale for his continued belief in the
scientific character of his enterprise. in terms of a
medical model, clinical data provide the facts calling for an
explanatory theory. Observed displacement or projection, for
example, calls for an explanation as to how and why
displacement or projection is seized on as a defensive
mechanism. The metapsychology functions as an attempt to
provide the theoretical account that would ultimately link up
the facts obtained in clinical theory. Griinbaum, in
restricting scientific assertions to the clinical theory and
to what can be rigorously proven, has set his sights too low
to find the medical link between theory and practice.
Clinical data, and clinical theory fitting aspects of the
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clinical data, call for a scientific theory, and the
metapsychology is the attempt to provide it. Clinical
results, alone, do not test an established theory; they
provide guidelines for its construction.
Grunbaum's portrayal of the failure of therapy to confirm
Freud's different claims about the specific pathogenesis of a
neurosis illustrates only that psychoanalytic confirmation
does not follow his epistemological model imported from
physics, where experiment can be designed as a direct test of
theoretical conjecture. For Grunbaum, the epistemic
liabilities of the treatment setting and the clinical data
obtained therein indicate that support for the causal claims
of psychoanalytic theory must come from extra-clinical
experimental studies. Because Grunbaum adheres to the
program of evaluating psychoanalytic etiological claims in
their early, simpler version as if they were claims about
electrons rather than about human beings whose neuroses are
particularized and intimately connected with their
idiosyncratic past, he ends up calling for studies that
couldn't be designed, studies that reveal that he is not
sympathetic with the evidential basis for the theory that
he's attempting to assess.
In order to support the hypothesis that a particular
repressed idea is the pathogen or specific cause of a
particular neurotic disorder, Grunbaum argues that one would
have to establish that exposure to the pathogen "makes a
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difference" to developing the neurosis. Hence, in addition
to finding positive instances of obsessional neurotics who
harbor repressed infantile, sexual wishes or fears, one would
need to find evidence of people who are not so afflicted and
who are not obsessional neurotics. Griinbaum states: "to
provide evidence for the causal relevance claimed by Freud,
we need to combine instances of N's (neurotics) that were P's
(exposed to pathogen) with instances of non-P's who are
n°"'N's-" j! asserting this, Griinbaum states that he
takes it for granted that "there are both N's and non-N's as
well as P's and non-P's ." 34 This assumption is however
extremely naive. Is there according to psychoanalytic theory
anyone who is a non-P? m one sense, there is not. For
example, is there anyone who does not have repressed
infantile desires? Once Freud gave up the idea that the
neuroses have specific determinants 35 and included the
influence of civilization as a determinant, the very idea
that one could locate people who could be used to test
hypotheses in the manner Griinbaum advocates loses touch with
the reality of the theory. Developmentally
,
no one escapes
pathogenic events and defensive repressions; repression is
one means by which every immature ego in an appropriate
social setting repels or fends off excessive demands caused
by either drives from within or excitations from without.
These demands operate like "traumas." As Freud states: "No
human individual is spared such traumatic experiences; none
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escapes the repressions to which they give rise." 36 The
request for a control group of people free of repressed
desires is like a medical doctor looking for a control group
of patients without bodies. 3 ^
Grunbaum's demands, that psychoanalysis, in order to have
legitimate claim to scientific status, find conclusive proof
for the existence of causal relationships between theoretical
conjectures and clinical data, reflect his adherence to a
mono log ica 1 epistemology. when we set Grunbaum's objections
and demands within the context of medical theorizing, they
reflect a mechanist-causalist bias, a bias long recognized as
partial and inadequate. For example, Grunbaum's conception
of a pathogen is that of a hostile, foreign agent that
invades the organism and thereby causes the disease. This
externalist conception, while it has often proved successful,
has always been tempered and supplemented in medical theory
by a holistic or generalist theory of disease which views
illness as the result of an internal disharmony or
imbalance. Unlike the externalist, who localizes the
cause of the disease and the defect, the generalist views
disease as a defect in the pattern of interaction between the
whole organism and its environment. 39 Freud was initially
tied to the externalist model but moved to a more generalist
conception. Grunbaum's objections are most effective only
against Freud's initial positions. Freud's focus on
etiologies, his use of surgical analogies and his notion of
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cure as the ridding of the pathogen through abreaction in
therapy give way to a notion of the compromise character of
symptom formation, the interplay between equilibrium and
disequilibrium, and the rejection of the idea that the
neuroses have specific determinants. On the generalist or
holistic conception of pathology, a pathogen can only enter
to cause disease if equilibrium is already disturbed.
Freud's mature views are better understood on this
alternative medical model rather than on the model of a
bullet which invades from outside and does specific,
localized damage to an organ. If generalism is correct, the
causal link between a pathogen and neurosis is screened by an
intervening factor of disequilibrium. This more systemic,
global view allows for therapy to play a role in
understanding pathology and its treatment without a clear
recognition of the nature of the disequilibrium. Grunbaum's
insistence that medicine be externalist, which is implied by
his assumptions, is yet another bias of the mechanistic
influence of the physics model.
Freud's more complex, multicausal medical model, the one
associated with his developing views, indicates that
Grunbaum's conception of etiology is not that of his
analytical target. I have not tried to argue that Griinbaum
is wrong, or that psychoanalytic theory is satisfactory.
What I have tried to establish is that Grunbaum's criticisms
result from the imposition of a methodological model that may
not be appropriate to the subject matter of psychoanalytic
theory, and that progress may be more appropriately
stimulated by considering a methodological model based on
medical science, with this, the criticism of Grunbaum's
critique is in view, but it is incumbent for my project to
attempt exploration of an epistemological model based on
medicine. Little has been attempted by philosophers of
science in this area, but I shall attempt some tentative
movement into this new region in my final chapter.
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1 a
My examination of the position of Popper, Ricoeur,
Habermas, and Grunbaum on the status of psychoanalysis has
stressed their failure to bring the scientific status of
medicine into the arena of methodological debate. I have
argued that what is common to all positions in the current
space of methodological discussion is that physics
constitutes the methodological paradigm of the natural
sciences, and that this assumption pre-judges the assessment
of psychoanalysis. Up to now I have argued that Freud
implicitly used the standards of medical science rather than
of physics as the epistemological and methodological
foundation of his work, and that he claimed a natural science
status for his enterprise because he assumed that medicine
was a natural science. This remains true even though Freud
gradually became aware that the epistemology and methodology
of psychoanalytic theory and psychotherapy involve an
extension of medicine into new domains that finally forces a
break with some of the commonly accepted features of
scientific medicine. It is now time to address the issue of
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the scientific status and epistemology of medicine. My aim
in this chapter is to develop a conception of the natural
sciences that includes medicine among them, and to suggest
that this conception is appropriate for the philosophical
evaluation of the status of psychoanalysis. Implicit in my
approach is the assumption that medicine is scientific, at
least in much of its theorizing and in some of its practice,
and that an understanding of the nature of medical knowledge
will open up alternatives both for assessing psychoanalysis
and for thinking about the epistemology of science. Since
Freud did not explicitly discuss the epistemological status
of medicine, I offer this only as a suggestion of how Freud
might have defended his intuitions concerning the natural
science status of psychoanalysis had he chosen to do so. I
am assuming that this discussion might have been formulated
in Freud's terms, on the grounds that the sense of medical
science has remained stable enough in the twentieth century
to circumvent any anachronisms in my suggestions that Freud's
intuitions can be defended in a more articulate
epistemological theory.
I should perhaps first deal with the potential objection
that I am merely using the suggestion that the relationship
of theory and practice in medicine is different from that of
physics to protect a special status for psychoanalysis. Is
it the case that medical knowledge is not robust enough to
sustain an epistemological scrutiny based on physics? Modern
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Physical theories are tested primarily by laboratory devices
which are in turn explicitly constructed to test certain
theories. The connection between theory and instrument or
device as a physical instantiation of theory is what permits
physical data to directly test physical theory. Physical
theory, in the context in which instruments for testing are
produced in physics, directly predicts certain experimental
outcomes. if the predicted outcomes are observed,
confirmation of the predicting theory is obtained, otherwise
the theory is not confirmed by the experimental results. in
some areas of medicine, for example in serology, medical
theory makes predictive assertions about laboratory
preparations that can be tested in the same way. if all of
medicine were pursued in laboratories in this way, medical
science could accept the same methodological designs that
have proven effective in discussing the epistemology of
physics. Special sub-disciplines of medicine satisfy the
most stringent epistemological criteria suggested by
paradigms from physics, but med icine connotes much that is
outside of biomedical science, and inevitably brings up the
epistemologically awkward problems associated with therapy.
Therapeutics is directed at individuals, and human beings are
not ideal instruments constructed for the testing of
therapeutic conjectures that may be derived from laboratory
medicine. A drug which might have cured a target disorder in
a person on certain assumptions can be screened out by
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unexpected activity on the part of the patient. The
individual is simply too complex and engaged in too many
activities to provide an ideal test of medical opinion,
isolated, in the hospital under continual surveillance, the
individual can perhaps provide reliable data. Much of normal
therapeutic practice occurs with individuals who are seen
only on occasion, whose activities a doctor is only partially
familiar with, and whose relevant properties are only
partially studied with respect to the problem calling for
therapeutic attention. We don't have a physics of corn
growing because of the variability in the specific situations
m which corn is grown. A physics of medical therapy seems
even more remote. It is the fact that the individual human
being is given as the focus of therapeutic practice that
seems to stand as the irreducible problem for any attempt to
bring medicine into epistemological conformity with theory
and experimental evidence in physics. Outside of the
laboratory, theoretical conjecture is constantly buffeted by
unknown variables.
^
Therapeutic success or failure is underdetermined by
medical theory, but this situation should not be interpreted
as though clinical medicine is the applied science to which
medical science stands as pure science. Clinical medicine is
not a simple application of various "basic medical sciences"
or "p re-cl in ica 1 " sciences (e.g., pathology, physiology,
anatomy, biochemistry, etc.). Clinical medicine is
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scientific in that it utilizes and draws on the theorizing of
these sciences
, integrating the explanatory modes of various
other sciences, and in that it revises its hypotheses in the
light of clinical failure. it is not an applied science in
the reductive sense of having a simplified object domain to
which it applies pure theory.
Following Feinstein and Forstrom
,
3 the position that I
will adopt is that clinical medicine has a unique domain, a
domain that differs from the domain of biochemistry, for
example, where a given molecule, that can be repeatedly
encountered in interchangeable instantiations, is the basic
object of theorizing. The focal entity of clinical medicine
is the person. People are not interchangeable from the
standpoint of medical theory in the way that uniformly
prepared molecules are identical from the standpoint of
physical theory. This subject matter marks clinical medicine
off from specialized biomedical disciplines whose testable
laws and hypotheses are utilized in the conjectures of
clinical medicine. The clinician must work with an
experimental entity that is already arranged and given. This
complex entity, the patient, places permanent constraints on
the link between theory and data. The person involves unique
genetic and molecular material, social and behavioral
factors, and factors such as values, purposes, consciousness,
and reflection, factors all of which may be relevant to the
course of therapy. As Pellegrino notes, the biomedical
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sciences, often referred to as basic, are not by themselves
sufficient to constitute medicine either as clinical science
medical practice. Relevant genetic, social,
environmental and psychological factors, as well as data such
as age, sex, race, occupation, social and economic status,
educational background, geographical setting, etc., are
important for forming a diagnosis and prescribing treatment.
These factors are not specialized forms of the variables
studied in the basic medical sciences.
Clinical medicine is relativized to the individual
patient, but unknown aspects of the patient's situation may
be as important as the clinical profile. To handle
complexity, medicine has long looked for "types" of patients
m order to control this complexity, but hasn't found a
scheme hinting at a therapeutic science. In any event, the
problem of individuality is especially acute for
psychoanalysis. I should mention here that my adherence to
the position that the individual is the focus of clinical
medicine may be only an historical observation, an
observation that is true of western medicine at least from
Freud's time to the present, but which may not reflect trends
in, for example, traditional Chinese medicine. If medicine
were more holistic, if the person— in—the-envi ronment were
treated, the problems of a complex focus would still remain.
A medical diagnosis functions like a hypothesis in that
it is a conjecture subject to revision and refutation when
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evidence mounts up that contradicts it. However, unlike the
case in a laboratory setting where an experiment may be
aevised that isolates various variables so as to clearly
instantiate the hypothesis under test, the therapeutic
procedures which follow from or seem to be indicated by a
given diagnosis may or may not be causally implicated in
producing results. in other words, the specific patient
response to treatment does not logically entail the truth or
falsity of the original diagnosis or the aspects of medical
sciences that were involved. Patient improvement does not
mean that the diagnosis is correct nor that the specific
therapeutic intervention causes the improvement. The
clinician continues the specific therapy if the patient shows
improvement and in this practical sense, at least some of the
time, uses the therapy as confirmation of the diagnosis. The
circumstances in which the clinician aims at healing sick
people inevitably temper any optimism that clinical results
can be read off as establishing scientifically testable
generalizations. The pragmatic method of knowing gains
ascendancy in medicine due to the fallibility of medical
knowledge, a fallibility attributable in part to the fact
that the clinician works with a very complex data base. This
may not rule out a scientific status for medicine, but when
the same situation is encountered in therapy based on
psychoanalytic theory, it is often taken to impugn the
scientific status of psychoanalysis, as in Grunbaum's case.
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My thesis attempts to bracket medicine and psychoanalysis
together, epistemologically, forcing those who would reject
psychoanalytic theory to explain why medicine seems to have
more robust scientific status on grounds that are not mere
a
reflections of prejudices.
Medicine
, including clinical medicine, shares clear
characteristics with other disciplines normally considered to
be scientific, at least in the opinion of methodologists who
do not make a fetish of physics. Stephen Toulmin highlights
the usual uncertainty involved in moving from general
scientific principles to particular applications in practice
and argues that the positivist equation of the mark of
science with prediction distorts the nature of scientific
endeavors. Drawing a parallel with atmospheric physics,
Toulmin argues that a scientist's "understanding is
frequently shown far better by his ability to explain why
'telling what is going to happen' is impossible in some
particular case than by his capacity to generate trivial
predictions. Medical forecasting bears comparison to
weather forecasting in that prediction is very difficult in a
situation constituted by many variables outside of the
control of the predictor. The medical experiment is
typically arranged by nature, and not by the physician, and
predictions must fail as frequently as picnics based on the
prognostications of the weather channel.
The point of this discussion is to highlight the general
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fallibility inherent in moving from explanations involving
general hypothetical relations to explanations or predictions
of particular facts, especially where predictions escape the
preconstructed confines of laboratory tests. The precise
experiments in certain areas of physics are the result of
unusual circumstances of preparation, and should hardly
constitute the norm for a general scientific methodology.
Toulmin states:
To understand the physics of the
understand why weather forecasts
practice, unreliable; similarly,
physiology of cell division and
see why many clinical problems,
problem, are so extraordinarily
intractable
.
b
atmosphere is to
are so often, in
to understand the
the immune system is to
for example, the cancer
complex and
Scientific understanding that moves beyond scientism and
physics fetishism must reflect on the limits and conditions
of its own particular discourse.
Freud noted the limits of psychoanalytic therapeutic
treatment, but did not for this reason deem it unscientific.
In doing so, he acknowledged the general fallibility of
scientific prediction, and was not coerced by philosophical
visions of logical rigor. In a letter (May 28, 1911) to
Ludwig Binswanger he comforts himself with the thought:
if we accomplish so little therapeutically, we at least
learn why it is impossible to accomplish more. Our
therapy seems to me the only rational one in this
sense
.
The sense of rationality Freud is referring to here is akin
to the general, pragmatic scientific understanding
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articulated by Toulmin. Freud's rationality inheres in his
self-reflective stance with respect to his own enterprise, in
his refusal to cover up the limitations of his findings, in
his refusal to resolve the tension and contradiction between
theory and therapy, and in his revisions of theory in the
light of accumulating evidence. The specific contradictions
and tensions involved in the concrete analytic encounter, an
undertaking which fosters regression, acting out, as well as
transference to the analyst, preclude predictions based on
the repetition of closely similar cases. Therapy was
rational for Freud. Although it did not promise a cure, it
could be guided by the standard feedback of clinical
medicine, continuing a procedure that seemed to be working to
benefit the patient and switching course of treatment where
improvement was not observed. Freud comments on the lack of
predictability and the reasons for it in the following way:
So long as we trace the development from its final
outcome backwards, the chain of events appears
continuous, and we feel we have gained an insight whichis completely satisfactory or even exhaustive. But if
we proceed the reverse way, if we start from the premisesinterred from the analysis and try to follow these up to
t e final result, then we no longer get the impression of
an inevitable sequence of events which could not havebeen otherwise determined. We notice at once that there
might have been another result, and that we might havebeen just as well able to understand and explain thelatter. The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory as the
analysis; in other words, from knowledge of the premises
we could not have foretold the nature of the result.
It is very easy to account for this disturbing state
of affairs. Even supposing that we have a complete
knowledge of the aetiological factors that decide a given
result, nevertheless what we know about them is only
their quality, and not their relative strength. Some of
them are suppressed by others because they are too weak.
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and they therefore do not affect the final result Burwe never know beforehand which of the determining
thp
th\ weaker the stronger. We only say atend that those which succeeded must have been thestronger Hence the chain of causation can alwavs berecognized with certainty if we follow the line ofanalysis, whereas to predict it along the line ofsynthesis is impossible
.
5
Freud s adherence to the claim that psychoanalysis is
scientific in spite of its failure to yield precise,
repeatedly confirmed predictions indicates that neither a
probabilistic nor a deterministic hypothetical-deductive
model of explanation, sufficiently captures what he means by
the scientific character of psychoanalytic investigation and
explanation. As in the case of medicine, such models do not
seem to capture the subtlety of medical reasoning, in the
specific therapeutic situation. Predictions about the
behavior of an organic body part derived from observations of
that part in the laboratory may prove not to hold when the
body part is treated in the context of the whole person. The
number of variables within a therapeutic context can
influence the outcome in a variety of unanticipated ways. It
seems wrong to bring down medicine as a science in order to
express a prejudice concerning psychoanalytic theory. An
epistemology of medicine may well cover the essential aspects
of psychoanalytic practice. I will now turn from a general
discussion to an examination of some more specific methods of
inquiry and modes of acquiring knowledge that are
characteristic of medicine.
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Med ical Knowledge and the Medical Model
I have emphasized that clinical medicine, and in varying
degrees other biomedical sciences, have as their object
domain the whole person in her complexity and particularity.
I have also suggested that this ontological difference in
subject matter marks off medicine from philosophically
paradigmatic experimental situations in physics and may at
least partially account for intuitions that the epistemology
of medicine differs from that of physics. Medical knowledge,
like all scientific knowledge, arises out of a comprehensive
set of meaningful social practices
.
9 Changes in medicine
and the social practices that give rise to these changes
occur within a social climate which at least partially
determines what is seen as a medical problem. By focusing on
changes in medicine, we can perhaps locate some features of
medicine that will prove useful in developing an account of
its epistemology. History intrudes everywhere into medicine,
whereas its appearance in physics may be quite discrete.
Fried and Agassi view medical theory as primarily
nosology (theory of illness or disease) which they further
narrow to etiology (theory of the cause of disease).^ The
concept of disease is an historically evolving one, and one
that raises clearly epistemological concerns since the term
'disease' and its correlative 'health' raise havoc with the
fact/value dichotomy put to so much methodological use in the
development of the epistemology of physics. In an obvious
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way the terms 'health' and 'disease' are value-laden and to
varying degrees culture-relative. The social
interpenetration with these conceptual categories is more
pronounced than the social interworking with some other area
of scientific terminology. The application of the evaluative
or normative concept of health assumes a goal or purpose
partly determined by a social and historically given
context. One is healthy with respect to a norm in a certain
cultural context, given a certain constitution in a
particular environment. Medicine is designed to move people
toward the appropriate concept of health. The changes in the
evolving concept of a disease shed light on the constructive
nature of the concept of disease and on the ways in which
medical facts and explanations draw upon a wider range of
explanatory presuppositions than those noticed by
philosophers of science who concentrate on physics, or at
least on the areas of physics which are most ahistorical.
Ludwik Fleck demonstrates how the concept of syphilis,
which was originally conceived in ethical-mystical terms and
labelled the carnal scourge," evolved and was given a
"scientific" grounding, a grounding that is the result of a
collective process. Tracing the disease concept of syphilis
from demonology to serology. Fleck shows how the
proto-scientific idea that syphilis was connected with impure
blood became established as a scientific fact with the
discovery of the Wassermann reaction. No specific
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methodology yielded the Wassermann reaction and the ensuing
tests which allowed for the diagnosis of syphilis by means of
serum. In fact, the Wassetmann test is instructive because
it exemplifies the craft skill involved in both scientific
discovery and practice. Fleck notes that the working out of
the improved technique of the test was a purely trial and
error process. The Wassetmann reaction became useful when
various reagents were tried in varied concentrations and in
various ways that slowly increased the reliability of the
test. The Wassermann reaction came to define the presence
of syphilis and it created the discipline of serology,
despite the fact that the test is known not to be completely
reliable. it came to be used because its reliability seemed
to suggest the presence of the disease and later its cure.
The invention or discovery of the Wassermann reaction and its
subsequent extension to other serological methods were
intimately tied to the practical experience involved in a
hands on feel for how to prepare and dilute the extract.
Fleck notes other cases where "experience involving the
irrational 'serological touch' is specifically needed." 11
The results of the Wassermann reaction, which led to the
coupling of the disease with successful treatment, were not
uniformly reproducible by experiment nor fully explicable by
a logical explanation of the way in which the test
12
worked. Yet the results were accepted because they were
useful and successful. The thinking that gave rise to the
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discovery was conditioned by progress in bacteriology and the
associated germ theory of disease. This theory reflects the
externalist point of view in medical theorizing, a view of
disease as the result of a causative, foreign agent which
invades the organism and brings about the disease. Though
this disease model proved extremely useful to the discovery
of the Wassermann reaction, Fleck notes that one cannot
define syphilis epistemologically on the basis of the
causative agent, spirochaeta pallida. Humans can harbor the
bacteria without becoming ill; that is, they can be carriers
without exhibiting the illness. The disease and the presence
of the causative agent are not coterminous. This is a
typical situation in medicine. Fleck states: "the idea of
the causative agent has lost the overriding importance it
enjoyed during the classical period of bacteriology." 13
Klerman remarks that the search for the single or major
cause of disease, which was thought to be necessary but not
necessarily sufficient for the development of a specific
disease, reached its high point with respect to psychiatric
illnesses in the early twentieth century. As late as the
1920s, when the relationship between pellagra and a specific
nutritional deficiency was established, some medical
theorists hoped to bring mental illness under the rubric of
standard medical nosology. Externalism can explain the
presence of some mental illnesses that are due to organic
causes. But other mental illnesses prove resistant to
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externalist, organic accounts. The so-called functional
disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness,
neuroses), to the extent that they can be viewed in terms of
a disease model, have to be regarded as chronic diseases, but
diseases with a mixed etiology that cannot be simply
attributed to an invading agent. Klerman notes that an
illness like schizophrenia (unlike syphilitic diseases of the
brain which fit the infection or externalist model) may be
more like diseases encountered in internal medicine, such as
hypertension or leukemia, diseases with uncertain etiologies
that are not easily explicable in externalist terms. 14
As suggested at the close of the preceding chapter,
Grunbaum implicitly embraces a nineteenth century externalist
concept of disease by demanding that psychoanalytic
etiologies be validated along lines that are closer to the
infection model. Here we need to note that while Freud's
rejection of symptomatic treatment for mental illness was
externa list, his later psychoanalytic theories reflect a
generalist bias, a bias which sees theory as "a bundle of
assumptions that we test together."'*' 5 Specific external
events can become causative only in a reaction to them
mediated by internal beliefs and desires in a complicated way
that precludes the externalist accounts involving invading
organisms and their elimination.
I have mentioned the generalism-externalism opposition in
medicine as if the two trends were easy to separate. In
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practice, these two trends become entangled, and the
historical influence of each view on the other casts
suspicion on the validity and significance of the
distinction. Ordinary pathogens may or may not be effective,
depending on the state of a potential victim. This
generalist observation muddles even straightforward treatment
of infectious diseases. Not everyone who is exposed gets
them. Freud was never a pure externalist nor a pure
generalist. Although a trauma that triggers neurosis seems
to hit like an invading pathogen on the externalist model,
Freud's drive theory was more generalist, likening disease or
imbalance to failures or disturbances in the development,
function, or adjustment of the organism's systems, including
the mental systems. In this regard, symptoms were viewed as
attempts to compensate for the imbalance. Disease as
invasion and disease as imbalance are contrasting
metaphysical metaphors which have influenced theory and
practice throughout the history of medicine and will
presumably continue to do so. While Freud accepted medical
advances under the materialist, mechanistic (externalist)
paradigm, he also increasingly noted the short-sighted
misunderstanding resulting from medicine's failure to give
credence to psychical processes and their determinant role in
pathology . ^
^
The generalist-externalist controversy has spurred
advances in medicine because success for one paradigm tends
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to fuel research in the competing paradigm. For example, an
externalist success involving the insertion of a plastic tube
to replace a damaged blood vessel or the administration of
medication poisonous to a parasite may ignore conditions
which might make the original blood vessel regenerate or make
the parasite innocuous. The generalist response is to look
for cases where the externalist's treatment is rendered
superfluous because an organic repair can be stimulated. In
cases where the externalist's treatment is harsh, the
generalist may look for a more gentle, long-term systemic
improvement. Vitamin therapy and special diets are quiet
examples of the direction of generalist successes. Cases of
spontaneous remission fall under the generalist umbrella in
light of the old adage, "Nature cures." On a generalist's
view, treatment may interfere with cure .'*’ 7 Neuroses,
psychoses, and other mental disturbances for which there is
no complete cure, perhaps because the situation of the
patient continuously reproduces the problem, whereas others,
in similar situations seem normal, push a theorist toward
generalist lines of thought.
Generalist and externalist theories are normative
analytic instruments, neither of which seems to generate
sound medical theories. We would not expect Freud, a subtle
thinker, to represent either position. Fried and Agassi
argue that Freud was basically an externalist early in his
career who moved toward generalism as his theories
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developed
. According to their analysis, Freud's focus on the
patient s inner life gradually transposes mother and father
U.e., important significant others) into the unconscious,
where their representations function as internal (not
external
) objects Thic 03 lS 13 stl11 compatible with a form of
external ism they are "thorns in the patient's side." 18
Freud's move to generalism seems to Fried and Agassi to be
only partial. While I think they are correct in arguing that
Freud's move to generalism was partial, their view seems to
ignore the fact that the pathogen is not necessarily the
internal psychic representation of an external figure or
idea, taken in analogy to an invading external pathogen. A
person may fall ill due to lowered resistance or an internal
disequilibrium. A breakdown in a person's pattern of
interaction, a disturbance which in turn may allow a pathogen
in the form of a hostile idea to erupt as a causative agent
into consciousness, may be crucial to the onslaught of
pathology. in other words, a failure of repression can
disturb equilibrium and create problems on the generalist
view just as repression can be the pathogen on the
externalist view, and some combination of these two views may
be more or less required to explain a specific psychic
disorder in the context of an individual biography.
Viewing psychic disorders and Freud's theorizing about
them within the context of medical theorizing and related
debates allows us to place the development of his thought
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against its roots in medical thought and practice. Freud's
movement away from an early externalist model involved an
expansion of the range of conditions regarded as causal to
include factors that would not lie easily within the
relatively mechanical, causal thinking of the medicine of his
time. Clearly, medicine has changed its causal thinking
since Freud's time and has to some extent reappropriated the
psychological factors that Freud noticed early on as
pathogenic. Current medical theorising allows for emotional
factors as causative agents, or as predisposing one to
disease, and medical training contains courses explicitly
designed to sensitize doctors to the significance of
increased stress. Stress may not be indicative of a disease
but it certainly can indicate disposition toward certain
symptoms. Current medical thinking stops short, in general,
from the luxuriant growth of psychic pathogens studied by
psychoanalytic theory, but therapeutic practice has accepted
at least some of the original insights of Freud's new medical
science. It's hard to reconstruct the shifts and turns of
the complex history of the relationships between medicine and
psychoanalytic theory, but Griinbaum remains with a nineteenth
century conception of medical causation. His adherence to a
straightforward model of validation based on experimentation
utilizing control groups ignores the more complicated
multifactorial models of causation that are presently
employed in the biomedical sciences. In effect, Grunbaum
194
restricts the study of disease to disorders that are
accessible to his
.methodological conception, and ignores the
very real complexities confronting medical theorizing.
Schaffner's recent work on the structure of theory and
explanation in the biomedical sciences illustrates some
important differences between theories in biomedicine and
theories in the physical sciences. Unlike the more
hierarchical deductive models of the physical sciences,
".most, but not all, theories in the biomedical sciences are
best construed as a series of overlapping interlevel temporal
models. Schaffner calls these theories "middle range"
theories, theories which fall between biochemistry at one
extreme and evolutionary theory at the other. Sciences such
as immunology, embryology and physiology can be given this
characterization. Their generalizations are more limited in
scope, are non-uni ve rsa 1 and are closer to tendency
statements than to laws. Within a "middle range" theory,
there will be a collection of overlapping models. By the
term
' inter level ,
' Schaffner means to focus on the different
levels of aggregation that entities are grouped under (e.g.,
molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, etc.). The different
entities that appear in the model are idealized in that they
are abstractions from the full biological details at their
particular level. These models, which consist of collections
of entities at different levels of aggregation, are termed
temporal models because they present collections that undergo
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change over time, change that requires descriptive theories
making essential use of qualitative alterations of properties
during development. 2 ° Unlike the case in physics where
time is eliminated by making it implicit in a differential
equation, in biology a process is the rule. These biomedical
theories of the middle range, though they do not fit
epistemological analyses that take physics and chemistry as
b b ^ i £ models
, ere esspnt- i ^ 1 i n i. l* _ .' e tial m the biomedical field, at least
at this stage of its development.
Drawing on the notion of "exemplar" developed by Kuhn,
Schaffner argues that generalizations in the biomedical
sciences are not logical abstractions; they are based on
analogical reasoning from exemplars or shared examples.
According to Schaffner, "exemplar thinking is more
Significant in the biomedical sciences than in the physical
sciences ." 21 whether this is due more to the structure and
limitations imposed by the ontological structure of the
domain or more to the fact that a move from the more
theoretical sciences to the applied sciences leads to the
predominance of analogical-exemplar based theories is an
issue that Caplan raises and that needs more investigation.
Analogical reasoning from examples would seem to be more
important as one moved toward the applied or practical
sciences where concrete cases serve as guidelines for how to
proceed. In clinical medicine, the patient functions as "the
clinical exemplar of a (often multiple) disease or
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pathological process. "22 Analogical reasoning in medicine
iS 3130 discussed ^ Xing, „h0 attributes Villemin's success
in proving that tuberculosis was a transmittable disease to
the use of analogical reasoning. 23
The point of this focus on analogical reasoning in the
biomedical sciences and the looser qualitative
generalizations that one often finds in medicine is to
provide support for the view that medical reasoning and
medical theory may have a different structure that may not
allow explanations to be reduced to the model of general laws
from which deductions can be made. On Schaffner's view,
generalizations in some biomedical sciences function as
positive analogies which connect a family of overlapping
models. The movement away from a focus on necessary and
sufficient conditions for a disease is reflected in
Schaffner's characterization of diseases and therapies as
like Wittgensteinian "family resemblance" concepts, concepts
which both reflect and encourage analogical and comparative
24reasoning. Schaffner's work provides the possibility of
a methodological pluralism that can be given in a form
acceptable to the most rigid logical standards proposed in
methodological inquiry. it is only the possibility, it
should be recalled, that is relevant to the question of
whether Grunbaum is assuming too much when he deploys his
confirmatory models.
Freud's metaphorical and analogical reasoning appealed to
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such diverse fields as literature, history, archaeology,
politics, medicine, and jurisprudence. This was the way in
which he attempted to find a way to talk about, to
characterize and ultimately to develop theories about mental
processes and functioning. No one sensitive to the rampant
problems of communication between psychoanalytic theorists
would be tempted to endorse Freud's theory as complete, or as
satisfactory in its formulation. Freud made many proposals
that cannot all be organized into a logically consistent
deductive theory. I have been discussing the question of
whether psychoanalysis has roots in scientific reason,
whether it can in principle achieve recognizable scientific
progress. if Freud's methodological outlook was rooted in
medical thinking, then it has a basis in scientific
methodology, and it has been suggested here that Freud's
analogical resources were precisely what would be expected if
he implicitly assumed that he was creating a new branch of
medicine. Grunbaum's standards, on the contrary, borrowing
from physics, make psychoanalytic theory a non-starter. It
can't progress as a science until it conforms to principles
of reasoning in physics.
The appeal to the epistemological structure of medicine
as the framework for evaluating the scientific status of the
epistemology of psychoanalysis does not turn psychoanalysis
into a science but it does cut against some of Grunbaum's
restrictive proposals for establishing causality and proof.
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I have noted the inadequacy of the single and even
"necessary" cause version of disease and some of the
difficulties involved in Grunbaum's proposal that validation
come from experimentation utilizing control groups.
Grunbaum's appeal to extra-clinical data, both from control
groups and epidemiological studies, must be set against the
backdrop of the limitations that plague generalizations and
validation in this area.
Recently, Spaeth and Barber have detailed some of the
problems associated with the use of the statistical model of
disease, a model that defines disease by statistical
deviation from a conventionally established norm. The norm
is itself statistically defined in terms of the mean.
According to Spaeth and Barber: "The basic assumption of
such a model is that within the population similarities
exceed differences ." 25 Unfortunately, as Spaeth and Barber
note, this assumption is only an assumption and an often
dubious one at that. Differing genetic structure,
environmental influences, and the interaction between these
factors, which together influence individual response,
complicate the assumption of homogeneity of the population
being theorized. Whereas the variability between the
individuals within a population may become the focus when
variability in clinical expression of known pathology is
evidenced, in terms of the statistical model of disease,
individuals within a population who manifest differences from
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the average are considered abnormal. One problem with
defining disease in this way is that placement of an
individual within the normal range on the bell curve does not
accurately represent whether one is healthy or diseased.
Spaeth and Barber illustrate the fallacy involved in
generalizing from populations to individuals using the
example of glaucoma.
Glaucoma is an example of a disease that can be
statistically defined in terms of abnormally high intraocular
pressure. The norm of intraocular pressure, in terms of
which glaucoma is defined, is not, however, regularly
distributed. The distribution is skewed, pushing the mean
toward the tail of the distribution, where differences may be
less significant. Also, "one third of those with
glaucomatous disease (that is, optic nerve damage and visual
field loss due to intraocular pressure higher than the eye
can tolerate) have random intraocular pressures within the
statistically defined range of normal ." 26 So one third of
those who biologically manifest the disease because their eye
cannot tolerate the pressure do not satisfy the statistical
requirements for the disease. Similarly, one could register
an abnormally high intraocular pressure and not suffer the
biological effects. According to Spaeth and Barber,
extrapolations or generalizations from populations to
individuals will only be valid in statistical terms and
cannot be valid when generalizing to particular individuals
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because the statistical characterizations themselves are not
applicable to particular individuals.
Causal explanations and "proof" of the kind Griinbaum
insists upon, particularly in clinical medicine, may be close
to impossible. Difficulties with establishing the "true"
ct iveness of a particular remedy or treatment explode the
confines of testing using experimental control groups, a
methodology which also assumes homogeneity of the group
tested. A remedy proven successful in a large number of
cases may still be ineffective with respect to a particular
case. King reports on a paper discussing the difficulties
involved in procuring evidence for the value of remedies for
barbiturate poisoning as follows:
For among 100 affected patients, 90 or more will probablv
so
treatment, and perhaps 4 or 5 have takenlarge a dose that no treatment will save them. So inonly a very small portion of patients does treatment
there were a consistently successful remedytor these few, a large controlled series would be
necessary to demonstrate it. if a remedy, in fact, onlysaves some of them, proof of its value is almostimpossible to reach. '
Grunbaum's demand that psychoanalysis furnish conclusive
proof for hypothesized causal connections between theoretical
conjectures and clinical data ignores the very real
constraints endemic to theory validation in medicine.
Establishing the existence of causal connections, and
isolating a cause from an effect are rarely accomplished on
the basis of conclusive evidence. Even if causes can be
isolated from their effects, the phenomenon of "delayed
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reaction" and the problems with identifying traces that may
last a long time mean that medicine and psychoanalysis may
have aspects that are more like detective work than the
development of mathematical abstractions in theoretical
Physics. The old dictum, "the absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence " 28 is perhaps even more pertinent to
psychoanalysis than to medicine. For although both medicine
and psychoanalysis require that we attend to the "small
signs" and "feeble indications" which reveal traces that have
previously gone unnoticed, in the psychoanalytic case, our
subtle defenses may work against recognition of the traces,
say in problematic utterances, that reveal pathology and call
for interpretation.
In light of the difficulties with establishing "proof" in
medicine
,
we can return to the placebo effect and Grunbaum's
use of it to undermine psychoanalytic claims. it is true
that the available evidence cannot prove that the
psychoanalytic account rather than suggestion is responsible
for cures of neuroses in certain cases, and this failure to
prove causation is conclusively established by the placebo
effect. However, in drug therapy, the consideration of the
placebo effect does not destroy the notion of the therapeutic
effectiveness of drugs. In fact placebo studies are used to
locate and improve therapeutic effectiveness, even if the
placebo effect is not itself well understood. The
philosophical skeptic might argue that no medicines can ever
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be proven clinically effective because there always exists
the possibility of discovering a placebo effect. But this
clearly goes too far against a medical background where the
causal effect of at least some drugs is well understood by
the canons of medical theory. Rather than attempting to
exclude the placebo effect, regarding it as an anomaly or a
contaminant that must be isolated and expelled from medical
practice and research, recent studies suggest studying the
placebo effect on its own terms and utilizing it to modify
accepted views of the effectiveness of certain therapeutic
strategies
.
It is well known that the placebo effect is no less real
than the pharmacological effect of drugs. By real I mean
that placebos "modify both subjectively reported and
objectively observed symptoms ," 29 and this is commonly
accepted by doctors as an aspect (possibly inexplicable) of
mecical practice. Modification by placebos may involve the
reduction of pain, the actual lowering of blood-sugar levels
in diabetics and other kinds of relief, but it can just as
well work in the opposite direction. For example, placebos
have been shown to produce toxic side effects just like those
of active drugs. Brody's suggestion that we bring
placebo effects into the arena of medical investigation and
use our understanding of them to enlarge the dominant medical
paradigm of physical causation is a more promising line of
development than Griinbaum's exclusionary approach.
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Grunbaum's use of the placebo effect as a tool or strategy to
show that the therapy may not be causally effective seems to
rely on the legitimacy of some unexpressed version of a
psychogenic account. At the very least, Grunbaum needs to
offer a causal theory of how placebos work if he is to have a
Platform for suggesting that the global scientific status of
psychoanalysis can be questioned in terms of placebo studies.
Extant accounts of the action of placebos more or less
accept that placebos must exert their influence
psychogen ica lly
, since they cannot initiate any
hypothetically effective physiological reactions. These
accounts range from what have been termed mentalistic
theories, which attribute the placebo effect to the
subjective awareness of the person, to conditioning theories
which attribute the placebo effect to a behavioristic
learning process. However, to say that placebos work
psychogenica lly is not to hold that specific physiological
effects may not be induced by psychogenic causes. Just
because the causal mechanism is unknown, it does not follow
that perceptions or ideas can't function as causes. The
therapeutic effectiveness of a placebo could derive from a
psychogenic activation of physiological mechanisms, and if we
could locate the causal link, a treatment thought to be
placebogenic for a particular disorder would turn out to have
specific remedial efficacy. The point is, this kind of
research, the search for processes in the brain whereby
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psychogenic factors or experience are converted to changes in
regulatory mechanisms, has received little attention.
According to recent studies, the cerebral intermediate links
between psychogenic processes and somatic ones must be
considered. This remains true even if ''psychogenic”
causes turn out ultimately to be physical causes whose
existence is not currently understood.
Freud was aware of the limitations of his notion of
psychical therapy and the sense in which it was and was not a
causal therapy. 32 He attempted to give a justification for
how suggestion could be harnessed for therapeutic purposes
and he offered an account that spurred further research or
investigation into the influence ideas exert on physical and
somatic processes. This is scientific theorizing; not
everything Freud said has to be true. Freud's attempt to
account for anomalous phenomena, to explain them in a way the
old model could not and to bring them under scientific
scrutiny suggests a more inclusive view of the scientific
enterprise than the exclusionary, restrictive approach of
Griinbaum.
If we bring into the picture the circumstance that
^ ea ^-i n9 contexts and individual reactions to them are
particular to the individual and the culture, and that there
is no discernible "placebo personality type," then we can see
the difficulties involved in controlling experimentation to
isolate placebogenic factors. Some version of a
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psychodynamic explanation which in turn allows for the
interplay between the mind and the body may be the best
potential source for the development of an' ultimately
explanatory account of the placebo effect. in any case,
given that it's so useful for therapy, it's highly debatable
whether ruling out this effect, on the grounds that
psychogenesis is not now intelligible, is scientifically
fruitful.
Balint notes that: "placebos and 'reassurance' have a
much better effect in physical conditions, especially in the
case of fairly normal, not very neurotic, people afflicted
with some organic illness but their effectiveness decreases
rapidly the more that personality problems become the
important factor ." 33 As such evidence is gathered, the
natural domain for potential scientific explanation can be
set into place
.
34
Perhaps doctors, patients and the public
at large have more "faith" in the curative powers of clinical
medicine and the technology that goes with it than they do in
a therapist with whom they merely talk. Medical practice has
not perhaps severed its roots in magic and ritual insofar as
the physician relies on the power of her profession to
produce beneficial results. Psychogenic and psychosocial
etiological factors and their specific influence are at
present insufficiently understood, but their causal role in
medicine is nevertheless not in serious doubt, and it may be
more extensive than many realize. Ruling it out in
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psychoanalysis could produce the embarrassment that it is
more deeply rooted in medical therapy. it should not be
the task of methodology to rule out topics of investigation
that suggest themselves in the unexplained successes of
therapeutic practice.
The structure of medicine is complex, and no rational
systematization of that structure has been attempted here. I
have suggested that medicine includes biomedical research
fields (serology, etc.) that are scientific by the most
stringent epistemological and medical standards. m
addition, I have suggested that clinical and therapeutic
practice
, while not scientific by the most stringent
standards
, operate by analogical and informal reasoning on
empirical material that involves correction in the face of
failed expectations. The more metaphysical aspects of
medicine, for example, its concept of health at a specific
time and place, seem to be merely a sharpening of societal
standards, and not philosophically imposed a priori
categories on the patient. Though the patient poses and
posits clear limits to the methodology of therapeutic
practice, the clear anchor in empiricism calls for an
assessment of medicine, vague and sprawling as it is, as a
science
.
In any case, the seemingly clear structure of physics is
not the sharp contrast that methodologists often suggest.
When physics is thought of as classical mechanics, classical
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electromagnetic theory, and so forth, there is a contrast.
But this excludes an older interest by physicists in such
topics as optics where the human observer introduces weird
p radoxes for the idea of an easy confirmation of physical
theorizing
.
35 m modern physics, in particular quantum
Physics, the role of the observer, the inevitable interaction
between knower and known, and the impact of this interaction
on the status of objectivity, mess up the tidy structure and
uniform methodology presented in many philosophies of
science
,
and assumed by Griinbaum in his critique. These
topics require a scrutiny that is precluded by the
presuppositions I am concerned with. Perhaps my intuitions
regarding medicine will give way under further analysis.
What I have claimed here is that epistemic assessments that
are blind to the problems of the question of the scientific
status of medicine are probably also blind to the most likely
interpretation of Freud's self-assessment that he was a
(natural) scientist.
Concluding Unscientific Diagnosis
"The whole is the truth; and the whole is false ." 36
If we view psychoanalysis as a potentially developing
scientific discipline that may use the analogical inference
patterns of medicine, the suggestion that psychoanalysis, to
progress, needs to sharpen its predictive hypotheses against
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extraclinical data reeks of the Procrustean imposition of an
epistemology derived from a different science: physics. One
consequence of the context of medical theory is that it
suggests other paths of progress, such as the path of
progress that has occurred in medicine through the
development of new diagnostic instruments. Laboratory tests
provide an example of constantly improving techniques of
considerable analytic value in resolving questions of
treatment. Whether psychoanalysis can or will develop
instrumentation that will break the hold of theory on
clinical data and permit analogous movement by the
development of an impartial application of instrumentation is
hard to judge. In psychiatry, the electroencephalogram has
proved useful for establishing some correlations between
mental and neu ropatho log ica 1 changes. This is a first step
along such a path. Since psychoanalysis deals with disorders
which do not yet seem to have an organic basis, or with
correlations to somatic processes that are insufficiently
established or understood, instruments of a different sort
will be needed. Projective tests such as the Rorschach and
the TAT illustrate attempts at movement in this direction,
but they depend still too much on the hermeneutical insights
of the person administering the test.
The disanalogy at present between medicine and
psychoanalysis, in terms of progress through instrumentation,
resides in the psychoanalytic therapeutic procedure itself.
209
Instruments in physical medicine help create
"objective" data
by permitting the physician to disengage from the patient's
words and ideas (i.e., from the patient's report of her
symptoms and problems). m contrast, the psychoanalyst needs
to and must engage with the patient's words and ideas. The
patient's
"subjective" report, which is better characterized
as a "high level" finding, may be the only sign of a
"disease" that calls for treatment. The analyst might
welcome instrumentation that could, for example, record the
intensity and focus of fear in a phobic patient, but the
content of that fear would also be central to treatment, and,
at present, the content cannot be divorced from the language
used to express it. In fact, there is no content distinct
from the language expressive of it.
At present the analyst functions as a clinical
instrument
,
using her own feelings and monitoring her own
unconscious in order to stay in touch with the analysand.
Instruments that could sharpen her clinical listening and
interpretative constructions, etc. might come to function
like the instruments of the meteorologist, providing at least
a common data base for scientific inference. The way in
which pertinent data is now gathered both within and outside
the clinical setting is different from data collection in
medicine. The process of gathering data, how something is
reported, the hesitations and resistances displayed, the
syntactical structure of the utterances, all of this is
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integral to understanding the data as data and to
interpreting it. Though the technique of free association
and its revolutionary consequences for psychology have been
likened to the microscope's impact on biology
,
37
it . s
obvious that the instrument of free association does not
force the same find of objective data text, free of coloring
interpretation at the same level, as do physical
instruments. The data text produced is not that of physical
instruments whose inscription devices can replicate common
data for all investigators. As Freud came to recognize the
centrality of the immediate clinical encounter as the clue to
the past, and as he came to attend to the possibility of
formulating psychogenic rather than physical laws, he moved
away from his roots in the externalist medical paradigm of
his day. His extension of medicine, starting from causal and
physiological paradigms, but moving toward the explanation of
new diseases along part icula r ist
,
psychical lines may mean
that the same kind of progress as that observed in medicine
may not be expected. In this regard, the individual,
biographical component as well as the social component, both
of which are more endemic to psychic disorders than to
physical disorders, may mean that the epistemology of psychic
disorders is more akin to the rare hereditary diseases or
individual physical traumas known in medicine.
Though Freud, throughout his life, retained the idea that
neuronal and chemical explanations might one day replace or
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at least supplement his psychological explanations, it
turn out that there is
may
no microscope or Wassermann test for
psychoanalysis. Unlike the case of medicine, where physical
instruments produce new data text that allows theory change
111 ltS accomn,odati °n to it, psychoanalysis seems to have no
way other than language to report new data and the reports
retain an essential perspective contributed by the reporting
analyst. A study of language and the relationship between
analyst and analysand may be the only way to get at the
relevant data. The fact that the data text is generated by
the method of analytic inquiry, notably through the use of
free association and attention to the transference and
resistance, is not however grounds for equating the data text
with fiction. The data text is not fixed; more data text can
be generated. The possibility of expanding data text means
that movement toward consensual agreement as regards
interpretation is at least a possibility. if we grant that
psychical processes are purposive then we can utilize the
existence of recurrent patterns and themes to constrain
imaginative embellishments on data text. Freud's methodology
both isolates and aids in interpretation of new data text.
This is a scientific start and it remains so even if a way is
never found to link psychological with neurological or
neurophysiological events. The eventual instrumentar ium for
a fully scientific psychoanalytic theory cannot be
anticipated here; the requirements of the way around
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Grunbaom's critique only call for an alternative to the
extra-clinical experimentation that he advises.
It's hard to say in what direction psychoanalysis will
develop. Although I have suggested viewing psychoanalysis
against the background of the epistemology of medicine, we
have seen that Freud's theory, his ''science of the
unconscious,'' is an extension of medical theorizing,
formulating psychogenic principles and focusing on the
particularized history of the individual, with or without
the development of instrumentation, psychoanalysis may not
make the same kind of movement as medicine. I have argued
for a broader conception of natural science than that held by
Popper and Grunbaum. It may turn out that psychoanalysis
does not grow into a fully natural, scientific theory, even
given this wider conception, but attention to the history of
science indicates that a field's scientific character cannot
be ascertained on purely logical or methodological grounds.
So, in view of the evidence, it seems premature to brand
psychoanalysis as unscientific.
My aim has not been to "save" Freud and psychoanalysis by
claiming that Freud was a scientist and that psychoanalysis
is a science. I have opposed taking paradigms of acceptable
scientific methodology from physics and imposing them on
medicine and psychoanalysis. Medicine is, intuitively at
least, partly scientific, and viewing psychoanalysis against
a medical background forces a rethinking of the motives for
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excluding psychoanalysis from science on purely
epistemological grounds. Perhaps more than any other
twentieth century thinker, Freud opens up space for
broadening our notion of scientific theorising. By
indicating the possibility of objectifying our psychical
acts, Freud paves the way for possibly changing how we
conceptualize and understand our psychical productions, and
so how we understand theorizing as itself a psychical act.
Psychoanalytic theory may give way in time to more reductive
theories and/or practices, but the range and depth of its
theorizing will have staked out the areas for such future,
perhaps more narrow or focused, investigations.
In line with the other "Masters of Suspicion," Marx and
Nietzsche
,
38
Freud has taught us that the most obvious is
rarely the most true. Any interpretative account, scientific
or otherwise, that purports to be whole, complete, and true
can, under scrutiny, be unmasked as partial and false. The
whole, if we could capture it, would be true; as it is, any
whole that we posit is false. As Ackermann's dialectical
account of the status of scientific knowledge makes evident:
All successful theories, as indeed all successfulfictions, show us a way the world is without revealingthe way that the world is, even partially. They are thusfalse of total reality, while they may be true of someaspect of it.
Psychoanalytic theory is no exception here, and I have
not tried to claim exceptional status for it. At the
least, I have tried to indicate the possibility that
very
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epistemology, like science, is not static and
a study of the development of psychoanalytic
enrich our conception of epistemology and of
that
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